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The Brief of the Respondent also presents cases in support of
respondent's position from which, respondent claims, the present
case is not distinguishable.

The cases respondent cites, however,

are clearly and easily distinguishable from the present case and
this reply will succinctly state the distinction.
For the Court's convenience, each case cited herein is
reproduced in the Addendum hereto.
POINT I. UNDER THE MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE
CHAPTER OF THE UTAH INSURANCE CODE AND UNDER
THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE INSURANCE
POLICY IN ISSUE, THE RESPONDENT HAS NO
SUBROGATION RIGHTS WHICH THE APPELLANT COULD
HAVE PREJUDICED.
The respondent

(referred to hereafter as "Progressive")

maintains that it is entitled to return of the funds it paid
appellant under its automobile policy because the appellant
"prejudiced Progressive's subrogation rights against the parties
legally

responsible

for her

injuries" and

constitutes a breach of the insurance contract."
brief, p. 10.)

"such

conduct

(Progressive's

Appellant's prejudicial action is said to be her

"release of the only defendants with any ability to pay."

(Id.,

p. 11). The general provision of the policy appellant purportedly
breached is paragraph(s) 5 of Part V of the policy, which reads as
follows:
In the event of any payment under this policy,
we are entitled to all the rights of recovery
of the person to whom payment was made against
another. That person must sign and deliver to
us any legal papers relating to that recovery,
do whatever else is necessary to help us
exercise those rights and do nothing after
loss to prejudice our rights.
2

When a person has been paid damages by us
under this policy, and also recovers from
another, the amount recovered from the other
shall be held by that person in trust for us
and reimbursed to us to that extent of our
payment.
(Emphasis added.)
paragraph(s) 5

Read

literally,

the

emphasized

language of

constitutes an assignment of a cause of action for

personal injury, which is not countenanced by the law.
Farm Mut.

Ins. Co. v. Farmers

459; 450 P.2d at 460 (Justice
the

second

paragraph

Insurance Exch.,

450 P.2d 458 at

Callister concurring.)

above

limits

See State

Of course,

Progressive's

rights

to

reimbursement to the extent of its payment and thus defines rights
of subrogation

(id.-)/ which

rights are

what Progressive claims.

The issue is whether, in this case, Progressive has any

rights of

subrogation which its insured could prejudice.
In

light

of

specific

provisions

coverage

are

the

fact

regarding

controlling,

does not constitute
Progressive cannot

that

the

write a

the statutes allow, nor

uninsured

the

last

the

words

which

on

motorist

the

and no-fault

matters

in issue.

is more restrictive than

deviates

provisions, and expect it to be enforced.
Part V - General Provisions of

Insurance Code and

language of Progressive's policy

policy that

one

Utah

from

the statutes'

Indeed, paragraph 11 of

Progressive's policy

conforms its

terms to the state's statutes.
A.

Uninsured Motorists Coverage

Progressive relies
Co., 607 F.Supp. 75

on Shepherd

(D.C. Miss.
3

v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.

1985),

as

illustrative.

The

insured

in Shepherd

released

her claims for injury in an

automobile accident in return for $10,000 in settlement and then
brought suit against her own insurer for uninsured motorist
coverage over the amount of her settlement, which settlement she
claimed did not compensate her for her damages.

The insurer

sought summary judgment on the grounds that Shepherd's execution
of a covenant not to sue the motorist responsible for her injuries
violated provisions of its contract's uninsured

motorist

provisions and abrogated its subrogation rights against the
negligent motorist.

Pertinent to the Shepherd Court's decision

that Shepherd had abrogated her insurer's rights are the facts
that:
1.)

the

insurer's

uninsured motorist

provisions,

as

quoted by the Court, s t a t e d :
This i n s u r a n c e does not apply: (a)
to bodily injury t o an insured . . .
with
r e s p e c t to
which
such
insured . . . s h a l l , without w r i t t e n
c o n s e n t of t h e company, make any
s e t t l e m e n t w i t h a n y p e r s o n or
o r g a n i z a t i o n who may be l e g a l l y
liable therefore . . . .
607 F.Supp. a t 76;
2.) the negligent motorist was insured and Shepherd's
settlement with him was for the limits of his policy; and,
3.) Shepherd was decided under the laws of Mississippi,
which guarantee an insurer's subrogation rights in the following
provision of the Mississippi uninsured motorist statutes:
An insurer paying a claim under the
endorsementor provisions required by
s e c t i o n 8 3 - 1 1 - 1 0 1 shall be
4

s u b r o g a t e d t o t h e r i g h t s of t h e
insured to whom such claim was paid
a g a i n s t t h e p e r s o n c a u s i n g such
i n j u r y , d e a t h , or damage t o t h e
e x t e n t t h a t p a y m e n t was made,
i n c l u d i n g t h e a s s e t s of t h e
involvent i n s u r e r .
607 F.Supp. at 76, footnote 2.
The above facts are pertinent to the Shepherd Court's
decision because they reveal that Shepherd is not illustrative of
Progressive's argument in the following ways:
1.)

There is no provision in Progressive's policy equivalent

to the provision quoted from Shepherd's insurer's policy.
2.) Appellant's settlements and release of claims were not
with the uninsured, or, as in Shepherd, underinsured, motorist,
but with other parties, and Progressive's policy clearly states in
its uninsured motorist provisions:
We will pay damages for bodily injury which an
insured person is legally entitled to recover
from the owner or operator of an uninsured
motor vehicle up to the limit of liability as
defined in this part. The bodily injury must
be caused by accident and arise out of the
ownership, maintenance or driving of the
uninsured motor vehicle . . . .
Progressive's policy, Part IV, Uninsured Motorists, Coverage 1, p.
4.
3.)

U t a h ' s uninsured motorist s t a t u t e s do not guarantee an

i n s u r e r ' s subrogation r i g h t s , as M i s s i s s i p p i ' s do.
The a b o v e - l i s t e d t h i r d reason Shepherd i s not i l l u s t r a t i v e of
t h i s case i s the same reason the other cases Progressive c i t e s do
not

support

subrogation

the
under

notion
its

that

Progressive

uninsured motorist

has

a

right

to

p r o v i s i o n s when

its

insured's

recovery i s obtained from a t o r t f e a s o r

uninsured m o t o r i s t .

other than the

The cases Progressive c i t e s were a l l decided

in t h e c o u r t s of I l l i n o i s :

Ackermann v. Prudential Property &

Cas. I n c . , 83 Ill.App.3d 590, 404 N.E.2d 534 (1980); cniddgn v.
Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass'n, 57 111.2d 330, 312 N.E.2d 247

(1974); Remgen Yt Midway Liquors, I n c . , 30 in.App.2d 132, 174
N.E.2d

7

(1961).)

Mississippi's,

The

Illinois

Insurance

g u a r a n t e e s an i n s u r e r ' s

p a y m e n t s made under u n i n s u r e d m o t o r i s t
S e c t i o n 1 4 3 ( a ) , 1 1 1 . Rev. S t a t . ,

Code,

subrogation
coverage

like

right

for

provisions.

1975, c h . 7 3 , p a r .

755a(3),

states:
In t h e event of payment to any person under
t h e coverage r e q u i r e d by t h i s S e c t i o n and
s u b j e c t t o t h e terms and conditions of such
c o v e r a g e , t h e i n s u r e r making such payment
s h a l l , to the extent thereof, be e n t i t l e d t o
t h e p r o c e e d s of any s e t t l e m e n t of [ s i c ]
judgment r e s u l t i n g from the exercise of any
r i g h t s of recovery of such person against any
person or organization l e g a l l y responsible for
t h e b o d i l y i n j u r y or d e a t h for which such
payment i s made, i n c l u d i n g t h e p r o c e e d s
r e c o v e r a b l e from the a s s e t s of the insolvent
[sic] i n s u r e r .
Ackermann v . P r u d e n t i a l P r o p e r t y & C a s . I n c . , supra* at 536.
P r o v i s i o n s e q u i v a l e n t t o those in the I l l i n o i s and M i s s i s s i p p i
Insurance

Codes

are

absent

from

Utah's

Insurance

Code.

P r o g r e s s i v e does c i t e one case from a j u r i s d i c t i o n which,
Utah, does not p r o v i d e for
Progressive

states

that

subrogation

like

in i t s insurance code.

t h e c a s e , Farmers

I n s . Exchange

v.

Christenson, 683 P.2d 1319 (Mont. 1984), upholds "the r i g h t of an
i n s u r e r which had paid under the uninsured motorist coverage t o

subrogation where recovery is obtained from a tortfeasor other
than the uninsured motorist."

(Progressive's brieff p. 14.)

The

Christensen case, however, was one in which the insured had
obtained no recovery from any tortfeasor, and the essence of its
holding supports the fact that Progressive's remedy is against the
uninsured motorist.

The facts, as set forth by the Court, were as

follows:

On June 6, 1981, defendant Mark A. Christenson
a p p a r e n t l y caused an a c c i d e n t by improperly
o p e r a t i n g a motor v e h i c l e .
K r i s t i n e N.
H i n c k l e y , a p a s s e n g e r in the v e h i c l e ,
s u s t a i n e d i n j u r i e s a s a r e s u l t of t h e
a c c i d e n t . Both Christenson and Hinckley were
m i n o r s a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t .
C h r i s t e n s o n had no insurance on the vehicle
when the accident occurred.
Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers) insured
Hinckley and paid $7,000 on her claim a r i s i n g
o u t of t h e i n j u r i e s she s u s t a i n e d in t h e
accident.
F a r m e r s p a i d t h i s u n d e r an
u n i n s u r e d motorist provision in the Hinckley
insurance p o l i c y . As required in the p o l i c y ,
t h e Hinckleys assigned t h e i r personal injury
a c t i o n t o Farmers as p a r t of a subrogation
clause.
On February 10, 1982, Farmers f i l e d an action
against Christenson and his parents for $7,000
p a i d on t h e p e r s o n a l i n j u r y c l a i m .
The
C h r i s t e n s o n s r e c e i v e d proper service of the
c o m p l a i n t and summons.
The C h r i s t e n s o n s
failed to answer or take any action to defend
against this action.
On A p r i l 1, 1982,
Farmers f i l e d a motion for default judgment
and on July 29, 1982, the court granted said
motion.
On January 1 1 , 1983, the Christensons f i l e d a
motion to vacate the default judgment and stay
the execution. They asserted the judgment was
void because Farmers was an improper party in
the a c t i o n . The Hinckleys lacked the a b i l i t y
to assign t h e i r personal injury action via the
s u b r o g a t i o n c l a u s e t o Farmers. Following a
7

hearing on their case, the court found that
the subrogation occurred properly and that
the default judgment was entered properly.
683 P.2d at 1320-1321. The case did not involve a dispute between
the insurer and its insured, as here. The dispute was between the
insurer and the "third party" insured motorist.

In its briefr

Progressive accurately quotes the sentence in the case which
begins, "We hold," but the holding in Farmers Ins. Exchange v.
Christenson, in its entirety, is as follows:

We hold t h a t an uninsured motorist c a r r i e r can
make payment t o an i n s u r e d , and when t h e
i n s u r e d s e t t l e s h i s c l a i m or o b t a i n s a
judgment a g a i n s t a t h i r d p a r t y , the c a r r i e r
can subrogate and c o l l e c t back the amount paid
to the i n s u r e d .
F u r t h e r , the uninsured
motorist c a r r i e r can required t h a t the action
be i n s t i t u t e d in t h e name of t h e i n s u r e d
a g a i n s t t h e u n i n s u r e d m o t o r i s t in order to
e f f e c t u a t e t h e s u b r o g a t i o n i n t e r e s t of the
uninsured motorist c a r r i e r .
But said a c t i o n
must n o t i m p a i r , d i m i n i s h or j e o p a r d i z e
i n s u r e d ' s a b i l i t y t o recover any damages in
e x c e s s of t h e s u b r o g a t i o n amount.
If a
s u b r o g a t i o n o c c u r s , then the uninsured
motorist c a r r i e r must, in good f a i t h , seek for
t h e i n s u r e d any o t h e r damages ( g e n e r a l ,
s p e c i a l or p u n i t i v e ) t h a t he may not have
received in h i s payment from the c a r r i e r .
683 P.2d a t 1322 (emphasis added.)

The Christenson Court,

reasoning towards i t s holding, also stated::
Respondent argues t h a t public policy requires
s u b r o g a t i o n in t h i s c a s e .
If t h i s Court
p r e c l u d e d s u b r o g a t i o n of c l a i m s a g a i n s t

uninsured m o t o r i s t s ,

then t h e

uninsured

m o t o r i s t would p r o b a b l y b e n e f i t .
Once the
i n s u r e d p l a i n t i f f r e c e i v e s the insurance
compensation for t h e a c c i d e n t , i t i s l e s s
l i k e l y he w i l l pursue l i t i g a t i o n aaaj r nst the
uninsured m o t o r i s t .
T h e r e f o r e , subrogation

enhance? t h e chances t h a t

motorist

w i l l pay for
8

the

uninsured

h i s wrongdoing,

and

in

promote the policy requiring motorists to

carry insurance.
As noted above, the controlling issue here is
one of public policy,

683 P. 2d 1321-1322 (emphasis added.)

Christenson does not give

Progressive the support Progressive's brief maintains it does.
The case, when read in context, says nothing about subrogation of
uninsured motorist claims in the absence of statutory provision
for them, nor does it deal with recovery from third parties who
are not uninsured motorists.
B.

"No-Fault" or Personal Injury Protection Coverage

"No-fault" automobile insurance coverage is, as its name
suggests, paid to an insured regardless of fault.

No-fault

benefits are, as progressive notes (Progressive's Brief, p. 16)
personal injury protection (PIP) benefits.

The insured pays her

premium for no-fault coverage to insure coverage of medical
expenses which accrue following an automobile accident.

Neither

Utah's Insurance Code nor the policy in issue in this case grant
the insurer a subrogation right as to no-fault benefits paid.

The

Act grants a no-fault/PIP insurer a right to reimbursement from
the insurer of a motorist tortfeasor for payments made by the
victim's insurer which the tortfeasor's insurance paid.

It does

not mention, let alone provide for, the no-fault/PIP insurer's
subrogation as to parties whose insurance covers liability for
acts unrelated to the operation, ownership, or maintenance of
motor vehicles.

It expressly states the "reductions" which shall

be made from coverage:
9

Limitations, exclusions, and
conditions to personal injury
(1) No person who has direct benefit
coverage under a coverage under a policy which
includes personal injury protection may
maintain a cause of action for general damages
arising out of personal injuries alleged to
have been caused by an automobile accident,
except where the person has sustained one or
more of the following:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

death;
dismemberment;
permanent disability;
permanent disfigurement; or
medical expenses to a person
$3,000.

in excess of

(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury
protection coverage under this part may only
exclude from this coverage benefits:
(i) for any injury sustained by
the injured while occupying another
motor vehicle owned by the insured
and not insured under the policy;
(ii) for any injury sustained by
any person while operating the
insured motor vehicle without the
express or implied consent of the
insured or while not in lawful
possession of the insured motor
vehicle; or
(iii) to any injured person, if
the person's conduct contributed to
his injury:
(A) by
intentionally
causing injury to himself;
or
(B) while committing a felony.
(b) The provisions of this subsection
do not limit the exclusions which may be
contained in other types of coverage.
(3) The benefits payable to any injured
person under § 31A-22-307 are reduced by:
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(a) any benefits which that
person receives or is entitled to
receive as a result of an accident
covered in this code under any
w o r k e r s ' compensation or similar
statutory plen; and
(b) any amounts which that person

receives or is entitled to receive
from the United States or any of its
agencies because he is on active
duty in the military service.

(4) When a person injured is also an
insured party under any other policy,
including those policies complying with this
part, primary coverage is given by the policy
insuring the motor vehicle in use during the
accident.
(5) Payment of the benefits provided for in
§ 31A-22-307 shall be made on a monthly basis
as expenses are incurred.
Benefits for any
period are overdue if they are not paid within
30 days after the insurer receives reasonable
proof of the fact and amount of expenses
incurred during the period.
If reasonable
proof is not supplied as to the entire claim,
the amount supported by reasonable proof is
also overdue if to paid within 30 days after
the proof is received by the insurer. If the
insurer fails to pay the expenses when due,
these expenses shall bear interest at the rate
of 1 1/2% per month after the due date. The
person entitled to the benefits may bring an
action in contract to recover the expenses
plus the applicable interest. If the insurer
is required by the action to pay any overdue
benefits and interest, the insurer is also
required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to
the claimant.
(6) Every policy providing personal injury
protection coverage shall provide;
(a) that where the insured under
the policy is or would be held
legally liable for the personal
injuries sustained by any person to
w h o m b e n e f i t s required under
personal injury protection have been
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paid by another insurer/ including
the Workers1 Compensation Fund of
Utah/ the insurer of the person who
would be held legally liable shall
reimburse the other insurer for the
payment, but not in excess of the
amount of damages recoverable; and
(b) that the issue of liability
for that
reimbursement
and its
amount
shall
be
decided
by
mandatory,
binding
arbitration
between the insurers.
§

31A-22-309,

Utah

Code

found in paragraph 6 of
analysis of

Ann. (emphasis added.)

Section

31A-22-309

Progressive's claims.

set forth the parameters of

the

section,

protection.

settled in this

case

personal injury

protection coverage,"

clubs, not motorists.

to

The defendants
not

Personal

helpful

to the

They limit reimbursement, and

personal injury

were

are

The provisions

insured

by

as they

injury

policies providing
with whom appellant
policies "providing
were both private

protection

coverage is

required under Utah law only in automobile insurance policies.
At

the

time

of

appellant's accident and Progressive's PIP

payment to her, the above section was codified as §

31-41-7, Utah

Code Ann., and read as follows:
31-41-7.
Personal injuries covered-Primary
coverage-Reduction of benefits.
(1) The coverages described in section 31-41-6
shall be applicable to:
(a) Personal injuries sustained by
the insured when injured
in an
accident in this state involving any
motor vehicle.
(b) Personal injuries arising out
of automobile accidents occurring in
this state sustained by any other
12

natural person while occupying the
described motor vehicle with the
consent of the insured or while a
pedestrian if injured in a accident
i n v o l v i n g the d e s c r i b e d motor
vehicle.
(2) When a person injured is also an insured
party under any other policy, including those
complying with this act, primary coverage
shall be afforded by the policy insuring the
motor vehicle out of the use of which the
accident arose.
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person
under section 31-41-6 shall be reduced by:
(a) Any benefits which that person
receives or is entitled to receive
as a result of an accident covered
in this act under any workmen's
compensation plan or any similar
statutory plan; and
(b) Any amounts which that person
receives or is entitled to receive
from the United States or any of its
agencies because of his or her being
on active duty in the military
services.
(Emphasis added.)

Section 31-41-7 contained the same provisions

for reduction of PIP benefits as § 31A-22-309 and no provision
whatsoever for reimbursement between insurers.
Progressive's policy, Part 11 - Expenses for Medical Services
to Insureds, contains no subrogation clause, stating, in its
entirety:
PART II - EXPENSES FOR MEDICAL
SERVICES TO INSUREDS
Coverage C - Medical Payments Coverage
We will pay reasonable expenses incurred
within one year from the date of accident for
necessary medical and funeral services because

13

of b o d i l y
person.

injury

sustained

by an

insured

Additional Definition Used in t h i s Part Only
As used in t h i s P a r t
"insured persons" mean:

"insured person"

or

1. Any p e r s o n w h i l e o c c u p y i n g your
i n s u r e d car while the car i s being
driven by you, a r e l a t i v e or another
person if t h a t person d r i v e s your
i n s u r e d c a r w i t h your e x p r e s s e d
permission.
Exclusions
This coverage does not apply for bodily injury
to any person:
1. s u s t a i n e d w h i l e o c c u p y i n g your
i n s u r e d c a r when used t o c a r r y
p e r s o n s for a f e e .
This exclusion
does not apply to shared-expense car
p o o l s whose members are on the way
t o or from t h e same p l a c e of
employment.
2. s u s t a i n e d w h i l e o c c u p y i n g any
v e h i c l e while located for use as a
residence or premises.
3. s u s t a i n e d w h i l e o c c u p y i n g a
m o t o r i z e d v e h i c l e with l e s s than
four wheels.
4. sustained while occupying or through
being s t r u c k by any v e h i c l e , other
t h a n your i n s u r e d c a r , which i s
owned by or furnished or a v a i l a b l e
f o r r e g u l a r u s e by you or a
relative.
5. sustained while occupying a vehicle
o t h e r t h a n a p r i v a t e passenger car
w h i l e t h e vehicle i s being used in
t h e b u s i n e s s or o c c u p a t i o n of an
insured person.
6. o c c u r r i n g d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of
employment i f b e n e f i t s are payable
14

or must be provided under a Workers 1
Compensation Law or similar law.
7. c a u s e d by w a r ( d e c l a r e d
or
undeclared),
civil
war,
insurrection, rebellion, revolution,
n u c l e a r r e a c t i o n , r a d i a t i o n or
r a d i o a c t i v e c o n t a m i n a t i o n , or any
consequence of any of t h e s e .
8. c a u s e d by t h e i n s u r e d p e r s o n ' s
commission or a t t e m p t t o commit a
f e l o n y , or by t h e i n s u r e d person
b e i n g i n v o l v e d i n an i l l e g a l
occupation.
9. sustained while your insured car i s
being operated by a person:
a.

under t h e minimum age t o
obtain a license
to
operate a private
passenger car in the s t a t e
in which the car
is
licensed.

b.

under
age.

fourteen

y e a r s of

10. sustained while your insured car i s
d r i v e n in or p r e p a r i n g f o r any
prearranged or organized r a c e , speed
contest or performance c o n t e s t .
Limits of L i a b i l i t y
Regardless of the number of vehicles described
in t h e D e c l a r a t i o n s , insured persons, claims
or p o l i c i e s , or v e h i c l e s involved in t h e
accident, we w i l l pay no more than the Limit
of L i a b i l i t y shown for t h i s coverage in the
D e c l a r a t i o n s for one or more persons injured
in any one accident.
Any amount p a i d or p a y a b l e f o r m e d i c a l
e x p e n s e s under t h e L i a b i l i t y or Uninsured
M o t o r i s t s Coverages of t h i s policy s h a l l be
deducted from the amounts payable under t h i s
Part.
Other Insurance
15

If t h e r e i s o t h e r a u t o m e d i c a l payments
insurance on a l o s s covered by t h i s P a r t , we
w i l l pay our proportionate share as our Limit
of L i a b i l i t y b e a r s t o t h e t o t a l of a l l
applicable auto medical payments l i m i t s .
We w i l l not be l i a b l e under t h i s policy for
any medical expense paid or payable under the
provisions of any:
1. p r e m i s e s i n s u r a n c e p r o v i d i n g
coverage for medical expenses.
2. i n d i v i d u a l , b l a n k e t , or g r o u p
accident,
d i s a b i l i t y
or
hospitalization.
3. m e d i c a l , s u r g i c a l , h o s p i t a l
funeral services, benefit
reimbursement p l a n , or

or
or

4. workers' compensation or d i s a b i l i t y
b e n e f i t s law or any s i m i l a r law.
The medical expenses for which n o - f a u l t / P I P b e n e f i t s

have

been paid cannot be included as an element of damages in a s u i t
against t o r t f e a s o r s because the victim has recouped them from h i s
own i n s u r e r .

A p p e l l a n t ' s medical expenses amounted t o

$42,000.00 when she i n i t i a t e d
defendant,
exceeded

her s u i t a g a i n s t

S c h o l t z , and t h e dramshops.
the

figure

she claimed

the

uninsured

Her medical

expenses

in her c o m p l a i n t ,

because

P r o g r e s s i v e had paid b e n e f i t s which covered some of them.
expenses now far exceed the amount sought in her complaint.
June, 1987, they were $70,716.76.
the accident i s s t i l l a n t i c i p a t e d .

over

Her
As of

Further surgery as a r e s u l t of
(Because the D i s t r i c t

Court's

n o t a t i o n on t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t the record has not been
p r e s e n t e d to the Court, appellant includes as Appendix A hereto
her

answers

to

interrogatories
16

in which she d e l i n e a t e s

her

injuries.

The medical records which establish the injuries she

delineates are inches thick, and, therefore, are not reproduced
for the Court at this point.

They are in the record, should the

Court desire to peruse them, and appellant refers to them at this
point only to clarify the severity and non-subjectivity of
appellant's injuries.)
C.

Collision Coverage

As with the uninsured motorist and no-fault provisions of
Utah's Insurance Code, the provisions regarding collision coverage
are silent as to any rights of subrogation.

They do not provide,

either, for reimbursement or for any reduction in benefits because
of workers' compensation or military benefits.
POINT II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURER
AND INSURED IN CONNECTION WITH AN UNINSURED
MOTORIST IS ONE IN WHICH THE INSURER AND
INSURED ARE, FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES,
ADVERSARIES AND ONE IN WHICH THE DUTY AND
RIGHT TO PROTECT ITS INTERESTS FALLS ON THE
INSURER; THE INSURED CANNOT BE SAID TO HAVE
"PREJUDICED" THE INSURER'S RIGHTS BY PURSUING
HER OWN.
The appellant has not prejudiced any of Progressive's rights.
As shown above, Progressive has no right to be subrogated to the
proceeds appellant received from parties other than the uninsured
motorist tortfeasor.

Progressive has not cited one case in which

such subrogation was allowed absent a statute specifically
authorizing subrogation in general and/or subrogation as to
parties other than the uninsured tortfeasor.
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Progressive's right

in a situation such as this case raises remains intact:

it has

the right to pursue subrogation against the uninsured tortfeasor.
The trust agreement included in Progressive's policy, under
the uninsured motorist coverage provision, includes the following
paragraph:
If we ask you in writing, you will take
necessary or appropriate action, through a
representative designated by us, to recover
payment as damages from the responsible person
or organization; if there is a recovery, then
we shall be reimbursed out of the recovery for
expenses, costs and attorney's fees incurred
in connection with this recovery.
Part IV - Uninsured Motorists, Trust Agreement, paragraph 4, p. 5.
Although Progressive's

agent states in his affidavit that

appellant's counsel Joseph E. Tesch requested

Progressive's

permission to represent its rights in appellant's lawsuit, and
Progressive's brief state that it was appellant's counsel Robert
D. Moore who made such a request, there is no documentation of
such request and the facts suggest none was made.

In any event,

Progressive did not ask "in writing," as provided in its policy,
or take any steps to protect its own interests in the case until
appellant had pursued it for over two years.
Progressive's

rights

If any prejudice to

has occurred, the prejudice

is of

Progressive's own making.
In Lvon v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 480 P.2d
739 (Utah 1971) (overruled on other grounds, Beck v. Farmers Ins.
Exhange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), at 798 footnote 1.), the Court
discussed the relationship between an insurer and the insured for
whom it provides uninsured motorist coverage in the context of
18

plaintiff's contention that she should be awarded damages for her
insurer's failure to bargain with or settle her claims against it
after she had obtained judgment against an uninsured motorist who
caused her injuries.

The Court addressed the contention as

follows:
Finally, plaintiff contends that the trial
court should have awarded her damages for
Hartford's failure to bargain with her or
settle her claim. She concedes that there is
no case in point but asserts that this court
should analogize her situation to that where a
liability insurer refuses in bad faith to
settle a claim with third parties within the
policy limits and a judgment in excess of the
policy limits is rendered against the insured.
She reasons that by Hartford's failure to
bargain, she was compelled to incur legal
expenses for which she is entitled to be
compensated.
Plaintiff's analogy is untenable because of
the distinction in the relationship between a
liability insurer and its insured and that
between the insurer and its insured L Q
connection with an uninsured motorist. In the
former situation, the insurer must act in good
faith and be as zealous in protecting the

interests Qf the jngurefl as it would be in
regard to its own. In the latter situation,
the insured and the insurer are, in effect and
practically speaking, adversaries.
480 P.2d

at 745

(emphasis added.)

Given the adversarial

relationship between insurer and insured in this situation, the
insured has no more duty to protect the insured's interests than
the insurer has to protect the insured's.

Hartford points out

that the insurer's obligation to perform does not arise until
there is a legal determination of the liability of the uninsured
motorist.

Id.

Progressive's policy states:
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We will pay damages for bodily injury which an
insured person is legally entitled to recover
from the owner or operator of an uninsured
motor vehicle up to the limit of liability as
defined in this part* The bodily injury must
be caused by accident and arise out of the
ownership/ maintenance or driving of the
uninsured motor vehicle*
Pete rmination
whether an insured person is legally entitled
to recover damages or the amount of damages
shall be made by agreement between the insured
person and us* If no agreement is reached,
the decision will be made by arbitration*
Such arbitration must be demanded within one
year after the date of the accident* If suit
is brought to determine legal liability or
damages without our written consent, we are
not bound by any resulting judgment.
Part IV - Uninsured Motorists, Coverage 1, p. 4.

As in Hartford,

Progressive's obligation to appellant did not arise until there
was a determination that she was legally entitled to recover
damages from the uninsured motorist.

Further, under the terms of

its own policy, Progressive attempts to retain control over the
determination.
Because of the adversarial nature of the insurer-insureduninsured motorist triangle, the insurer is allowed to intervene
in its insured's action against the uninsured motorist.
Chambers. 657 P.2d 279 (Utah 1982).
insurer

Lima v.

Intervention allows the

to protect its rights by raising the issues of the

uninsured's liability, the damages flowing therefrom, whether its
insured will be made whole, and the attendant issues Progressive
now seeks to raise in this appeal.

Progressive did not intervene.

Subrogation, if not specifically spelled out in statutory
provisions is an equitable concept.

Progressive, as its own

agent's affidavit establishes, knew of appellant's lawsuit well in
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advance of settlement negotiations.

Yet Progressive chose not to

participate in any aspect of the case.

Progressive could have

been involved in the settlement negotiations if it had been a
proper party to the case.

In equity, Progressive cannot be

allowed to rely on the sole efforts of the appellant to effectuate
a recovery and appear at the conclusion of her efforts to demand a
claimed

subrogation.

Even where

subrogation

and

full

reimbursement regardless of the extent of the insured's recovery
are mandated by statute, as they are in workers' compensation
insurance cases, the insurer is required to contribute to the
effort entailed in the recovery by paying its share of the costs
thereof, including attorney's fees.

Section 35-1-62 of the

Workers' Compensation Act of Utah sets forth the right of an
injured worker to an action for damages against a third person who
caused his injuries.

The action is in addition to the benefits

the workers' employer's compensation insurer pays the worker.

In

case of recovery from the third person, the worker must reimburse
its employer's insurer in full for all benefits received, but the
insurer must bear the reasonable expenses of the worker's action.
Section 35-1-62 states:
If any recovery is obtained against such third
person it shall be disbursed as follows:
(1) The reasonable expense of the action,
including attorneys' fees, shall be paid and
charged proportionately against the parties as
their interests may appear. Any such fee
chargeable to the employer or carrier is to be
a credit upon any fee payable by the injured
employee or, in the case of death, by the
dependents, for any recovery had against the
third party.
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(2) The person liable for compensation
payments shall be reimbursed in full for all
payments made less the proportionate share of
costs and attorneys' fees provided for in
subsection (1),
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured
employee or his heirs in case of death, to be
applied to reduce or satisfy in full any
obligation thereafter accruing against the
person liable for compensation.
(emphasis

added.)

Section

35-1-62 abrogates

the common

law

feature of equitable subrogation which requires that the insured
must be made whole before the insurer's
arises.

right of

subrogation

Lyon v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, aimta*

spoke of this equitable feature as follows:
Since subrogation is an offspring of equity,
equitable principles apply, even when the
subrogation is based on contract, except as
m o d i f i e d by specific provisions in the
contract. In the absence of express terms to
the contrary, the insured is entitled to be
made whole before the insurer may recover any
portion of the recovery from the tort-feasor.
If the one responsible has paid the full
extent of the loss, the insured should not
claim both sums, and the insurer may then
assert its claim to subrogation.
480 P.2d at 744, 745. Even as § 35-1-62 precludes any question as
to the

wholeness

of the victim's

recovery, it

nevertheless

requires the insurer to share the costs of the recovery, thus
emphasizing the unfairness inherent in allowing an insurer to do
nothing to effectuate recovery and subsequently assert a right of
full subrogation.
Equity
case.

refutes Progressive's

right of subrogation in this

Appellant has set forth in her brief the facts which prove
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her recovery from the private club defendants has not made her
whole and she will not repeat them here.

Nevertheless, if

subrogation is allowed Progressive, equity demands that appellant
receive reasonable

remuneration for the efforts and costs,

including attorney's fees, the expenditure of which resulted in
the settlements in this case.
CONCLUSION
Under Utah law, Progressive has no right to the subrogation
it seeks.
between

Given that fact and the adversarial relationship

insurer and insured in an uninsured motorist claim

context, appellant had no duty to protect Progressive's interests
and did not, and in fact could not, breach her insurance policy by
prejudicing Progressive's "rights.",
DATED this

I

day of Jigjb, 0988.

R6beut

D. Moore

J4~
Foseph E.
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APPENDIX A
ANSWERS TO DEFENDANT 350 MAIN
STREET ASSOCIATION, DBA THE BLACK
PEARL'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JANET HIGHAM,
Plaintiff,
vs.
350 MAIN STREET ASSOCIATION,
dba THE BLACK PEARL, a nonprofit corporation, FOUR
FOURTY NINE dba THE CLUB,
a non-profit corporation,
and JEROME PATRICK SCHULTZ,
an individual,

ANSWERS TO DEFENDANT
350 MAIN STREET ASSOCIATION,
DBA THE BLACK PEARL'S
FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES
C i v i l No. 7676

Defendants.

The plaintiff's injuries from the accident referred
to in her complaint were extensive and the records, charges,
expenses and paperwork the care of them generated and continue
to generate were equally extensive.

Therefore, the plaintiff's

answers to these interrogatories are based on facts of which
the plaintiff is currently aware.

The answers are subject to

modification and supplementation as further information is made
known to the plaintiff and the documents necessary for discovery

known to the plaintiff and the documents necessary for discovery
are examined and analized.
INTERRQ(gATQRY MO, 1,

Please state your full name, date of

birth, and present address.
ANSWER:

Janet M. Higham, June 22, 1932; P.O. Box 1833,

304 Norfolk, Park City, Utah
INTERROGATORY NO, 2,

84062.

State each and every fact upon which

you intend to rely to prove the allegations set forth in paragraphs
16, 17, 18, and 19 of count 2 of your complaint.
ANSWER:

The facts upon which plaintiff relied in making

the allegations set forth in paragraph 16, 17, 18 and 19 of her
complaint include but are not limited to the following information:
a.

The statement given to Detective Lloyd D. Evans

at the time of the accident by John Knox, the passenger in defendant
Schultz's vehicle.
b.

The statement given to patrolman R.L. Clayton

the morning following the accident by Ann K. "Chris11 Gorham,
coatroom attendant at the Black Pearl on the evening of the accident.
c.

The statements given to Patrolman R.L. Clayton

the morning following the accdient by Stuart T. Brown and James
Wheble.
d.

the complaint filed by Patrolman R.L. Clayton

against defendant Schultz.
e.

Statements made by defendant Schultz at the

time of his prosecution for driving while intoxicated.
The plaintiff will respond regarding facts on which
27

she intends to rely after further discovery.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3,

Set forth exactly what injuries you

claim you received as a result of this accident,
ANSWER:

The best record of plaintiff's injuries is contained

in her medical records. The effects of the injuries are continuing
and the full extent of them is as yet unknown.

A summary of

her injuries includes the following:
Plaintiff suffered right leg and ankle pain, thorasic
spine pain and some abdominal pain following the accident.

She

suffered a subtalar dislocation on the right with an open fracture
of the right patella.

She had stellate laceration of the forehead

and eyelids. She had a widened mediastinum on chest x-rays following
the accident.

She had a compression fracture of T6 and fractures

of ribs 2-5 on the right.

She had an equivocal paritoneal lavage

with 80 f 000 red cells upon arrival at the Holy Cross Hospital.
She suffered a right pneumothorax and developed respiratory embarrassment requiring placement of a right sided chest tube.

She

suffered a massive retroperitoneal hemmorage, and laceration
of the inferior vena cava and portal vein, as well as a crush
injury to the pancreas with a pelvic hematoma.
a partial laceration of the pancreas.

She also suffered

Plaintiff had an open

fracture dislocation of the right subtalar joint, and an open
comminuted fracture of the patella and open comminuted fracture
of the right lateral femoral condyle with complete disruption
of the patellar mechanisim.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4.

Have you been hospitalized as a result
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of the injuries received in this accident?
ANSWER:

Yes f plaintiff has been hospitalized as a result

of the injuries received in this accident.

Her injuries are

continuing in nature and further hospitalization may be anticipated.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5.

If sor for each period of hospitalization,

state:

ANSWER:

a.

The name and address of the hospital;

b.

The inclusive dates of hospitalization;

c.

The purpose for each hospitalization;

d.

The total charge for each such hospitalization.

To date, the plaintiff has been treated or examined

in each of the following hospitals for the injuries alleged in
her complaint:

1.

Holy

1st South, Salt Lake City, Utah

Cross

Hospital, 1045

Past

84102.

Dates Q£ Treatment;
March 2, 1983 through April 3, 1983.

The

plaintiff was treated for multiple trauma as a result of the
auto accident.

The total charge for the hospitalization was

$32,646.49.
April 6, 1983, through April 9, 1983.

The

plaintiff was treated for an obstructed pancreatic fistula caused
by the auto accident.

The total charge for the hospitalization

was $1,457.55.
April 19, 1983 through April 29, 1983.

The

plaintiff was treated for persistent failure to heal of the pancreatic
fistula caused by the auto accident.

The total charge for the

hospitalization was $7,861.81.
May 23, 1983, through May 31, 1983.

The

plaintiff was hospitalized for treatment of post traumatic chondromalacia secondary to multiple trauma sustained in the auto accident.
The total charge for the hospitalization was $2,858.13.
January 24, 1984, through January 26, 1984.
The plaintiff underwent surgery on her leg which was required
because of complications of the injuries she suffered to her
right leg in the auto accident.

The total charge for the hospital-

ization was $984.19.
2.

St. Benedict's Hospital, 5475 South 5th East

Ogden, Utah.

Dates of Treatment;
July 15, and 16, 1983.

The plaintiff was

hospitalized for plastic surgery on scars caused by the avulsion
injury to her forehead and both upper eyelids which she suffered
in the auto accident.

The total charge for the hospitalization

was $937.91.
INTERROGATORY NO, 6.

State whether

you have been treated

by any doctors, physical therapists, or anyone practicing the
healing arts for injuries received in this accident.
ANSWER;

Yes, plaintiff has been and continues to be treated

by doctors for injuries received in this accident.
INTERROGATORY NO 7.

if so, for each such person, state:

a.

His name, address and specialty;

b.

Each date of examination and treatment;

c.

The type of examination and treatment;

6.

The total charge to date for examination

and treatment.
ANSWER:

To date, the plaintiff has been treated by the

following doctors:
1.

Chad Halverson, M.D., Holy Cross Hospital,

145 East 100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84112;

Dates of treatment:
March 3, 1983, exploratory laparotomy.

The reason

for the treatment was that the plaintiff was the victim of multiple
trauma due to the accident complained of.

The total charge for

treatment was $2,593.00.
March 7, 1983.

Treatment for the subclavian area.

The reason for the treatment was damage to the area under her
clavicle which resulted from the auto accident.

The total charge

was $55.00.
March 8, 1983.
jugular line.

Treatment of damage to the internal

The reason for the treatment was damage which

resulted from the auto accident.

The total charge was $55.00.

March 8, 1983, to April 1, 1983.

The treatment

was hyperalimentation required because of plaintifffs inability
to ingest sufficient nutrients as a result of the traumas of
the auto accident.

The total charge for which was $625.00.

March 24, 1983.

Dr. Halverson performed reopening

of lap incision required because of the traumas of the auto accident.
The total charge was $100.00.
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March 24, 1983.
stop hemmorage.

Exploration of drain site to

The plaintiff was found lying in a pool of blood

flowing from her lateral Penrose drain which was placed during
the exploratory laparotomy of March 2, 1983, following the auto
accident.

The total charge for treatment was $243.00.
April 7, 1983, tube fistulotomy.

Plaintiff's

pancreatic fistula, caused by the trauma of the auto accident,
was obstructed.

The total charge for treatment was $166.00.

April 21, 1983.
en-y.

Pancreaticojejunostomy by Roux-

Plaintiff underwent this treatment because of persistent

failure to heal of her pancreatic fistula caused by the auto
accident.

The total charge was $1,837.00.
2.

Robert A. Place, M.D. (TS-CDS), 1055 East 3900

South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84117.

Dates of Treatment;
March 3, 1983. Physical examination and consultation
with Dr. Halverson.

The reason for the treatment was because

of the trauma the plaintiff suffered in the accident.

Dr. Place

did not charge the plaintiff for the treatment.
3.

Peter A. Hashisaki, M.D. (ID) 50 North Medical

Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah

84132.

Dates Qf Treatment;
March 21, 1983.
for Dr. Halverson.

Physical examination and consultation

Following the exploratory laparotomy performed

by Dr. Halverson, the plaintiff developed a fever.
examined her to discover the cause of the fever.

Dr. Hashisaki

The total charge

for examination was $303.00.
4.

Gary R. Zeluff, M.D. (OOS) 1002 East South Temple,

#303f Salt Lake Cityf Utah

84102.

Petes <?£ Treatment;
March 3, 1983.

Irrigation and debribement, partial

patellectomy and open repair of quadracepts mechanism, irrigation
debribement and reduction with deltoid repair of right subtalar
joint.

The reason for the treatment was the multiple trauma

with an open fracture dislocation of the right subtalar joint,
open comminuted fracture of the right patella and open comminuted
fracture right femural condyle with complete disruption of the
patellar mechanisim suffered in the auto accident complained
of.

The total charge for treatment was $2,000.00.
May 23, 1983.

Treatment of post traumatic chondro-

malacia secondary to multiple trauma sustained in the auto accident.
The total charge for treatment was $1,780.00.
January 1, 1984.

Arthroscopy with patella shave

and lateral retinacular release.

The reason for this treatment

was post traumatic chondromalacia secondary to the multiple trauma
and patellum quad mechanisim disruption sustained in the auto
accident.

The total charge for treatment was $1,180.00.
5.

Larry K. Patton, M.D., 324 Tenth Avenue,

#228, Salt Lake City, Utah

84113.

Date? of Treatment;
March 3 , 1983.

C l o s u r e of forehead wound w i t h

l o c a l advancement flaps and f u l l t h i c k n e s s skin g r a f t s ,
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closure

of the bilateral upper eyelid lacerations, full thickness skin
grafts to the left upper lid.

This treatment was given to the

plaintiff because of an avulsion injury to the forehead, including
both upper eye lids, suffered in the auto accident complained
of.

Plaintiff will supplement this response with the amount

of the total charge for treatment as soon as the record of the
charge is found.
6.

John E. Keiter, M.D., (PS)f 3905 Harrison Boulevard,

Ogden, Utah 84403.

Dates Qt Treatment;
July 15, 1983, plastic surgery on scars caused
by the injury to the forehead and both upper eyelids plaintiff
suffered in the auto accident complained of.

The total charge

of treatment was $1,560.00.
7.

Joseph A Schoenhals, M.D., 1002 East South Temple,

Salt Lake City, Utah

84102.

Dates of Treatment:
March 3,5,8,9,10,11,14,16,18,19,20,22,23

and 28.

Dr. Schoenhals is a pulmonary specialist who inserted a chesttube
in the plaintiff to repair the right pneumothorax and followed
her with care for pulmonary complaints during her initial hospitalization at Holy Cross in March 1983.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8.

State whether you or any of your agents

or authorized representatives have obtained medical reports from
any of the individuals referred to in the immediately preceding
interrogatory.
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ANSWER:

Neither plaintiff nor her agents or authorized

representatives has, to date, obtained medical reports from any
of the individuals referred to in the immediately preceding interrogatory other than a letter from Dr. John E. Keiterf M.D., a
copy of which is attached as Exhibit #1. Requests for said records
have been made and upon request from counsel for defendant after
receipt of the records they will be made available for examination
and copy.
INTERROGATORY NO, 9.

If so, state as follows:

a.

The name and address oE the person supplying

b.

The name and address of the person having

the report;

custody of the report;
c*

The date of the report;

d*

If you will do so without a Request for

Production, please attach a copy of such report to your Answers
to these interrogatories.
ANSWER:

See answer to interrogatory no. 8.

INTERROGATORY NO. 10.

List each and every other out-of-pocket

expense not heretofore mentioned that you claim as a result of
this accident.
ANSWER:

The plaintiff incurred expenses including, but

not limited to, the costs of transportation to and from hospitals,
doctors and other imperative appearances during the period in
which she was incapable of driving; dental expenses for problems
which arose because of her injuries and because of the special
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diet on which she was placed during the period when her pancreatic
fistula was draining her body of three to four thousand calories
a day; expenses for equipment and supplies she needed to perform
her physical therapy; the expenses for canes and special shoes
necessary because of her leg injuries.

These expenses continue

to accrue as the plaintiff continues to suffer the effects of
the accident.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11.

Were any x-rays

taken to aid in the

determination of the extent and nature of your injuries or to
reveal the progress of your injuries or to reveal the progress
of your recovery?
ANSWER:

X-rays were taken to aid in the determination

of the extent and nature of plaintiff's injuries.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12.

If sof for each such procedure, state:

a.

The name and address of the person who took

b.

The time and place the x-rays were taken;

c.

The parts of your body x-rayed.

the x-rays;

ANSWER:

X-rays taken of which plaintiff at present has

record include:
a.

Valley Radiologists, 1002 East South

Temple, Suite 102, Salt Lake City, Utah
b.

84102.

X-rays were taken on May 3, 1983, May

4, 1983, and May 5, 1983.
c.

The parts of the body x-rayed were the

abdomen, the chest, the femur, the cervical spine, the legs and

the soft tissue of the neck.
INTERROGATORY NO 13,

Were you disabled as a result of the

accident?
ANSWER:

Plaintiff was disabled as a result of the accident.

INTEfiRQQATQRY flQ. 14.

If so, state:

a.

A description of the disability;

b.

The percentage of disability, if you have

received such a rating and if such rating was made, by whom and
his address;
c.

Whether the disability is temporary or permanent;

and if temporary, when it is expected to terminate.
ANSWER:

The plaintiff's disabilities are physical, affecting

her internal organs and her right leg. No rating of her disabilities
has as yet been made.

She was temporarily totally disabled from

March 3, 1983, to August 22, 1983.

She is as yet disabled to

the extent that she cannot resume her position as Nursing Supervisor
at McKay Dee Hospital.
INTERROGATORY NO, 15,

Do you claim lost wages or income as

a result of the injuries you suffered?
ANSWER:

Plaintiff claims lost wages as a result of the

injuries she suffered.
INTERROGATORY NO, 16.

a.

If so, State:

The names and addresses of all employers and the

nature of employment since the date of injury;
b.

The rate of pay at each place of employment;

c.

The name and address of your immediate supervisor
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at each place of employment;
d.

The time lost at each place of employment as a

result of **he injuries;
e.

The total claimed lost income to date.

f.

If you will do so without a Motion to Produce,

please attach copies of plaintifffs federal income tax returns
for the five (5) years immediately preceding the accident.
ANSWER:

1.

a.

I.H.C. Hospitals Inc., McKay Dee Hospital

b.

$1,198.45 per month

c.

The plaintiff has not been able to return

Center, Ogden, Utah.

to work at the McKay Dee Hospital since the time of the accident.
d.

Nursing supervisor.

The plaintiff hp^

full responsibility over approximately 1,000 nurses at this hospital.
The hospital has approximately 360 beds.

The responsibility

included staffing of the entire hospital, including such duties
as coordinating nursing staff requirements of operating room. etc.
2.

a.

Granite School District, 340 East 3545

South, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111.

b.

$1,630.00 per month

c.

Plaintiff could not work during the

months of March, April, May, June, July and August of 1983.
d.

The plaintiff is a full-time instructor

in areas of health occupation and nurses aids.
to instruct students.

Her duties are

The plaintiff's Federal income tax returns

for the five years immediately preceding the accident are attached
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as Exhibit #2.
INTERROGATORY NO. 17.

Do you claim your future earning capacity

has been impai red?
ANSWER:

Plaintiff's future earning capacity has been impaired.

The full extent of the impairment is at present unknown.
INTERROGATORY NO. 18.

If SO, state:

a.

The amount claimed for such future loss;

b.

The basis upon which such computation is made.

ANSWER:

See answer to Interrogatory No. 17.

INTERROGATORY NO. 19.

State whether plaintiff has been hospitalized

during his lifetime as a result of any injury or illness, other
than that described in plaintiff's Complaint.
ANSWER:

The plaintiff has been hospitalized during her

lifetime as a result of injury and illness other than that described
in her complaint.
INTERROGATORY NO. 20.

If so, in each instance, state:

a.

The name and address of the hospital;

b.

The name and address of the doctors who treated

plaintiff;
c.

How the injury or illness was incurred;

d.

The nature and extent of the injury or illness;

e.

Any disability which plaintiff sustained as a

result of said injuries or illness;
f.

Whether a claim or a lawsuit was filed as a result

g.

If a claim was filed, the person or firm against

thereof;
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whom the claim was made;
h.

If a lawsuit was filedf where said lawsuit was

filed, the name and caption of said lawsuitf and the court in
which it was filed.
ANSWER:

During her lifetime, the plaintiff has been hospital-

ized as a result of injury or illness in the following hospitals:
1.
Idaho,

Magic Valley Memorial Hospital, Twin Falls,

The plaintiff was hospitalized for three months in 1956

because she had polio. She does not recall the treating physicians.
She incurred polio from nursing polio victims in Idaho, where
she had gone upon hearing of a need for nurses.

Idaho had received

an ineffective batch of vaccine that year and consequently many
Idahoans contracted polio.

The illness was abortive in nature,

and plaintiff recovered. The illness did cause some right intercostal
narrowing of plaintiff's chest muscles which remained.

No claim

or lawsuit was filed as a result of this occurrence.
2.

Hill Air Force Base Military Hospital.

The

plaintiff was hospitalized in 1962 for gall bladder surgery.
She does not recall the treating physicians.

The plaintiff's

gall bladder had created gall stones and the gall bladder was
infected. The plaintiff underwent major surgery with no complications
and no residual effects.

No claim or law suit was filed as a

result of this surgery.
3.
Ogden, Utah.

McKay Dee Hospital, 3939 Harrison Boulevard,

The plaintiff was hospitalized in 1965 for treatment

of an ovarian cyst. The doctor who treated her was Thomas M. Feeny,
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3905 Harrison Boulevard, Ogden, Utah 84403.

The medical records

will reveal what is known of the cause of the ovarian cyst and
the nature and extent of the problem.

The plaintiff did not

sustain any disability as a result of it and no claim or law
suit was filed.
INTERROGATORY NO. 21,

State whether or not plaintiff has ever

filed a claim for medical expenses or compensation as a result
of an industrial injury.
ANSWER:

Plaintiff has not filed a claim for medical expenses

or compensation as a result of an industrial injury.
INTERROGATORY NO. 22.

If sof for each instancef state:

a.

the name and address of the employer;

b.

when said injuries were incurred;

c.

the names and addresses of the doctors who treated

the plaintiff;
d.
ANSWER:

the nature and extent of the injuries.
See answer to interrogatory No. 21.

INTERROGATORY NO. 23.

Please state whether plaintiff was suffering

from any illness or physical disability immediately prior to
the accident described in plaintiff's Complaint.
ANSWER:

Plaintiff was not suffering from any illness or

physical disability immediately prior to the accident described
in her Complaint.
INTERROGATORY NO. 24.

If so, state the nature and type of

each illness or disability.
ANSWER:

See answer to interrogatory no. 23.
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INTERROGATORY NO. 25.

State whether plaintiff has suffered

any injuries, or incurred any illness after the accident referred
to in plaintiff's complaint.
ANSWER:

Plaintiff has not suffered any injuries or incurred

any illness after the accident.

Some of the injuries she suffered

in the accident have recurrent effects.
INTERROGATORY NO. 26.

If so, for each illness or injury, state:

a.

the date it occurred;

b.

where and how it occurred;

c.

the nature and extent of the injury or illness;

d.

the name and address of the doctors and physicians

who have treated the plaintiff;
e.

whether any lawsuit was brought against any person

by reason of the illness or injury, and if so, the name of the
court wherein the lawsuit was brought, the name of the parties,
and the name of the case, and whether said lawsuit was tried
or settled.
ANSWER:

See answer to interrogatory No. 25.

INTERROGATORY NO. 27.

Was any personal property damaged as

a result of the accident herein?
ANSWER:

The plaintiff's 1981 Buick Skylark two door automobile

was damaged as a result of the accident.
INTERROGATORY NO. 28.

a.

If so, state as follows:

Itemize each piece of property damaged and the

damage to that property.
b.

The name and address of all individuals having
42

made estimates or repairs;
c.

Whether each piece of property has been repaired,

and if sof the actual amount expended for the repairs;
d.

If you will do so without a Request for Production,

please attach a copy of each and all repair invoices or estimates
of repair to your Answers to these interrogatories.
ANSWER:

a.

The 1981 Buick Skylark was damaged beyond

repair.
b.

No estimates or repairs were made on the 1981

Buick Skylark, other than the estimated cost of repair made by
the reporting officer at the scene of the accident, which was
$5,000.00.
c.

The 1981 Buick Skylark has not been repaired.

d.

See answer "c;: above.

INTERROGATORY NO 29.

State the name and address of each person

known to the plaintiff or plaintiff's representatives who knows
anything concerning the facts of the incident described in plaintiff's
Complaint.
ANSWERt

Persons known to plaintiff at present to know

facts regarding the accident include the paramedics at the scene
of the accident, the doctors and nurses who treated her, the
personnel of the life-flight helicopter in which she was flown
to Holy Cross's emergency room and the following:
Lise Kelley, 143 Stonewall, Memphis, Tennissee, 38104,
phone 901-274-2916.
Patrolman R. L. Clayton, 1825 Paunsdale Drive, Sandy,
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Utah.
Detective Lloyd D. Evans, Park City Police Department,
Park City, Utah.
Patrolman L.G. Witt, Park City Police Department, Park
City, Utah.
Robert Kelley, 143 Stonewall, Memphis, Tennissee, 38104,
phone 901-274-2916.
Martin J. Wiesheier, 2661 North Dayton, Chicago, Illinois,
60614, phone 312-248-5152.
Woodie, a guitarist with the Ace Pancakes, a band based
in Denver.
John Knox, 3750 Summit, Casper, Wyoming, phone 307-235-6017.
Mike McCauley, 3650 Jasmine, West Valley City, Utah,
phone 801-966-6385.
H.H. Tony Cate, 300 Norfolk Avenue, Park City, Utah,
649-6253.
James Wheble, 918 Woodside, Park City, Utah
Kristen Gorham, 60 Rossi Hill, Park City, Utah
Stuart Brown, 917 Empire, Park City, Utah.
INTERROGATORY NO. 30,

Please state whether any photographs

or diagrams were made of the accident or the accident scene or
anything involved in the accident.
ANSWER;

Detective Lloyd D. Evans, Park City Police Department,

photographed the accident scene.
of the photographs.

Detective Evans has custody

They depict the vehicles involved in the

accident after it occurred and the roadway on which the accident

(n so

occurred.

Patrolman R.L. Clayton, 1825 Faunsdale Drive, Sandy,

Utah, made a diagram of what happened at the time of the accident
as part of his Investigating Officer's Report of Traffic Accident.
A copy of the diagram is attached hereto as Exhibit #3.

Copies

of the photographs are being made by Detective Evans and will
be provided to defendant when they are placed in plaintiff's
possession.
INTERROGATORY NO. 31,

If so, for each photograph or diagram,

state:
a.

The name and address of the persons having taken

the photograph or made the diagram;
b.

The name and address of the person having custody

of such photographs or diagram;
c.

What each photograph or diagram depicts;

d.

If you will do so without a Motion to Produce,

please attach copies of each such photos or diagrams to your
Answers to these photos or diagrams to your Answers to these
interrogatories.
ANSWER:

See answer to interrogatory no. 30.

INTERROGATORY NO. 32.

Has plaintiff

or any of plaintiff's

representatives hired any experts to determine the cause of the
accident or to reconstruct the accident?
ANSWER:

Neither plaintiff nor any of her representatives

has hired any experts to determine the cause of the accident
or to reconstruct the accident as of this time but anticipate
that the need may arise as a result of discovery which is continuing
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and not yet completed.

Counsel for the various defendants will

be advised in a timely fashion should a determination that an
expert will be used at trial be made.
INTERROGATORY NO. 33.

If so, state the name and address of

each expert, his specialty, and whether written reports have
been made to plaintiff or plaintiff's representatives concerning
the experts findings or conclusions.
ANSWER:

See answer to interrogatory no. 32.

INTERROGATORY NO, 34.

With respect to any insurance benefits

paid to the plaintiff pursuant to the provisions of the Utah
No-Fault Act, set forth the following:
a.

The name or names of the insurance carrier making

b.

The amount of payment made, in total, and

c.

The specific amount of payments made for:

payments.

d.

1.

medical expenses,

2.

lost wages,

3.

loss of essential services,

4.

any other category of payment.

Whether or not the plaintiff intends to place

into evidence at the time of trial, expenses incurred by the
plaintiff but paid by an insurance carrier under the Utah No-Fault
Act.
ANSWER:

The plaintiff

objects to this Interrogatory.

Insurance benefits are not relevant to the subject matter involved
in this action and questions regarding them do not seek information

reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissable
evidence.

However, without waiving the above objection, the

name of the insurance carrier making payments to the plaintiff
pursuant to the provisions of the Utah No-Fault Act is Progressive
Insurance.

Plaintiff in unaware of exact amounts paid for medical

benefits, if any, but was paid approximately $7,800 for lost
wages (calculated at $150.00 a week for one year), and between
$952.00 and $1,600.00 for loss of household services (calculated
at $119.00 to $200.00 per month for eight months).

The plaintiff

will place in evidence all legally admissible evidence that will
fairly demonstrate her special and general damages.
DATED THIS ML

Day of April, 1984.

P HICHAM
J^NET"

/

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE MEv^THIS ofyffi Day of April, 1984.
My Commission Expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at: Salt Lake City, Utah

UilJ
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy.of the
foregoing ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES was sent this dWnday of
April, 1984, to the following:
Joseph E. Tesch
TESCH & HDFNAEGEL
30 North Main Street, Suite #2
Heber City, Utah 84032
Robert Felton
SPECIALE & FELTON
Suite 220 Coordinated Financial Center
324 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2303
Dale Lambert
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorney for 449, dba The Club
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Gary B. Ferguson
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorney for Black Pearl
CSB Tower, Suite #700
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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ADDENDUM 1
State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Insurance Exchange
450 P.2d 458 (Utah 1969)
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fraudulent concealment of the facts by the
defendant. That part of the decree is ordered stricken and otherwise the decision
of the court below is affirmed. No costs
awarded.
CROCKETT, C. J., and CALLISTER
and H E N R I O D , JJ., concur.
E L L E T T , J., concurs in the result.

1. Subrogation <&=>\

Subrogation springs from equity concluding that one who has been reimbursed
for a specific loss should not be entitled
to a second reimbursement.
2. Assignments <§=>24(2)
Insurance <§=>606(l.l, 4)

Subrogation is permitted in insurance
field with respect to property damage and
to medical costs, but a claim or cause of
action for personal injuries arising out of
tort is not assignable.
3. Insurance <§=607
Policy
provision
for
subrogation
against tort-feasor as to insured's claim for
medical payments was not against public
policy but was valid and enforceable.

22 Utah 2d 183
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Carl R. SESSIONS, Third-Party Defendant.
No. 11350.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 11, 1969.

4. Insurance <§=>607.l(7)
Evidence in action on claim against
tort-feasor by injured party's insurer as
subrogee of medical payments claim established that timely notice of subrogation
rights had been given to protect insurer's
subrogation claim.

W, Brent Wilcox of Hanson & Garrett, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
L. L. Summerhays of Strong & Hanni,
Salt Lake City, for respondent.

Action by injured party's insurer, as
subrogee, against another insurer on injured party's medical payments claim
against tort-feasor. Other insurer brought
in another party as third-party defendant.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Bryant H. Croft, J., entered summary
judgment determining that subrogation provision of policy was valid, and other insurer appealed.
The Supreme Court,
Henriod, J., held that subrogation provision was not against public policy but was
valid and enforceable, and that evidence
established that timely notice of subrogation rights had been given.
Affirmed.
I. 19 A.L.R.3d 1055 (1968); Wilson v.
Tenn. Farmers Mut. (Tenn.1966), 411
S.W.2d 699; Tenn. Farmers Mut. Insur-

H E N R I O D , Justice.
Appeal from a summary judgment holding that a provision in an insurance policy
for the subrogation of the insured's claim
for medical payments against a tortfeasor
is valid and not against public policy. Affirmed with costs to respondent.
[1-4] Subrogation springs from equity
concluding that one having been reimbursed for a specific loss should not be entitled to a second reimbursement therefor.
This principle has been accepted in the
insurance field with respect to property
damage, and with respect to medical costs
by an impressive weight of authority. 1 On
ance Co. v. Rader (Tenn.1966), 410 S.W.
2d 171; Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co.
(19G6), 266 N.C. 309, 145 S.E.2d 845;
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Cite as 4

the other hand it is generally conceded that
a claim or cause of action for personal injuries arising out of tort is not assignable.2 Arguments are persuasive for and
against any such distinction. Nonetheless,
we presently are constrained to affirm the
universal rule of non-assignability of personal injury' claims, but also the majority
rule as to subrogation provisions contained
in insurance policies with respect to medical expenses in cases such as that here.
We have been requested to determine but
two points: 1) Whether the policy provision is valid and enforceable, and we say it
is, and 2) Whether timely notice of subrogation rights was given here in order to
protect plaintiff's subrogation claim. The
trial court said adequate notice was given
and the record supports such conclusion,
which we affirm.
CROCKETT, C. J., and E L L E T T , J.,
concur.
CALLISTER, Justice (concurring):
I concur with the conclusion of the majority opinion that the subrogation provision in the insurance policy is valid and
enforceable. However, the reasons which
support the conclusion merit discussion.
The decisions from other jurisdictions
which have considered the issue of the validity of a subrogation clause under medical
payments coverage have been far from uniform both in reasoning and result. An excellent review of these diverse opinions
may be found in Higgins v. Allied American Mutual Fire Ins. Co. 1
The cases which have invalidated the
subrogation clause have been premised on
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the ground that the clause in effect attempted to assign a claim for personal injury, and under the law of the jurisdiction
such an assignment was invalid. 2 One line
of cases, which is supported by better reasoning, rejects this concept and holds that
the subrogation clause does not constitute
an assignment of a claim for personal injury. 3 The distinction between an assignment and subrogation is described in 6 C.
J.S. Assignments § 2 b(12), as follows:
* * * subrogation presupposes an
actual payment and satisfaction of the
debtor claim to which the party is subrogated, although the remedy is kept alive
in equity for the benefit of the one who
made the payment under circumstances
entitling him to contribution or indemnity, while assignment necessarily contemplates the continued existence of the
debt or claim assigned. Subrogation operates only to secure contribution and
indemnity, whereas an assignment transfers the whole claim. 4
Another aspect which fortifies the validity of the subrogation clause is that the pro,r,c
ion for medical payments is in the nature of an indemnity contract, i. e., it indemnifies the insured for medical expenses
resulting from the accident, and the amount
paid under the contract depends on the
amount spent by the insured for the proper care of his injuries. 5
Subrogation is a
normal incident of indemnity insurance.
(16 Couch on Insurance 2d, § 61:8, pp.
241-242.)
Finally, there appears to be a valid distinction in the language of the subrogation
clause in the instant case and that found in
the cases where the courts have held it to

:,uch. Med Serv. v. Sharpe (1954), 339
Mich. 574, 64 N.W.2d 713; Nat. Un. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Grimes (1967), 278 Minn. 45,
153 N."\V.2d 152.

3.

2. 40 A.L.R.2d 502, I I (1955).
1. (D.C.C.A., 1968), 237 A.2d 471.

See the cases cited in footnote 3 of Higgins v. Allied American Mutual Fire Ins
Co., note 1, supra; e. g. Damhesel v
Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co.,
60 Ill.App.2d 279, 209 N.E.2d 876 (1965).

4. Also see 16 Conch on Insurance 2d, §
61:92, pp. 289-290; Kimball & Davis,
The Extension of Insurance
Subrogation,
60 Mich.L.Rev. 841, 866-867.

2. Peller v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co.,
220 Cal.App.2d 610, 34 Cal.Rptr. 41
(1963);
Travelers Indemnity Co. v.
Chumbley (Mo.App.), 394 S.W.2d 418,
19 A.L.R.3d 1043 (1965).

5. Damhesel v. Hardware Dealers Mutual
Fire Ins. Co., note 3, supra.
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be an assignment of a cause of action for
personal injury. 6 In those cases, the insurance company was subrogated to all the insured's rights of recovery therefor, which
the insured may have against any person,
and the insured shall execute instruments
and papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such rights. In the instant
action, the trial court found that the subrogation provision provided that upon payment of medical bills on behalf of the insured, the company should be subrogated
to the extent of such payments to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment that
might result from the exercise of any rights
of recovery which the injured person or
anyone receiving such payment may have
against any person or organisation and that
such person should execute and deliver instruments and papers and do whatever else
is necessary to secure such rights. Such
person should do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights.
In Peller v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins.
Co.7 the court rejected the argument that
the right to subrogation was distinguishable from an assignment. The court observed that the distinction was purely verbal in that the legal effect of the policy
provisions was the same regardless of what
term was attached to the procedure, since
the result was to transfer the insured's
cause of action against a third party tortfeasor to the insurer. In the instant case,
even if the subrogation provision were interpreted as an assignment (which this
opinion rejects), it assigns solely the proceeds that may possibly be recovered in an
action for personal injuries brought against
the tortfeasor. This court has previously
held that a court of equity will erforce
such an assignment even though the cause
of action was not assignable. 8
* * * Subrogation is an equitable
device to compel the ultimate discharge
of a debt or obligation by the one who
6. See cases in note 2, supra.

in good conscience ought to pay or discharge it.9
The judgment of the trial court should
be affirmed.
T U C K E T T , J., concurs in the concurring
opinion of CALLISTER, J.

O
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22 Utah 2d 187
Edward Wilson AMMERMAN, by his Guardian Ad Litem, LaVerne Bruce Ammerman,
and Eddie Soliz, Plaintiffs and Appellant,
v.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,

Defendant and Respondent.
No. 11068.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 10, 1969.

Action against insurer to recover
amount by which judgment against insured exceeded policy limits. Upon remand 19 Utah 2d 261, 430 P.2d 576, the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Stewart M. Hanson, J., granted insurer's
motion to dismiss and insured appealed.
The Supreme Court, Callister, J., held that
insured need not pay amount of judgment
exceeding policy limits as condition precedent to action against insurer for failure
to settle claim within policy limits.
Reversed and remanded.

I. Attorney and Client <§=^21

Attorneys who had represented judgment creditor could represent judgment
debtor in action against judgment debtor's
insurer.
9. National Farmers Union Property & Cas.
Co. v. Farmers Insurance Group, 14 Utah
2d 89, 92, 377 P.2d 786, 788 (1963).

7. Note 2, supra.
8. In re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 162,
213 P.2d 657 (1950).
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Cite as 607 F.Supp.75 (D.OMU*. 1985)

Linda SHEPHERD, Plaintiff,

Jerome B. Steen & William C. Griffin,
Steen, Reynolds, Dalehite & Currie, Jackson, Miss., for defendant.

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Civ. A. No. J84-052(KL).
United States District Court,
S.D. Mississippi,
Jackson Division.
Feb. 19, 1985.

Insured brought action against insurer
seeking to recover under uninsured motorist provisions of policy. Both parties
moved for summary judgment The District Court, Tom S. Lee, J., held that: (1)
by executing covenant not to sue, insured
abrogated insurer's subrogation rights, and
(2) by executing covenant not to sue in
violation of uninsured motorist provisions
of policy, insured foreclosed her right to
recover from insurer.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment granted.

1. Insurance <s=»606(10)
Insurer's ability to recover from driver
of automobile involved in accident with insured or to recover from driver's insurer
was dependent entirely upon insured's
right; thus, by foreclosing her own right to
sue by signing covenant not to sue, insured
abrogated insurer's rights.
2. Insurance <£= 603.1
Where agreement not to sue executed
by insured constituted "settlement" in violation of uninsured motorist provisions of
liability policy, whether agreement was
characterized as release or covenant not to
sue, insured could not recover from insurer
under uninsured motorist provisions of policy.

Joseph E. Roberts, Cothren, & Pittman,
Jackson, Miss., for plaintiff.
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TOM S. LEE, District Judge.
This cause is before the court on the
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the
defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company (State Farm). After
consideration of the memoranda with at;
tachments submitted by the parties, this
court is of the opinion that the defendant's
motion is well taken and should be granted.
The plaintiff, Linda Shepherd, was injured when the vehicle which she was driving was struck from the rear by a car
operated by Mohammad Esmail Amini.
She allegedly sustained severe injuries to
the head, neck, cervical spine and shoulders
and required treatment by an orthopedic
surgeon for several months. The automobile driven by Amini was insured by Stonewall Insurance Company (Stonewall). Linda Shepherd was the named insured of an
insurance policy issued by State Farm with
a policy limit of $10,000 and her mother,
Juanita Atkins, also held a policy issued by
State Farm with a policy limit of $25,000.
After the accident, Stonewall paid Shepherd $10,000.00 on behalf of Amini and, in
return, Shepherd executed a covenant not
to sue by which she agreed not to sue or
"make any claim against Mohammad Esmail Amini, Stonewall Insurance Company,
or Dixie Insurance Company
" The
agreement further provided that "the execution of this Covenant Not to Sue . . . does
not in any way prejudice the rights of the
undersigned to assert or make a claim
against the undersigned's automobile liability insurance carrier, State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company
".
Shepherd alleges that her damages exceed the $10,000.00 paid to her by Amini's
insurer and that she is entitled to recover
from State Farm pursuant to the provisions
of policies issued to her and her mother and
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the Mississippi uninsured motorist statutes.1
State Farm asserts that it is entitled to
summary judgment because Shepherd's execution of the covenant not to sue without
the consent of State Farm was in violation
of the uninsured motorist provisions of the
policy which state in part:
This insurance does not apply: (a) to
bodily injury to an insured . . . with respect to which such insured . . . shall,
without written consent of the company,
make any settlement with any person or
organization who may be legally liable
therefor
The covenant not to sue, according to State
Farm, furthermore abrogated its subrogation rights against Amini.2
In United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company v. Hillman, 367 So.2d 914 (Miss.
1979), Hillman, the insured, had sustained
injuries when a truck, driven by an uninsured motorist, collided with Hillman's
automobile. Without the knowledge of
U.S.F. & G., Hillman executed a release of
the uninsured motorist The U.S.F. & G.
policy stated that the uninsured motorist
coverage did not apply "to bodily injury to
an Insured with respect to which such insured . . . shall, without written consent of
[U.S.F. & G.], make any settlement with
any person or organization who may be
legally liable therefor". The court held
that, since Hillman had violated an unambiguous provision of the policy and had, in
releasing the uninsured motorist, foreclos1. Section 83-11-103, MissXode Ann., defines an
uninsured motor vehicle as, inter alia, "An insured motor vehicle, when the liability insurer
of such vehicle has provided limits of bodily
injury liability for its insured which are less
than the limits applicable to the injured person
provided under his uninsured motorist coverage." Although the automobile driven by Amini
was covered by an insurance policy, it is an
uninsured motor vehicle for purposes of the
statutes because Shepherd alleges her damages
exceeded the amount of coverage.
2. MissXode Ann. § 83-11-107 (1972) provides
in part:
An insurer paying a claim under the endorsement or provisions required by section 83-11101 shall be subrogated to the rights of the
insured to whom such claim was paid against

ed U.S.F. & G.'s subrogation rights guaranteed by Mississippi's uninsured motorist
statutes, recovery from U.S.F. & G. must
be denied. Id. at 922.
[1,2] The plaintiff has attempted to distinguish the release in Hillman from the
covenant not to sue executed by her.
Shepherd contends that the covenant not to
sue is personal to her and not prejudicial to
the subrogation rights of the defendant.
Subrogation, however, "is the substitution
of one person in place of another . . . so
that he who is substituted succeeds to the
rights of the other in relation to the debt or
claim, and to its rights, remedies or securities". Indiana Lumberman *s Mutual Insurance Co. v. Curtis Mathes Mfg. Co.,
456 So.2d 750, 754 (Miss.1984) (quoting
Lyon v. Colonial United States Mortgage
Co., 129 Miss. 54, 91 So. 708 (1922)). State
Farm's ability to recover from Aminn or his
insurer is dependent entirely on Shepherd's
rights. By foreclosing her own right to
sue, Shepherd has also abrogated State
Farm's rights. Furthermore, since the covenant not to sue executed by Shepherd
constitutes a "settlement" in violation of
the policy, the court finds that the legal
distinctions between a release and covenant
not to sue are immaterial.,
For the reasons stated herein, it is the
court's opinion that the defendant's motion
for summary judgment should be granted.
A separate judgment shall be submitted in
accordance with the local rules.
the person causing such injury, death, or damage to the extent that payment was made,
including the proceeds recoverable from the
assets of the involvent insurer.
3. In Dancy v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., 324 F.Supp. 964 (S.D.Ala.1971),
the insured executed a covenant not to sue in
favor of a man against whom he had a tort
claim, as well as the man's insurance company,
and then sought recovery under the uninsured
motorist provision of his policy with State
Farm. The court, in granting summary judgment for the insurer, found that the covenant
not to sue, like a release, breached the policy
provision prohibiting settlement without the insurer's consent and interfered with the insurer's
subrogation rights. Id. at 965.
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1017, 1020, involved a claim of improper
examination of witnesses in a probation
revocation hearing. The trial judge examined three female witnesses about their employment, education, drinking, drug use
habits, receipt of public aid and association
with various types of men. In addition the
trial judge characterized some of the defendant's witnesses as "hippie-dippies."
The conduct of the judge in BuIIard is strikingly different from that of the trial judge
here. There is a total absence of any
branding characterization of the defendant
in this case or any concern with the life
style and association of the defendant as
remote from the offense charged as the
inquiry into the life styles and associations
of the three witnesses was in BuIIard.
For the reasons stated above, the conviction of defendant of attempt murder is
affirmed.
The defendant raises an additional issue
regarding his sentencing. On two separate
occasions during these proceedings, the trial
judge observed that the minimum term of
imprisonment for attempt murder was 4
years. At the time of sentencing, Illinois
appellate courts had ruled inconsistently on
whether the term for attempt murder was a
4-year minimum term. (See People v. MacRae (1977), 47 Ill.App.3d 302, 314, 5 Ill.Dec.
362, 370, 361 N.E.2d 685, 693.) But, shortly
after the imposition of sentence in this case,
the supreme court ruled that the Illinois
statutes do not specify a minimum term for
attempt murder.
[4] In view of the trial judge's mistaken
belief that a minimum sentence of 4 years
was required as a matter of law, this matter must be remanded for a new sentencing
proceeding. In reaching this conclusion we
have considered People v. Eddington (1979),
77 IU.2d 41, 48, 31 Ill.Dec. 808, 811-812, 394
N.E.2d 1185, 1188-89, but we believe that
what took place when the defendant was
sentenced was more comparable to what
happened in People v. Moore (1978), 69
I11.2d 520, 524, 14 Ill.Dec. 470, 472, 372
N.E.2d 666, 668. There is nothing in the
record to indicate that had the trial judge
not held a mistaken belief about the mini-

mum length of the sentence the defendant
still would have received the same sentence.
Clearly there is no indication by the trial
judge, as there was in Eddington, that he
did not consider the matter before him a
"minimal kind of situation." Eddington, 77
I11.2d at 48, 31 Ill.Dec. at 812, 394 N.E.2d at
1189.
The conviction of the defendant for attempt murder is affirmed, but the sentence
imposed upon the defendant is vacated and
this matter is remanded for a new sentencing proceeding.
McNAMARA and RIZZI, JJ., concur.

83 Ill.App.3d 590
39 Ill.Dec. 150

Jeffrey ACKERMANN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 79-632.
Appellate Court of Illinois,
First District, Third Division.
April 23, 1980.
Insurer appealed from declaratory
judgment rendered in the Circuit Court,
Cook County, Arthur L. Dunne, J., holding
that its subrogation rights under an uninsured motorist clause extended only to proceeds due from the uninsured motorist.
The Appellate Court, McGillicuddy, P. J„
held that the insurer was entitled to be
subrogated, to the extent of payment made
under the uninsured motorist coverage, to
any proceeds received by the insured from
either the uninsured motorist or any other
tort-feasor.
Reversed and remanded.
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Insurance <*=>(>01.25
Insurer was entitled to be subrogated,
to extent of payment made under uninsured
motorist coverage, to any proceeds received
by insured from either uninsured motorist
or any other tort-feasor. S.H.A. ch. 73,
§ 755a.

hold in trust for the benefit of the company all rights of recovery which he shall
have against such other person or organization because of the damages which are
the subject of claim made under this
Part;
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a complaint
for declaratory judgment which requested
that the court declare that he was entitled
McKenna, Storer, Rowe, White & Farrug,
to recovery under the uninsured motorist
Robert Soderstrom and Richard Clark, Chiprovisions of his policy and that Prudential
cago, for defendant-appellant.
was entitled to subrogation rights only as to
Schwartzberg, Barnett & Cohen, Heller & any assets of the uninsured motorists but
Morris, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee.
not as to any assets of any other insured
co-tort feasor. In response, Prudential filed
McGILLICUDDY, Presiding Justice:
a motion to strike the complaint and dismiss
On October 2, 1976, the plaintiff, Jeffrey the cause of action, asserting that the plainAckermann, was a passenger in an automo- tiff was not entitled to the relief sought as
bile operated by Paul Short which collided a matter of law. After hearing argument
with a vehicle driven by William Wallete. concerning the motion the trial court enAt the time of the collision, Wallete was tered an order declaring that,
insured by Allstate Insurance Company
"[AJssuming but not deciding that Plain(Allstate) under an automobile casualty intiff is an insured under Coverage J—Unsurance policy which provided for public
insured Motorist of the insurance policy
liability coverage in the amount of $25,000.
referred to in the Complaint and is otherShort and the vehicle he was operating
wise entitled to make a claim under said
were uninsured. The plaintiff was insured
coverage, the rights of the Defendant
by the defendant, Prudential Property and
under the paragraph of said coverage enCasualty Insurance Company (Prudential),
titled Trust Agreement',
are
and his policy included coverage for personlimited to the pursuit of rights against
al injuries resulting from a collision involvand to the pursuit of the assets of the
ing an uninsured vehicle.
allegedly uninsured motorist Paul Short
only and may not be pursued against
The plaintiff pursued his claim for damWilliam Wallete, Allstate Insurance Comages against Wallete and sought uninsured
pany as Wallete's insurer, or against any
motorist benefits from Prudential. Subseother person or organization not defined
quently, Allstate offered the plaintiff $20,in said policy as an uninsured motorist."
000 in settlement of his claim against WalIt
is from this order that Prudential aplete. Prudential asserted its right to subropeals.
gation against the settlement offer in acPrudential contends that the trial court
cordance with the terms of its policy which
erred in failing to grant its motion to strike
provided in pertinent part that:
"Trust Agreement. In the event of pay- and dismiss. It asserts that the language
ment to any person under this Part: (a) of the trust agreement provision in the
the company shall be entitled to the ex- policy clearly provides that Prudential is
tent of such payment to the proceeds of entitled to reimbursement from the proany settlement or judgment that may ceeds received by the plaintiff from "any
result from the exercise of any rights of person or organization legally responsible
recovery of such person against any per- for the bodily injury." It contends that
son or organization legally responsible for there is no distinction in this provision bethe bodily injury because of which such tween proceeds received from an insured
payment is made; (b) such person shall tortfeasor or an uninsured tortfeasor.
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Moreover, Prudential contends that the
wording of the trust agreement closely parallels the language of section 143(a) of the
Illinois Insurance Code concerning uninsured motorist insurance. This section
states:
"In the event of payment to any person
under the coverage required by this Section and subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage, the insurer making such payment shall, to the extent
thereof, be entitled to the proceeds of any
settlement of judgment resulting from
the exercise of any rights of recovery of
such person against any person or organization legally responsible for the bodily
injury or death for which such payment is
made, including the proceeds recoverable
from the assets of the insolvent insurer.
" IH.Rev.SUt., 1975, ch. 73, par.
755a(3).
This issue was decided by the Supreme
Court in Glidden v. Farmers Automobile
Insurance Association (1974), 57 I11.2d 330,
312 N.E.2d 247. In that case Glidden's
wife, a pedestrian, was struck and killed by
an uninsured motorist. In addition to his
uninsured motorist claim against the defendant insurance company, Glidden filed
suit against a dram shop defendant. The
Supreme Court specifically held that the
insurer was entitled to be subrogated, to
the extent of payment made under the uninsured motorist coverage, to any proceeds
received by the plaintiff from both the uninsured motorist and the dram shop defendant.
The plaintiff argues that the recent decision of Wilhelm v. Universal Underwriters
Insurance Co. (1978), 60 Ill.App.3d 894, 17
Ill.Dec. 872, 377 N.E.2d 62, supports the
trial court's order. In Wilhelm an insurance policy contained a provision purporting
1. The Code required every automobile liability
policy to contain uninsured motorist coverage
in an amount not less that the limits set forth in
the Financial Responsibility Act 111 Rev Stat.,
1975, ch. 73, par 755a(l)

to allow the insurer to set off from its
liability under an uninsured motorist clause
any amounts received from any person
jointly liable for an accident. The court
held that this provision was invalid to the
extent it would reduce the uninsured motorist coverage to an amount lower that
that required by the Insurance Code.1 The
court noted that the purpose of the coverage requirement is to place the policyholder
in substantially the same position he would
occupy if the uninsured driver possessed the
required minimum liability insurance.
The plaintiff argues that the effect of the
subrogation clause in Prudential's policy is
identical to the effect of the setoff clause
invalidated in Wilhelm.2 He contents that
his damages are in excess of the $20,000
offered by Allstate. The plaintiff asserts
that if Prudential is entitled to subrogation
rights against the Allstate settlement, he
will be in a worse position than if Short had
been insured. If Short had complied with
the Financial Responsibility Act (111.Rev.
Stat., 1975, ch. %Vz, par. 7 203) the plaintiff
would have been compensated by at least
$10,000 from Short's insurer 3 and $20,000
from Allstate. If Prudential is entitled to
subrogation rights against the Allstate settlement, the plaintiff will recover only $20,000.
The plaintiff cites Capps v. Klebs (Ind.
App.1978) 382 N.E.2d 947, in which the
court found such a result unfair. The court
stated.
'if Trinity's [the insurer] interpretation of the subrogation provision were
adopted in this case, Trinity would, in
effect be allowed to avoid its statutory
obligation to provide a minimum of $30,000 to compensate its insured for losses
caused by the uninsured motorist, although the policyholder remains uncomsuch payment, out of the proceeds of any settlement or judgment against any person legally
responsible for the injury " 60 111 App.3d at
899-900, 17 111 Dec. at 876, 377 N E 2d at 66

2. Although the Wilhelm court invalidated the 3. Public Act 81-1202 has increased the minimum amount of insurance required to $15,000,
setoff clause, it also noted that the Insurance
effective March 1, 1980
Code provides "that the insurer having paid the
claim, is entitled to recover, to the extent of
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pensated for such losses. The statute
was designed to diminish this type of
uncompensated loss up to the limits of
the required policy provision. Pro tanto
subrogation would effectively nullify the
coverage ostensibly provided by the policy. The Capps would be in a worse position than they would have been in had
Klebs been insured. . . .
To allow
subrogation when the Capps have not
been fully compensated places them in
the same position as if Klebs was uninsured and there was no uninsured motorist statute in effect. Under such circumstances there would be no advantage to
paying premiums for uninsured motorist
protection in such joint tortfeasor situations. We cannot ascribe such an intent
to the legislature. The only purpose of
the subrogation provision that is consistent with the statutory framework of minimum coverages required by law is to
prevent double recovery."
See also Security National Insurance Company v. Hand (1973), 31 Cal.App.3d 227, 107
Cal.Rptr. 439; Milbank Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Kluver (1974), 302 Minn. 310, 225
N.W.2d 230; Craig v. Iowa Kemper Mutual
Insurance Co. (Mo.App.1978) 565 S.W.2d
716.
InjGlidden the Supreme Court decided
the issue of subrogation in connection with
the uninsured-motorist clauses of insurance
policies. Therefore, even though the plaintiff's argument and the authorities he cites
are persuasive, under the Glidden decision
we find that Prudential is entitled to reimbursement from the plaintiff to the extent
that it makes payment to him for uninsured
motorist coverage, if he recovers from either tortfeasor.
For the foregoing reasons the order of
the Circuit Court of Cook County, which
denied Prudential's motion to strike and
dismiss and held that Prudential could seek
reimbursement only from the monies paid
by the insured motorist, is reversed. The
case is remanded to the Circuit Court for
further proceedings consistent with the
views expressed herein.
Reversed and remanded.
McNAMARA and SIMON, JJ., concur.
404 N

E2d—13
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83 IU.App.3d 594
39 Ill.Dec. 153

Jose FRANCISCO, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v,

Concepcion FRANCISCO,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 79-954.
Appellate Court of Illinois,
First District, Third Division.
April 23; 1980.

Wife filed motion to vacate divorce
judgment. The Circuit Court, Cook County, Charles J. Fleck, J., vacated judgment
and allowed wife time to answer complaint,
and husband appealed. The Appellate
Court, First District, Simon, J., held that:
(1) husband, by failing to file any report of
proceedings, had waived all points which
Court could only review if it knew what
happened at such proceedings, and Court
had to presume that Circuit Court's findings were supported by the evidence; (2)
where wife never received notice of complaint for divorce or the divorce judgment
and there was an "inference of fraud,"
judgment was void ab initio for lack of
jurisdiction, and such judgment could be
challenged by a petition for relief from
judgment and could be attacked at any
time without regard to two-year limitation
and without any showing of diligence or a
meritorious defense; and (3) wife's failure
to file special and limited appearance did
not foreclose her from attacking judgment
on ground that it was entered without jurisdiction.
Order affirmed; cause remanded.
1. Divorce <3=»183, 184(4)
Husband, by failing to file any report
of proceedings in which judgment of divorce was vacated and wife was allowed
time to answer complaint for divorce, had
waived all points which Appellate Court

ADDENDUM 4
Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass'n,
57 111.2d 330, 312 N.E.2d 247 (1974)
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t. insurance <§=53t.3

5T IU.2d 330
Robert GLIDDEN, Indiv. and as admr.,
Appellant,
v.
The FARMERS AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Appellee.

No. 45990.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
May 29, 1974.

Provisions in automobile policies that,
if there was "other insurance," coverage
was "excess insurance" over similar coverage if insured was occupying a nonowned
automobile were not applicable in situation where insured was a pedestrian and not
occupying an automobile at time she was
struck and killed by an uninsured motorist.
2. Insurance <3=467.5I

Insuiei brought declaratory judgment
action against his insurer to determine limits of liability under three automobile policies. The Circuit Court, Winnebago County, Albert S. O'Sullivan, J., determined all
issues adversely to plaintiff, and plaintiff
appealed. The Appellate Court, 11 Ill.App.
3d 81, 296 N.E.2d 84, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, and plaintiff
appealed. The Supreme Court, Davis, J.,
held that where insured whose wife, while
a pedestrian, was struck and killed by an
uninsured motorist, had purchased three
distinct automobile policies from one insurer, each providing uninsured motorist
coverage in amount of $10,000 per person,
and medical payment coverage in amount
of $2,000 per person, "other insurance"
clauses, which were ambiguous as to whether they were effective to reduce insured's
-recovery to what he would have obtained
under one policy, were to be construed in
favor of insured so as to permit a recovery
up to $30,000 under the three uninsured motorist coverages, and $6,000 under the three
medical payment provisions, but not to
exceed total damages sustained It was
further held that setoffs were to apply only
where necessary to prevent double exposure for medical payments, that insurer was
subrogated to any moneys recovered by insured from uninsured tort-feasor and
«om an independent dram shop action,
and that insured was. not entitled to attorney's fees.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
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Public policy expressed by uninsured
motorist statute is that insured be provided
coverage which would compensate him, in
event of injury by an uninsured motorist,
to at least same extent as had he been injured by a motorist who was insured in
compliance with Financial Responsibility
Law. S.H.A. ch. 73, § 755a(l).
3. Insurance @=3|52*2
An insurance policy is not to be interpreted in a factual vacuum.
4. Insurance £=> 146.5(5)
Apparent purpose of "other insurance"
clauses is to make certain that one company does not pay a disproportionate
amount of the loss which is to be shared
with another company; such clauses have
no meaningful purpose when applied to coverage issued by one company to one insured.
5. Insurance <§=M46.7(I)
Ambiguities within an insurance policy
should be construed in favor of insured.
6. Insurance <§=*53l.2, 531.3
Where insured, whose wife, while a
pedestrian, was struck and killed by an uninsured motorist, had purchased three distinct automobile policies from one insurer,
each providing uninsured motorist coverage
in amount of $10,000 per person, and medical payment coverage in amount of $2,000
per person, "other insurance" clauses, which
were ambiguous as to whether they were
effective to reduce insured's recovery to
what he would have obtained under one
policy, were to be construed in favor of in-
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sured so as to permit a recovery up to $30,000 under the three uninsured motorist coverages, and $6,000 under the three medical
payment provisions, but not to exceed total
damages sustained. S.H.A. ch. 73, § 755a
(1).
7. Insurance <§=»532

Where total proven or undisputed damages incurred by insured are greater than
combined total of uninsured motorist and
medical coverage, crediting provision cannot apply; setoffs are to apply only where
necessary to prevent double exposure for
medical payments. S.H.A. ch. 73, § 755a
(1).
8. Insurance @=>606(l, 4)
Where plaintiff, whose wife, while a
pedestrian, was struck and killed by an
uninsured motorist, and plaintiff's insurer
was found liable for full amount of uninsured motorist and medical payment coverage under each of three policies issued to
plaintiff, insurer was subrogated to any
moneys recovered by plaintiff from uninsured tort-feasor and from an independent
dram shop action.
9. Costs C=>I72

Insured was not entitled to an award
of attorney's fees in declaratory judgment
action brought against insurer where insurer was within its rights in refusing to
arbitrate issues of liability and damages prior to question of coverage being settled
by courts. S.H.A. ch. 73, § 767.

Yalden & Ridings, Rockford (Craig A.
Ridings, Rockford, of counsel), for appellant.
Maynard & Brassfield, Rockford (Eugene E. Brassfield, Rockford, of counsel),
for appellee.
DAVIS, Justice.
The plaintiff, Robert Glidden, sued in the
circuit court of Winnebago County for a

declaratory judgment against the defendant, The Farmers Automobile Insurance
Association, his insurer, to construe the
limits of coverage under three certain automobile liability insurance policies issued to
the plaintiff, covering three separate vehicles. Part IV of each policy offered uninsured-motorist coverage in the amount
of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident, and Part II of each policy provided medical-payment coverage in the amount
of $2,000 per person. The plaintiff's wife,
while a pedestrian, was struck and killed by
an uninsured motorist.
It is the plaintiff's contention that he is
entitled to recover up to $30,000, i. e., $10,000 under the uninsured-motorist provisions
of each policy, without limitation by reason
of the "other insurance" provisions, and
also that he is entitled to recover up to
$6,000 under Part II, the medical-payment
provision of the three policies. The defendant contends that under the provisions
of the three policies the plaintiff is limited
ro a total recovery of $10,000 under Part
IV of his coverage, and $2,000 under Part
II, the medical-payment provision under
the three policies. The defendant further
contends that payments made under the
medical-payment provisions, Part I I , must
be set off against the payments to be made
under the uninsured-motorist coverage under Part IV.
The defendant also contends that it is
entitled to subrogation rights under the
provisions of its policies applicable to payments made for uninsured-motorist coverage. Lastly, the plaintiff contends that
he is entitled to the recovery of attorney's
fees from the defendant.
The trial court determined all issues adversely to the plaintiff. The appellate
court (11 Ill.App.3d 81, 296 N.E.2d 84
(1973)) held that the plaintiff is limited
to a maximum recovery of $10,000 under
Part IV of the uninsured-motorist provisions of the three policies; that the plaintiff is not so limited with respect to the
medical-payment coverage under Part II of
the three policies, and that he could re-
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cover a total of $6,000 thereunder; that
the monies paid out under the medical-payment provisions of Part II are not automatically to be credited against the uninsured-motorist payments under Part I V ;
that the defendant is entitled to subrogation from the proceeds of any settlement
or judgment resulting from the exercise
of rights of recovery of the insured against
the person or organization responsible for
the injury to the extent of payment made
by the insurer to the insured; and that
the plaintiff is not entitled to the recovery
of fees.
The primary issue of this appeal is
whether the plaintiff is limited to a maximum recovery of $10,000 under Part IV
of the three policies providing uninsuredmotorist coverage, or a total of $30,000.
The policies contain the usual provisions:
that if there is "other insurance" (1) the
coverage is "excess insurance" over similar coverage if the insured is occupying
an automobile not owned by him, and (2)
in all other situations the exposure is
limited to the payment only of the pro
rata portion of the loss represented by
the ratio of the limits of uninsured-motorist coverage provided by the particular
policy to the total of all such coverage
available to the insured, and the total
damages are deemed to be no greater than
the highest limit in an applicable policy.
Specifically, the policies state:
"Other Insurance:
With respect to
Bodily Injury to an insured while occupying an automobile not owned by
the named insured, the insurance under
Part IV shall apply only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance
available to such insured and applicable
to such automobile as primary insurance, and this insurance shall then apply only in the amount by which the
limits of liability for this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability
of such other insurance.
Except as provided in the foregoing
paragraph, if the insured has other sim312 N.E.2d—16Va
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ilar insurance available to him and applicable to the accident, the damages
shall be deemed not to exceed the higher
of the applicable limits of liability of
this insurance and such other insurance,
and the company shall not be liable for a
greater proportion of any loss to which
this coverage applies than the limit of
liability hereunder bears to the sum of
the applicable limits of liability of this
insurance and such other insurance."
[1] The first limitation, referring to
"excess insurance," is not applicable here
because the insured (plaintiffs wife) was
not occupying an automobile at the time
of the accident in question. The question
which arises is the effect of the second
paragraph of the above "other insurance"
provision, in this factual setting.
If the above clause is interpreted literally, it appears that the defendant's contention is correct. Each policy states that
if there is other insurance which also provides uninsured-motorist coverage, then
the liability of the insurer is limited to its
pro rata share of such coverage. Here,
there are three policies, each providing
$10,000 of such coverage, or a total of
$30,000. The exposure under each policy
would thus be one third of the $10,000 limit, or $3,333.33.
A majority of courts (see Annot. (1969),
28 A.L.R.3d 551, at 559 et seq.) have rejected such a literal interpretation, primarily under the theory that the result is
contrary to the public policy expressed in
the "Uninsured Motorist" statute of the
particular State. Like the comparable statute in Illinois, those "Uninsured Motorist"
statutes generally have provided that no
automobile liability insurance policy shall
be issued unless it provides uninsured-motorist coverage in the limits expressed in
the Financial Responsibility Law ($10,000
per person, $20,000 per accident).
These courts have stated that the statut o r y language of the "Uninsured Motorist" statutes is plain, unambiguous and
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mandatory in providing that no insurance
"policy * * * shall be renewed or delivered or issued * * * unless coverage
is provided therein * * * in limits
* * * set forth [in the Financial Responsibility L a w ] . "
(See Ill.Rev.Stat.
1969, ch. 73, par. 755a(l).) This line of
authority concludes that each policy must
contain the specified coverage; and that
the proration provisions of the uninsuredmotorist clauses, being contrary to the
policy expressed in the controlling statutory
language, must be judicially rejected. Van
Tassel v. Horace Mann Insurance Co.
(1973), 296 Minn. 181, 207 N.W.2d 348;
Blakeslee v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. (1972), 388 Mich. 464, 201 N.W.2d
786; Protective Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Woten (1970), 186 Neb. 212, 181 N.W.2d
835; Sellers v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. (Fla.1966), 185 So.2d 689;
Alliance Mutual Casualty Co. v. Duerson
(Colo.App.1973), 510 P.2d 458.
[2] However, there is a clear division
of authority on this question. (See Annot.
(1969), 28 A.L.R.3d 551.) We are not
compelled to follow the majority view,
and under the facts in the following cases,
we have rejected the rationale expressed
by that view. (Morelock v. Millers' Mutual
Insurance Association (1971), 49 I11.2d 234,
274 N.E.2d 1; Putnam v. New Amsterdam
Casualty Co. (1970), 48 I11.2d 71, 269 N.E.
2d 97.) In both Morelock and Putnam
we held that the public policy expressed
by our uninsured-motorist statute is that
the insured be provided coverage which
would compensate him, in event of injury
by an uninsured motorist, to at least the
same extent as had he been injured by a
motorist who was insured in compliance
with the Financial Responsibility Law.
In Morelock, 49 I11.2d at page 239, 274
N.E.2d at page 3, we stated that "the
'other insurance* clause does not frustrate
the legislative purpose and thereby violate
public policy * * *."
[3] There is, however, a distinguishing
factor in this case. Here one insurer issued three different policies on three sep-

arate vehicles to one insured. Each policy
provided separate uninsured-motorist coverage under Part IV, and medical-payments
coverage under Part II, and a separate
premium was accepted by the insurer from
the insured for those coverages. An insurance policy is not to be interpreted in
a factual vacuum; it is issued under given
factual circumstances. What at first blush
might appear unambiguous in the insurance
contract might not be such in the particular factual setting in which the contract
was issued. Jensen v. New Amsterdam
Insurance Co. (1965), 65 Ill.App.2d 407,
415, 213 N.E.2d 141.
[4-6] When an insured
purchases
three distinct policies from an insurer, each
providing the specified coverage, and pays
a separate premium for each, does he
reasonably contemplate that the "other insurance" clauses therein are effective to
reduce his recovery to what he would have
obtained under one policy? We think not.
The apparent purpose of "other insurance"
clauses is to make certain that one company does not pay a disproportionate
amount of a loss which is to be shared with
another company. There is no purpose in
proration unless the "other insurance" is
written by another company. The clause
has no meaningful purpose when applied
to coverage issued by one company to one
insured. In this situation its meaning is
ambiguous, and the clause should be construed in favor of the insured. United
Services Automobile Association v. Dokter
(1970), 86 Nev. 917, 920, 478 P.2d 583, 585;
Sturdy v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.
(1969), 203 Kan. 783, 457 P.2d 34; see also
Deterding v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1966), 78 Ul.App.2d
29, 36, 222 N.E.2d 523.
It is true that an insured might end up
in a case such as -this in a better situation
than if the wrongdoer had been insured
to the minimum requirements of the Financial Responsibility Law. That, however, is not material as long as he pays
for the coverage. The insured is better
off because he paid additional premiums.
If there is to be a "windfall" in this situa-
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tion, it should be to the insured, who paid
the several premiums, rather than to the
insurer, which collected them. (See Widiss, Perspectives on Uninsured Motorist
Coverage, 62 Nw.U.L.Rev. 497, 523
(1967).) We conclude that the plaintiff
is entitled to recover up to $30,000 under
the three uninsured-motorist coverages, not
to exceed, however, the total damages sustained.
Regarding the medical-payment provisions and the question of whether the plaintiff may recover up to $6,000 under all
three policies, or be limited to the $2,000
coverage of one policy, the "other insurance" clause under this coverage provides:
"If there is other automobile medical
payments insurance against a loss covered by Part II of this policy the company shall not be liable under this policy
for a greater proportion of such loss than
the applicable limit of liability stated in
the declarations bears to the total applicable limit of liability of all valid and
collectible automobile medical payments
insurance; provided, however, the insurance with respect to a temporary substitute automobile or non-owned automobile shall be excess insurance over any
other valid and collectible automobile
medical payments insurance."
The above comments with respect to the
uninsured-motorist "other insurance'* provision are equally applicable to the medical-payment coverage. The plaintiff also
paid three separate premiums for the medical-payment coverage in each policy. It
would be unconscionable to permit the single insurer to issue the three coverages to
the insured, collect the premiums therefor,
and contend the "other insurance" clause
bars recovery of more than the limit expressed in one policy. We also note that
this "other insurance" clause is only a pro
rata clause and does not expressly limit the
total recovery to the highest limit in any
one policy. The plaintiff may recover up
to $6,000 under the three policies, not to
exceed, however, the total damages sustained.
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[7] As to the question of whether the
payments made under the medical-payment
provisions of a policy are to be set off
against the payments to be made under the
uninsured-motorist provisions, the appellate
court held that its decision in Melson v.
Illinois National Insurance Co. (1971), 1
Ill.App.3d 1025, 274 N.E.2d 664, was to
be followed. In that case, at page 1028,
274 N.E.2d at page 666f the appellate court
stated that "where the total proven or undisputed damages incurred by the insured
are greater than the combined total of
uninsured motorist and medical coverage,
the crediting provision cannot apply." Setoffs are to apply only where necessary to
prevent double exposure for medical payments. We agree with that conclusion.
If the crediting provisions were to apply in all situations, including those where
the total damages suffered 'by the insured
exceed the combined total uninsured-motorist and medical-payment coverages, the
net result would be that the uninsuredmotorist coverage under the policy would
not assure compensation comparable to that
available if the insured had been injured
by one insured in compliance with the Financial Responsibility Law. Such an interpretation would run afoul of the minimum coverage required under our decisions
in Morelock v. Millers' Mutual Insurance
Association (1971), 49 I11.2d 234, 274 N.E.
2d 1, and Putnam v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. (1970), 48 I11.2d 71, 269 N.E.2d
97.
[8] The uninsured-motorist clauses of
the policies provide that to the extent the
company makes any payments thereunder,
it is subrogated to the rights of the insured
to any proceeds recovered from one legally
responsible for the injury. The appellate
court held that the insurer was entitled
to such subrogation, and cited Remsen v.
Midway Liquors, Inc. (1961), 30 Ill.App.
2d 132, 174 N.E.2d 7. In the instant case,
the plaintiff had pending an independent
dramshop action. The trial court held that
the defendant company, to the extent of
payments made under the uninsured-motor-
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ist coverage, was subrogated to any monies
recovered by the plaintiff in that action.
We believe that the insurer should be subrogated to any monies recovered from the
uninsured tortfeasor and under the dramshop action.
[9] As to the plaintiffs right to attorney's fees, we believe the appellate court
correct in holding that the defendant was
within its rights in refusing to arbitrate
issues of liability and damages prior to the
question of coverage being settled by the
courts. (Flood v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1968), 41 I11.2d 91, 242 N.E.2d
149.) The questions of coverage in this
case were complex. The conduct of the
defendant was not vexatious or without
reasonable cause (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1969, ch. 73,
par. 767), and the refusal to allow fees was
proper.
The judgments of the trial court and of
the appellate court are affirmed in part
and reversed in part, and this cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part
and remanded.

tate taxes and declaratory judgment that
certain assessment procedures are invalid.
The Circuit Court, Cook County, Walter P.
Dahl, J.f dismissed the suits, and taxpayers
appealed. The appeals were consolidated.
The Supreme Court, Ryan, J., held that adequate remedy at law existed by means of
payment of taxes under protest and that
county assessors assessments were valid.
Affirmed.

1. Declaratory Judgment €=»4I
Injunction G=>I6
Existence of an adequate remedy at
law prohibits injunctive relief but existence
of another remedy does not preclude declaratory relief.
2. Declaratory Judgment <£=>2I6
Relief should not be afforded by way
of declaratory judgment in case challenging validity of tax assessment if case
would not merit relief by way of injunction; same principles prohibiting granting
of injunction prohibit granting declaratory
relief in such cases. S.H.A. ch. 110, § 57.1.
3. Taxation @=>2, 494(1)

O

I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

37 I11.2d 318
La SALLE NATIONAL BANK, Trustee,
Appellant,
v.
The COUNTY OF COOK et a!.f Appellees.
OAK PARK TRUST AND SAVINGS
BANK, Trustee, Appellant,
v.
The COUNTY OF COOK et al., Appellees.

Nos. 45988, 46139.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
May 29, 1974.

Suits seeking injunction prohibiting
assessment, levy and collection of real es-

Taxation of property is a legislative
and not a judicial function and courts will
not review assessments of property upon
which taxes are based unless assessments
are fraudulent or constructively fraudulent.
4. Declaratory Judgment C=2I6
Taxation <§=*498, 608(9)
Even though taxpayers alleged in complaint that the failure of Revenue Act to
provide them with right of judicial review
while providing review to taxpayers outside county violated their rights of due
process and equal protection, where complaint in actuality simply complained that
property had been assessed at excessively
high value, legal remedy by way of payment of real estate taxes under protest followed by objections to application for
judgment for delinquent taxes provided adequate remedy at law, so that taxpayers
did not have grounds for relief by way of
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30 Ill.App.2d 132
Delbert E. REMSEN, Administrator of the
Estate of George W. Remsen, Deceased,
and Elizabeth N. Remsen, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
M I D W A Y LIQUORS, INC., a corporation,
and Town Hall Tavern, Inc., a corporation, Defendants^

payment under circumstances entitling him
to contribution or indemnity, while "assignment" necessarily contemplates the
continued existence of the debt or claim
assigned.
See publication Words and Phrases,
for other judicial constructions and definitions of "Assignment" and "Subrogation".

and
Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Intervenor-Appeilee.
Gen. No. 11428.

Appellate Court of Illinois.
Second District, Second Division.

3. Assignments «S=31

"Assignment" has a comprehensive
meaning and is a transfer or making over
to another of the whole of any property,
real or personal in possession, or in action,
or of an estate, or right therein.

April 19, 1961.
4. Assignments <§=24(2)

Suit involving the distribution of the
settlement proceeds for injuries in loss of
support in an action under the Liquor Control Act. An insurer was granted leave
to intervene. From a judgment of the
Circuit Court, Winnebago County, Albert
S. O'Sullivan, J., the plaintiffs appealed.
The Appellate Court, Spivey, J., held that
a trust agreement was one of subrogation
and not a prohibited assignment of an action for injuries to the body and that the
trial court properly allocated the attorneys'
fees among the various claimants to the
proceedings in the Dram Shop action.

The release and trust executed by administrator of deceased-insured under family automobile policy and by his injured
wife, providing that their claims were
transferred to insurer only to extent of
insurer's payment and were repayable only
in the event of its recovery from anyone
liable for injury was agreement of "subrogation" and not forbidden assignment of
injury cause. 111.Rev.Stat. 1957, c. 43, §§
135, 136; S.H.A. ch. 110, § 26.1(1) (c).
See publication Words and Phrases,
for other judicial constructions and definitions of "Subrogation".
5. Insurance <§=3606(l)

Affirmed.

1. Subrogation <©=>l

Subrogation is founded on principles of
justice and equity and its operation is governed by equitable principles and rests on
the principle that substantial justice
should be attained regardless of form.

An advance by insurer of the amount
of insurance to insured under a loan agreement reciting that the amount is received
as a loan to be repaid only from such recovery as might be had from a third person is not an "assignment" of the insured's
cause of action.
6. Subrogation <§=»!

2. Assignments €=31
Subrogation <§=H

"Subrogation" presupposes an actual
payment and satisfaction of the debt or
claim to which the party is subrogated, although the remedy is kept alive in equity
for the benefit of the one who made the

69

Doctrine of subrogation is a favorite
of the law and applies where one person,
not acting as a mere volunteer or intruder,
pays a debt for which another is primarily
liable and which in equity and good conscience should have been discharged by the
latter.
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7. Subrogation €=>l
There is no public policy forbidding
subrogation of bodily injury cases.
8. Insurance <^452, 530
"Uninsured motorist coverage" is not
likened to medical payments protection
which are limited to $500 for each person
injured without regard to liability whereas
"uninsured motorist coverage" compensates
only when there is liability on part of another for injury, and the recovery thereunder, in addition, provides for loss of
wages and income, loss of support, and pain
and suffering, which might properly be compensable by the person causing the injury.
See publication Words and Phrases,
for other judicial constructions and definitions of "Uninsured Motorist Coverage".
9. Contracts <§=*I59
The term "proceeds" in written instruments has many meanings and the subject
matter and purpose of the contract must
be considered, and it means gross proceeds
and net proceeds.
See publication Words and Phrases,
for other judicial constructions and definitions of "Proceeds".
10. Insurance C=al46(3)
A policy is construed most favorable
to the named insured and others who are
covered by it.
I!. Insurance €=>607
Within automobile policy and trust
agreement executed between insurer and
insured-decedent's administrator and widow providing that insurer having made
payments would be entitled, to. extent of
payments, to "proceeds" of any settlement
or judgment, "proceeds" meant what litigant would actually receive after reasonable costs of proceeding including attorneys' fees so that subrogors were entitled
to attorney fees paid in connection with
settlement by them of a dram shop action
with portion of the proceeds of the settle-

ment of which insurer was subrogated.
Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, c. 43, §§ 135, 136; S.H.A.
ch. 110, §26.1(1) (c).
See publication Words and Phrases,
for other judicial constructions and definitions of "Proceeds".

Miller, Thomas, Hickey & Collins, Rockford, for appellants.
Foltz, Haye & Keegan, Rockford,
appellee.

for

SPIVEY, Justice.
This appeal involves an order of the
Circuit Court of Winnebago County distributing the settlement proceeds for injuries in loss of support in an action under
Art. VI, Sect. 14 of the Liquor Control
Act, Chap. 43, Sect. 135, Ill.Rev.Stat.1957.
George W. Remsen was insured under a
family automobile insurance policy issued
by the intervenor, Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin.
In addition to the usual and customary coverage provided, Remsen obtained and paid
an additional premium for what is termed"Family Protection Against Uninsured Motorists", said coverage affording liability
limits of $10,000 for each person and $20,000 for each accident.
On September 29, 1957, Remsen and his
wife, Elizabeth, were involved in an automobile collision with one John Reynold
Carlson who carried no liability insurance
on his automobile. As a result of the occurrence, Remsen received injuries from
which he subsequently died and his wife,
Elizabeth, was seriously injured in her person.
Subsequently, on September 23, 1958,
Delbert E. Remsen, as administrator of the
estate of George W. Remsen, and Elizabeth
N. Remsen, individually, instituted a dram
shop action under the provisions of Art.
VI, Sect. 135 of the Liquor Control Act
against Midway Liquors, Inc. and Town
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Hall Tavern, Inc. alleging that they caused
the intoxication of Carlson in whole or
part.
Count I of the complaint is an action by
the administrator for the benefit of the dependents of George W. Remsen, his widow,
Elizabeth, and their five minor children,
for injury in their means of support.
Count II is an individual action by Elizabeth N. Remsen, the widow, for injuries
to her person. The appeal presents no
issue as to the liability of either dram shop
defendant.
Following the filing of the dram shop
action (date not disclosed by the record),
the suit was settled by the administrator
and Elizabeth Remsen individually with
Midway Liquors, Inc. and a covenant not
to sue executed. By the terms of this settlement Midway Liquors, Inc. paid to the
administrator the sum of $6,250 for injury
to means of support and to Elizabeth N.
Remsen the sum of $6,250 for her personal
injuries. On November 18, 1959, by stipulation of the administrator and Elizabeth
Remsen, an order dismissing the cause of
action as to Midway Liquors, Inc. was entered.
Thereafter (date not disclosed by the
record), the administrator entered into a
settlement agreement with the defendant
Town Hall Tavern; by the terms of said
agreement the administrator was paid the
sum of $13,250 for injury to means of
support. On March 7, 1960, Elizabeth Remsen dismissed Count II of the complaint.
The record is absent of any order dismissing Count I as to the defendant Town Hall
Tavern.
»i
Pursuant to a previous order of July 21,
1959, all settlement funds were deposited
with the Clerk of the Court pending further order of distribution. This fund
amounted to $26,500 which included $6,625
received by Elizabeth Remsen for her personal injuries, and $19,875 received by the
administrator for the loss of means of support alleged to have been sustained by the
174 N . E . 2 d — 1 %
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dependents of George W. Remsen, deceased.
On February 19, 1960, Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of W i s consin was granted leave to intervene and
file an intervening petition as provided by
Chap. 110, Sect. 26.1(1) (c), Ill.Rev.Stat.
1959.
In their intervening petition, Employers
allege they have been subrogated to $19,500
of the settlement proceeds of the dram
shop action and ask that they be reimbursed in that amount out of the funds in
the hands of the Clerk of the Court. The
petition further alleges that Employers had
paid pursuant to its insuring agreement
rider for family protection against an uninsured motorist the sum of $10,000 t o
Delbert E. Remsen as administrator and
$9,500 to Elizabeth N. Remsen.
In consideration of these payments Delbert E. Remsen as administrator of the
estate of George W. Remsen, and Elizabeth N. Remsen each executed identical instruments (except as to amount) to Employers styled "Policy Release and Trust
Agreement" each dated October 22, 1958.
These instruments were prepared by a representative of Employers and provided a s
follows:
"Know All Men By These Presents: that
for and in consideration of the payment to
me of * * * by Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin,
hereinafter called the Company, the receipt
of which is hereby acknowledged, I do hereby fully and forever release and discharge
the Company from any and all claims and
demands, actions and causes of action,
which I may have against the Company
under the "Family Protection Against U n insured Motorists'' endorsement attached t o
Policy No. 0237-00-024257, because of t h e
death of George W. Remsen, resulting or t o
result from that certain accident on or
about the 29th day of September, 1957, at
or near the intersection of Route 173 and
Collins Road, County of Winnebago, State
of Illinois.
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"I have not made any settlement with or
prosecuted to judgment any action against
any person or organization who may be legally liable for bodily injury on account of
which the Company is making this payment.
Such person or organization, wherever
mentioned in this Release and Trust Agreement, shall include John Reynold Carlson
and also any person or organization who
may be liable for said bodily injury under
Section 14 or 15 of Article VI of An Act of
the General Assembly of the* State of Illinois entitled 'An Act Relating to Alcoholic
Liquors/ in force February 1, 1934, or any
law amendatory thereof.
"I agree that this settlement is in full
compromise of a doubtful and disputed
claim both as to the question of liability and
that the payment is not to be construed as
an admission of liability.
"I further agree that in consideration of
this payment:
"(a) any amount which I may be entitled
to recover from any person who is an insured under the bodily injury liability coverage of said policy shall be reduced by the
amount of this payment;
"(b) that the Company shall be entitled to
the extent of this payment of $10,000 to the
proceeds of any settlement or judgment that
may result from the exercise of any rights
of recovery I may have against any person
or organization legally responsible for the
bodily injury because of which this payment
is made;
"(c) that I shall hold in trust for the
benefit of the Company all rights of recovery to the extent of the payment of * * *
which I shall have against such other person or organization because of the damages
which are the subject of claim made under
the 'Family Protection Against Uninsured
Motorists' endorsement;
"(d) that I shall do whatever is proper
to secure and shall do nothing after loss to
prejudice such rights;

"(e) that if requested in writing by the
Company, I shall take, through any representative designated by the Company, provided the Company pays all attorney's fees,
costs and expenses, such action as may be
necessary or appropriate to recover such
payment as damages from such other person or organization, such action to be taken
in my name; in the event of a recovery,
the Company shall be reimbursed out of
such recovery for expenses, costs and attorneys' fees incurred by it in connection
therewith;
"(f) that I shall execute and deliver to
the Company such instruments and papers
as may be appropriate to secure my rights
and obligations and those of the Company
established by this provision."
The provisions of the policy endorsement
covering Family Protection Against Uninsured Motorists (Bodily Injury Liability)
as amended, insofar as they are germane
provide:
"I.

Damage for Bodily Injury Caused
by Uninsured Automobiles.

"To pay all sums which the insured or his
legal representative shall be legally entitled
to recover as damages from the owner or
operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury, sickness or disease,
including death resulting therefrom, hereinafter called 'bodily injury', sustained by the
insured, caused by accident and arising out
of the ownership, maintenance or use of
such uninsured automobile; provided, for
the purpose of this endorsement, determination as to whether the insured or such representative is legally entitled to recover
such damages, and if so the amount thereof,
shall be made by agreement between the insured or such representative and the company or, if they fail to agree and the insured so demands, by arbitration."
"4. Limits of Liability, (a) The limits
of liability stated in the schedule as applicable to 'each person' is the limit of the
company's liability for all damages, includ-
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ing damages for care or loss of services, because of bodily injury sustained by one person as the result of any one accident and,
subject to the above provision respecting
each person the limit of liability stated in
the schedule as applicable to 'each accident'
is the total limit of the company's liability
for all damages, including damages for care
or loss of services, because of bodily injury
sustained by two or more persons as a result of any one accident."
"7. Trust Agreement. In the event of
payment to any person under this endorsement :
"(a) the company shall be entitled to the
extent of such payment to the proceeds of
any settlement or judgment that may result
from the exercise of any rights of recovery
of such person against any person or organization legally responsible for the bodily
injury because of which such payment is
made;
"(b) such person shall hold in trust for
the benefit of the company all rights of recovery which he shall have against such
other person or organization because of the
damages which are the subject of claim
made under this endorsement;
"(c) such person shall do whatever is
proper to secure and shall do nothing after
loss to prejudice such rights;
"(d) if requested in writing by the company, such person shall take, through any
representative designated by the company,
such action as may be necessary or appropriate to recover such payment as damages
from such other person or organization,
such action to be taken in the name of such
person; in the event of a recovery, the company shall be reimbursed out of such recovery for expenses, costs and attorneys' fees
incurred by it in connection therewith;
"(e) such person shall execute and deliver to the company such instruments and
papers as may be appropriate to secure the
rights and obligations of such person and
the company established by this provision."

73

"8. Payment of Loss by the Company.
Any amount due hereunder is payable (a)
to the insured, or (b) if the insured be a
minor to his parent or guardian, or (c) if
the insured be deceased to his surviving
spouse, otherwise (d) to a person authorized by law to receive such payment or to
a person legally entitled to recover the
damages which the payment represents;
provided, the company may at its option pay
any amount due hereunder in accordance
with division (d) hereof."
The court by its judgment order appealed
from, in addition to making certain findings
of fact consistent with the facts set out in
this opinion, found, that the sum of $26,500
now in the hands of the Clerk must be distributed to resolve the claims of Deibert E.
Remsen, administrator, Elizabeth N. Remsen and Employers; that plaintiff's attorneys had rendered legal services of the fair
value of $8,800 which they are entitled to
recover from the aggregate sum of $26,500;
that Employers is entitled to the sum of
$10,000.00; recovered by the administrator,
said sum to be deducted from the share of
the proceeds after attorney's fees are deducted which amounts to $17,700; that
from the balance then remaining of $7,000,
the plaintiff, Elizabeth N. Remsen shall
have deducted from her share of the recovery ($6,625) for her personal injuries
the sum of $4,400 to be paid to Employers;
and that the balance then remaining of $3,300 be distributed to the dependents of
George W. Remsen, deceased, for their loss
of means of support. The judgment order
then ordered, adjudged, and decreed that
the Clerk pay Employers the sum of $10,000 from the proceeds obtained under
Count I ; pay Employers the sum of $4,400
from the proceeds obtained under Count
I I ; pay plaintiff's attorneys the sum of
$8,800; and pay unto the dependents of
George W. Remsen for their loss of means
of support, the sum of $3,300 to be apportioned to the widow and five children each
the sum of $550.
Insurance for protection against bodily
injury as a result of the wrongful acts of
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an uninsured motorist is of relative recent
origin. The purpose is to provide some
form of compensation for innocent victims
of accidents.
Under the uninsured motorists endorsement the insurance company agrees to pay
the insured all sums that he shall be legally
entitled to recover as damages for bodily
injury sustained by accident arising out of
ownership, maintenance and use of an uninsured automobile.
In the event of payment to any person
under the subject endorsement the policy
provides by its endorsement conditions entitled "Trust Agreement" that the company
shall be entitled to the extent of such payment to the proceeds of any settlement or
judgment that may result from the exercise
of any right of recovery of such person
against any person or organization legally
responsible for the bodily injury because
of which such payment is made, and further provides that the person receiving payment shall execute and deliver to the company such instruments as may be appropriate to secure the rights and obligations of
such person and the company.
Appellants contend that the Policy Release and Trust Agreements executed by
the administrator and Elizabeth Remsen
amounted to an assignment of an action
for injuries to the body and as such are
prohibited in Illinois. If as appellants urge
they constitute an assignment of an action
for injuries to the body they are void.
North Chicago Street Railway Co. v. Ackley, 171 111. 100, 49 N.E. 222, 44 L.R.A.
177; and Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 111. 571, 162
N.E. 170.
Appellee on the other hand suggests that
this instrument is a subrogation agreement
and only an assignment of the proceeds of
any recovery or a part thereof.
Counsel for both parties state and our
research confirms, the character of the
Trust Agreement has not been construed
by any reviewing court in the United
States.

Basically, subrogation arises in two manners, legal subrogation out of a condition
or relationship by operation of law and
conventional subrogation by act of the parties.
[1] Subrogation is founded on principles of justice and equity, and its operation is governed by principles of equity. It
rests on the principle that substantial justice should be attained regardless of form,
that is, its basis is the doing of complete,
essential and perfect justice between the
parties without regard to form. 83 C J . S .
Subrogation § 2a. People ex rel. Nelson
v. Phillip State Bank and Trust Company
et al., 307 Ill.App. 464, 30 N.E.2d 771.
In S3 C J . S . Subrogation § 16, it is said,
"As a general rule, any person who, pursuant to a legal obligation to do so, has paid,
even indirectly, for a loss or injury resulting from the wrong or default of another
will be subrogated to the rights of the creditor or injured person against the wrongdoer or defaulter, persons who stand in the
shoes of the wrongdoer, or others who, as
the payor, are primarily responsible for
the wrong or default."
[2] Subrogation presupposes an actual
payment and satisfaction of the debt or
claim to which the party is subrogated, although the remedy is kept ahve in equity
for the benefit of the one who made the
payment under circumstances entitling him
to contribution or indemnity while assignment necessarily contemplates the continued
existence of the debt or claim assigned.
Subrogation operates only to secure contribution and indemnity, whereas an assignment transfers the whole claim. 6 C J . S .
Assignments § 2b(12).
[3] "The word 'assignment' has a comprehensive meaning, and in its most general sense is a transfer or making over to
another of the whole of any property, real
or personal, in possession or in action, or of
an estate or right therein." 6 C J . S . Assignments § l a ; Siegel v. People, 105 111. 89,
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and Talty v. Schoenholz, 323 111. 232, 154
N.E. 139.
In New York Casualty Co. v. Sinclair
Refining Co., 10 Cir., 108 F.2d 65, 71, it
was stated ' T h e doctrines of subrogation
and a constructive trust are analogous.
The creditor is regarded as holding his
claim against the principal debtor and his
securities therefor in trust for the subrogee."
[4] Based upon the general principles
we have set out, we conclude that the Trust
Agreement is one of subrogation and not an
assignment of an action for injuries to the
body. It meets all of the characteristics
of subrogation in that the debt was paid
under a legal obligation for the wrong of
another. It does not transfer the entire
claim but only to the extent of the insurer's
payment and is repayable only in the event
of subrogor's recovery from any person liable for the injury.
An analogous proposition is found in National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Johnson,
317 Mass. 485, 58 N.E.2d 849. In that case
a claim was made by the insured under a
policy of forgery insurance. The insurance carrier made payments to the defrauded insured under the terms of the policy and
the insured in consideration for such payment executed and delivered a loan receipt
for the amount paid. The receipt provided
that the loan was repayable only to the extent of any net recovery that insured might
obtain on account of such loss from the
forgeries and as security for the payment
the insured pledged the recovery to the carrier and insured agreed to commence and
prosecute at the expense and under the
control of the carrier an action against the
one liable for the forgeries.
The court concluded that it was doubtless the law that the right to litigate a
fraud is not assignable at law or equity
being contrary to public policy but that the
instrument in question was not an assignment of the claim.
[5] 46 C.J.S. Insurance § 1209(1) (c),
states, "An advance by insurer of the
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amount of insurance to insured, under a
loan agreement reciting that the amount
was received as a loan to be repaid only
from such recovery as might be had from a
third person, does not constitute an assignment of insured's cause of action." See
also Katz v. Hotel Murida, 194 Misc. 741,
90 N.Y.S.2d 760; Kelley, Maus & Co. v.
Newman, 79 Ill.App. 285; Hibernian Banking Association v. Davis, 295 111. 537, 129
N.E. 540; Farmers' State Bank, McNabb,
111. v. Kidd, 313 IlLApp. 132, 39 N.E.2d
394.
Concluding as we have that the instant
case presents a case of conventional subrogation, should we, under the facts in this
case, extend that doctrine to injuries to the
body and would its application promote
justice and equity ?
The application of subrogation will not
create the conditions giving rise to the underlying reasons announced in all of the
Illinois decisions, including the Ackley and
Bierd cases, for holding an assignment of
an action for injuries to the body to be
against public policy.
[6] The doctrine of subrogation has
been steadily expanding, is a favorite of
the law and has been nurtured and encouraged. It is broad enough as now applied to include every instance in which one
person not acting as a mere volunteer or intruder pays a debt for which another is
primarily liable, and which in equity and
good conscience should have been discharged by the latter. Smith v. Clavey
Ravinia Nurseries, Inc., 329 Ill.App. 548,
69 N.E.2.d 921. Cited with approval in
Dworak for Use of Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Tempel, 18 Ill.App.2d 225, 152 N.E.2d 197,
affirmed 17 I11.2d 181, 161 N.E.2d 258;
Geneva Construction Company et al. v.
Martin Transfer & Storage Company, 4 111.
2d 273, 122 N.E.2d 540; and Standard
Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, 19 Ill.App.2d
319, 152 N.E.2d 500.
Common law subrogation has been recognized and applied to injuries to the bod^
under the Workmen's Compensation Act of
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Illinois. Geneva Construction Company
et al. v. Martin Transfer & Storage Company cited above.
Our attention has not been called to any
authority to the effect that subrogation, as
opposed to an assignment, of injuries to the
body is against public policy and not permissible.
[7] Finding no public policy reasons for
forbidding subrogation of bodily injury cases, we find it was proper in this case for
the same reasons they have been found
proper in dram shop actions involving property damage as announced in the Dworak
case cited above.
Appellants contend the court erred in allowing intervention to impress a subrogation claim in a loss of means of support
dram shop action.
By the plain terms of the contract of insurance the carrier's right to repayment
may be had "against any person or organization legally responsible for the bodily
injury." (Emphasis supplied.)
The dram shop operators were legally liable for the damages and we held that subrogation under the uninsured motorists clause
is proper.
It is argued that the full amount recovered shall be for the exclusive benefit of the
person or persons injured in loss of support.
The recovery less the subrogation claim
was so distributed.
This subrogation will not deprive a recovery to those entitled to loss of means of
support or damages because the funds in
the hands of the administrator paid by Employers is available for distribution to the
widow and next of kin under the Injuries
Act for pecuniary injuries resulting from
the death of George W. Remsen.
[8] Appellants further contend that the
uninsured motorists protection should be
likened to medical payments protection.
With this suggestion we are unable to
agree.

Payments under the medical payment
clause are limited to $500 for each person
injured without regard to liability.
They
are limited to reasonable expenses incurred
by the injured person for medical, hospital,
nursing and funeral services. They stand
in the same category as any contract for
accident insurance.
Nor is there any
agreement to repay.
On the other hand, uninsured motorists
coverage compensates only when there is
liability on the part of another for the injury. (Also hit and run). The recovery
under the uninsured motorists clause in
addition provides for loss of wages and
income, loss of support, and pain and suffering which might properly be compensable by the person causing the injury. Recovery under the uninsured motorists clause
would not preclude recovery under the
medical payments clause.
We have considered the other reasons
advanced by appellants in support of their
assignments of error and find they are
without merit.
Intervenor-appellee filed a cross appeal
and assigned as cross-error the court's
awarding attorneys' fees out of the funds
paid in settlement of the dram shop action.
No claim is made that the attorney fees
are unreasonable.
Appellee contends they are entitled to
full reimbursement up to the amount of the
proceeds paid the administrator and Elizabeth Remsen in the dram shop action, before attorneys' fees in that action may be
deducted from the proceeds. In particular
Employers say that it is entitled to the full
$6,625 of the proceeds paid Elizabeth Remsen for the injuries to her person rather
than $4,400 representing the $6,625 less
attorneys' fees.
The policy and the trust agreement both
provide that the company shall be entitled,
to the extent of their payments, to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment. We
must decide what the word "proceeds" implies.
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[9] In Gould v. Lewis, 267 Ill.App. 569,
the court said, " * * * 50 Corpus Juris
427, expresses 'a broad middle ground* in
the interpretation of the term 'Proceeds/
Not a word of any fixed or definite meaning, but of varying and loose significance,
employed with different meanings, of equivocal import and great genuality. * * *
Its meaning in case each depends on its
context, depends very much on the connection in which it is employed and the subject matter to which it is applied. The
same authority also states (at pages 429,
430) : 'In contracts and written instruments, the word "proceeds" has many
meanings and varied usages and is in many
instances of doubtful meaning. The subject matter and purpose of a contract must
be considered in order to determine the
meaning of the word as used by the parties. As used, the word has been variously defined, * * *; it has been held to
mean gross proceeds and net proceeds/
From a review of the many authorities cited
in Corpus Juris it is clear that the statement therein contained that 'the word "proceeds" has many meanings and varied
usages and is in many instances of doubtful meaning,' is fully justified. In 23 Am.
& Eng.Ency. of Law, 195, it is stated that
'the term (proceeds) is one of equivocal
import. Its construction depends much
upon the context and the subject matter
to which it is applied. * * * The general rule that where the terms of a contract are ambiguous and uncertain their
meaning may be determined from extrinsic
evidence, also applies to the instant contract/ "
[10] A policy of insurance is construed
most favorable to the named insured and
others who are covered by it. Western
States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Standard Mutual
Ins. Co., 26 Ill.App.2d Z7&, 167 N.E.2d S33;
Rashinski v. Travelers Casualty Ins. Co.,
312 Ill.App. 260, 38 N.E.2d 362; and Scott
v. Inter-Insurance Exchange of Chicago
Motor Club, 267 Ill.App. 105, affirmed 352
111. 572, 186 N.E. 176.
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The same rule of construction has oft
times been applied against the scrivener of
any instrument of contract.
As in the instant case, it is the practice
of plaintiff's attorneys to make a charge
for their services and should be well known
to the scrivener of both the policy and the
trust agreements.
[11] We feel that the only equitable
construction to place on the word "proceeds" is that it means what the litigant
would actually receive after the reasonable
costs of the proceeding including attorneys'
fees.
We find another compelling reason for
this conclusion. The contract of insurance
and the trust agreement permits the insured to institute proceedings against any
person liable for their injuries. It is fair
to foresee instances wherein the recovery
might be equal to or less than the subrogation rights and after applying that deduction, it would leave the insured to pay his
attorney out of his own separate funds.
This very situation has been recognized in
the Workmen's Compensation Act of New
Jersey.
Cross-appellant cites the case of Manion
v. Chicago, R. I. P. R. Co., 2 Ill.App.2d
191, 119 N.E.2d 498, wherein this court held
that an employer who had paid an injured
employee under the Workmen's Compensation Act was entitled to reimbursement
pursuant to Section 29 (now Section 5 of
the Workmen's Compensation Act) out of
any recovery by the employee in a common law action against any negligent third
party, without bearing a share of costs
and attorney fees incurred in the common
law action. Worthy of note is the fact
that following this decision Section 5 was
amended to provide for the employer sharing in the costs and attorneys' fees in the
third party common law action.
We do not feel that the Manion opinion
will be in conflict in any way with our
holding. That decision was based upon
statutory subrogation, whereas we are deal-
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ing with conventional subrogation based
upon contract.
The Manion case hinged upon an interpretation of the statute as did the three
cases cited therein. When the Manion case
was decided the statute was silent as to
attorneys' fees and the court properly concluded that it was the obvious intention
of the legislation that the employer be fully
reimbursed without regard to attorneys'
fees.
We conclude that the trial court properly allocated the attorneys' fees among the
various claimants to the proceedings of the
dram shop action.
The order of the Circuit Court of Winnebago County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
CROW, P. J., and WRIGHT, J., concur.

O
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city. The Circuit Court, Rock Island
County, A. J. Scheineman, J., rendered a
judgment for the city, and the owner appealed. The Appellate Court, Crow, P. J.,
held that the owner, whose application and
guarantee of water bill, which provided
that acceptance of application by city
should constitute contract and be subject
to all existing and future regulations adopted by water department, was accepted by
city, was liable for the cost under ordinance.
Affirmed.

!. Waters and Water Courses 0 2 0 3 ( 1 )

Owner's application and guarantee of
water bill, which stated that acceptance
of application by city constituted contract
subject to regulations adopted by city for
wrater department was admissible as material, on issue of liability for cost of replacing service pipe, although owner's motion to strike city's defense that owner
had agreed to be subject to the regulation
was allowed. S.H.A. ch. 110, § 57.1.
2. Municipal Corporations C=>I22(I)

30 111 App.2d 167
Joseph R. ROSBOROUGH, PlaintiffAppellant,
V.
CITY OF MOLINE, a Municipal Corporation,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
Moline Heating and Construction Company,
a corporation, Defendant.

Gen. No. 11494.
Appellate Court of Illinois.
Second District, Second Division.

Ordinance of which court may or
must take judicial notice need not be
stated in pleading. S.H.A. ch. 51, § 48a.
3. Evidence C=32, 330
Ordinance stating that service pipes
from water main to premises shall be installed and maintained at expense of property owner was properly admitted in evidence, or properly judicially noticed, and
was material in suit by owner against city
for judgment determining whether owner
or city was liable for cost of repair to service pipe. S.H.A. ch. 51, § 48a.

April 21, 1961.
4. Municipal Corporations <§=>3, 57, 59

Suit by property owner for judgment
declaring whether cost of repair and replacement of water service pipe in city
street connecting water main to the property was chargeable to the owner or the

Cities are of statutory creation, and
their powers are limited to those which
are expressly granted by General Assembly
or are necessarily implied from such as
are granted.
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ADDENDUM 6
Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Christenson,
683 P.2d 1319 (Mont. 1984)
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SHEEHY, Justice, dissenting:
I dissent. This plaintiff is entitled to
have a jury determine whether the defendant was liable for her fall on the business
premises of the defendant.
It is clear from the evidence here, and it
is admitted in the defendant's brief on appeal that the color of the carpet on the
raised portion of the business premises
blended with the linoleum on the lower
portion of the business premises. The majority have interpreted the plaintiffs statement that she "just didn't see it," as an
indication that she did not look to determine the stair was there. It is as easy to
interpret the statement to mean that having looked she could not see it because the
carpet blended with the linoleum.
The majority decides, as the District
Court decided that because the plaintiff
had passed over the same step when she
went in the opposite direction 45 minutes to
one hour earlier, that she had knowledge of
the step and therefore knew of its existence on the return trip. That interpretation establishes a test that goes beyond
what migH be expected of a reasonably
prudent, ordinary person; it is a test for
superhumans. I doubt that any of us could
remember in detail the elevations in a
strange business premises one hour after
we had passed over the same for the first
time.
This woman rose from the hair dryer,
and returned to the step at the beckoning
of the attendant in the business. She sustained a dangerous fall which injured her
and resulted in a fracture to a bone in her
ankle because she "just did not see" that
the carpet was blended with the linoleum,
and actually was 6 inches higher than the
linoleum. It should be a jury decision as to
whether she was trapped by these innocent
looking premises.
This case should be submitted to the jury
on the issue of whether the business operator of the premises should have anticipated
the danger lurking in the coloration of the
linoleum and the carpet so as the raise a
duty to wrarn customers or alter the premises.
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One jieed only read the majority opinion
to realize that a fact issue exists in this
case. Most of the majority opinion is an
interpretation of the facts, and always
against the plaintiff. Interpretation of
facts is jury business, not court business.
The probability that plaintiff will not prevail at trial is no justification for granting
summary judgment. It may appear that
recovery is very remote, but that is not the
test. If there is a genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment is not appropriate. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P.
WEBER, Justice, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority
opinion. I agree with Justice Sheehy that
because there are genuine issues of material fact, summary judgment is not appropriate under Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P.
SHEA, Justice:
I join in the dissent of Mr Justice
Sheehy.

FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Mark Allen CHRISTENSON, Roland J.
Christenson and Karense M. Christenson, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 83-177.
Supreme Court of Montana.
Submitted March 2, 3^34.
Decided July 12, lii4.
Uninsured motorist and his parents
sought to vacate default judgment in action
brought against them by injured party's
uninsured motorist carrier. The District
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Court, Thirteenth Judicial District, in and
for the County of Yellowstone, William J.
Speare, J., denied motion, and defendants
appealed. The Supreme Court, Harrison,
J., held that uninsured motorist carrier can
make payment to insured, and when insured settles his claim or obtains judgment
against third party, carrier can subrogate
and collect back amount paid to insured;
furthermore, uninsured motorist carrier
can require that action be instituted in
name of insured against uninsured motorist in order to effectuate subrogation interest of uninsured motorist carrier, but action must not impair, diminish or jeopardize
insured's ability to recover any damages in
excess of subrogation amount.
Affirmed.
Morrison, J., and Weber, J., filed specially concurring opinions.
Sheehy, J., filed dissenting opinion.
Shea, J., dissented and will file opinion.

Insurance <s=>601.25, 607.1(2)
Uninsured motorist carrier can make
payment to insured, and when insured settles his claim or obtains judgment against
third party, carrier can subrogate and collect back amount paid to insured; furthermore, uninsured motorist carrier can require that action be instituted in name of
insured against uninsured motorist in order
to effectuate subrogation interest of uninsured motorist carrier, but action must not
impair, diminish or jeopardize insured's
ability to recover any damages in excess of
subrogation amount, and if subrogation occurs, uninsured motorist carrier must, in
good faith, seek for insured any other damages that he may not have received in his
payment from carrier; limiting Allstate v.
Reitler, 628 P.2d 667. (Per Harrison, J.,
with two Justices concurring and two Justices concurring in result.)

Lloyd E. Hartford argued, Billings, for
defendants and appellants.

§1-

Crowley Law Firm; Ronald Lodders argued, Billings, for plaintiff and respondent.
HARRISON, Justice.
This is an appeal from an order denying
a motion to vacate a default judgment and
stay of execution. The defendants sought
to vacate a default judgment by claiming
the judgment to be void The District
Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, in
and for the County of Yellowstone, denied
the defendants' motion
On June 6, 1981, defendant Mark A.
Christenson apparently caused an accident
by improperly operating a motor vehicle.
Kristine N. Hinckley, a passenger in the
vehicle, sustained injuries as a result of the
accident. Both Christenson and Hinckley
were minors at the time of the accident.
Christenson had no insurance on the vehicle when the accident occurred.
Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers)
insured Hinckley and paid $7,000 on her
claim arising out of the injuries she sustained in the accident. Farmers paid this
under an uninsured motorist provision in
the Hinckley insurance policy. As required
in the policy, the Hinckleys assigned their
personal injury action to Farmers as part
of a subrogation clause.
On February 10, 1982, Farmers filed an
action against Christenson and his parents
for $7,000 paid on the personal injury
claim. The Christensons received proper
service of the complaint and summons.
The Christensons failed to answer or take
any action to defend against this action.
On April 1, 1982, Farmers filed a motion
for default judgment and on July 29, 1982,
the court granted said motion.
On January 11, 198S the Christensons
filed a motion to vacate the default judgment and stay the execution. They asserted the judgment was void because Farmers
was an improper party in the action. The
Hinckleys lacked the ability to assign their
personal injury action via the subrogation
clause to Farmers. Following a hearing on
their case, the court found that the subro-

FARMERS INS. EXCHL <GE v. CHRISTENSON
Cite as 683 P.2d

gation occurred properly and that the default judgment was entered properly.
Appellants raise two issues on appeal:
(1) Can an insured party subrogate a
personal injury action to an insurance company following the payment of claims arising out of a policy protection against uninsured motorist?
(2) Was the default judgment void if
Farmers was an improper party to the action?
Appellants contend the District Court
erred in determining that respondent received a valid subrogation interest from
Kristine Hinckley. They contend that an
injured party cannot subrogate a personal
injury claim to an insurance company.
Such subrogation is invalid. Therefore, the
insurance company is not a real party in
interest in the suit and cannot sue the
tortfeasor.
Appellants rely heavily on Allstate v.
Reitler (Mont.1981), 628 P.2d 667, 38 St.
Rep. 821, for the proposition that the insured cannot subrogate personal injury
claims to an insurance company
Reitler
involved a woman, Welton, who suffered
an injury in an automobile accident caused
by Reitler. Welton received $2,000 from
Allstate for her medical expenses, but that
amount failed to cover the total expenses.
She then settled with Reitler's insurance
company (Farmers Insurance Exchange)
and signed a release of claims against
them. Allstate then claimed a right to
subrogation and tried to recover the $2,000
it paid to Welton from Reitler. This Court
held that subrogation clauses on medical
insurance policies are invalid, and went on
to say the insured could not subrogate
their personal injury claim to the insurance
company.
Appellants also cite Cody v. Cogswell
(1935), 100 Mont. 496, 50 P.2d 249, to support their claim that personal injury claims
cannot be assigned. That case involved a
writ of attachment on a personal injury
cause of action before a judgment was
rendered. This Court held that personal
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injury suits were not subject to writs of
attachment.
Respondent distinguishes Reitler in that
it involved medical payment coverage and
not uninsured motorist coverage. It dismisses the broad statements against assignment of personal injury claims as dicta.
Justice Morrison, the author of Reitler,
carefully limited the holding to medical
payments subrogation clauses:
"We hold that medical payment subrogation clauses are invalid. In doing so, we
are mindful that this Court is joining a
minority of jurisdictions so holding.
However, the public policy considerations
militate in favor of such a result.'' 628
P.2d at 670, 38 St.Rep. at 824.
This is not to say we approve of the
wording of the clause in this contract
which in our opinion could be abused by the
insurance company. The clause reads:
"Subrogation. In the event of any payment under this policy, the company shall
be subrogated to all the insured's right
of recovery therefore, against any person or organization, and the insured
shall execute and deliver instruments
and papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such rights. The insured shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights." (Emphasis added.)
In our opinion under this clause it could
be possible that the insurance company
could collect an amount in excess of what
was paid out to the insured. That will not
be permitted. The insurance company can
only be permitted to be subrogated for the
amount paid out to insured.
Respondent asserts that equity dictates
the need for subrogation. It cites Skauge
v. Mountain States Tel & Tel. (1977), 172
Mont. 521, 565 P.2d 628, to support this
claim. In Skauge, this Court permitted
subrogation of a claim fcr damages to personal property that resulted from defendant's negligence. We said subrogation
may occur after the insured has been made
whole for his entire loss.
Respondent argues that public policy requires subrogation in this case. If this
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Court precluded subrogation of claims
against uninsured motorists, then the uninsured motorist would probably benefit.
Once the insured plaintiff receives the insurance compensation for the accident, it is
less likely he will pursue litigation against
the uninsured motorist. Therefore, subrogation enhances the chances that the uninsured motorist will pay for his wrongdoing,
and promote the policy requiring motorists
to carry insurance.
As noted above, the controlling issue
here is one of public policy. We hold that
an uninsured motorist carrier can make
payment to an insured, and when the insured settles his claim or obtains a judgment against a third party, the carrier can
subrogate and collect back the amount paid
to the insured. Further, the uninsured motorist carrier can require that the action be
instituted in the name of the insured
against the uninsured motorist in order to
effectuate the subrogation interest of the
uninsured motorist carrier. But said action
must not impair, diminish or jeopardize insured's ability to recover any dam^es in
excess of the subrogation amount. If a
subrogation occurs, then the uninsured motorist carrier must, in good faith, seek for
the insured any other damages (general,
special or punitive) that he may not have
received in his payment from the carrier.
While it is argued that this issue hinges
on this Court's interpretation of Reitler,
where we denied subrogation to medical
payment coverage, we believe that public
policy demands that our holding in that
case is limited to medical payment coverage.
Appellants' reliance on Cody, supra, also
cited in Reitler for the proposition that
Montana has long opposed assignment of
personal injury claims, is unfounded.
Cody never dealt with the issue of assignment. That case only involved an issue of
attachment.
"In their briefs and argument on this
question, counsel for both sides have devoted considerable time and space to the
question of whether such a cause of action is assignable, or whether it survives
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the death of the person in whom it reposes. As we view the case, these matters
have no relevancy to the real issue
presented here. The only question to be
determined is whether a cause of action
for personal injuries is subject to attachment before judgment is rendered thereon." 100 Mont at 500, 50 P.2d at 250.
In the second issue, appellants claim that
because subrogation cannot occur, then respondent cannot be a real party in interest.
They cite Rule 17(a), M.R.Civ.P, that
"[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest . . . "
The lack of a real party in interest renders
the judgment void. A void judgment is
always subject to collateral attack as provided in Rule 60(b)(4), M.R.Civ.P.
Due to the fact we find the subrogation
is proper, we will not treat the second issue
due to mootness.
The District Court properly found such
judgment valid. We hereby affirm.
HASWELL, C.J., and GULBRANDSON,
J., concur.
SHEA, J., dissents and will file opinion
later.
MORRISON, Justice, specially concurring:
I concur in the result but for a different
reason.
This action was initiated by Farmers Insurance Exchange filing a complaint
against Mark Allen Christenson, Roland J.
Christenson and Karense M. Christenson
seeking to recover damages in the sum of
$7,000. The record reflects that proper
service was had upon defendants and they
failed to appear. A default judgment was
entered on July 29, 1982. Defendant's motion to vacate judgment was not filed until
January 11, 1983, some 166 days later.
Defendants acknowledge that the default
judgment cannot be set aside upon any
grounds other than that the judgment is
void.
Christensons argue that the damages
sought bv Farmers Insurance Exchange
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resulted from an unlawful assignment of &
personal injury claim belonging to Farmers
assignor. This argument was urged in the
District Court and the District Court ruled
against Christensons. The District Court
based its ruling on the merits of the legal
argument. The District Court held that
Farmers' claim rested on a valid subrogation interest.

On May 28, 1981, we stated it was invalid
in Montana to assign a personal injury
claim against a tortfeasor to a subrogee.
Today, in 1984, we permit such assignment.
The Court today is approving the assignment, in the name of subrogation, of a
personal injury claim so the insurer can sue
as the real party in interest. No statute
supports the Court's action.

The District Court should not have
reached the merits. There simply is no
basis for arguing that the judgment entered July 29, 1982 was void. The District
Court clearly had jurisdiction of both the
subject matter of the action and of the
parties personally. When a court has jurisdiction then a judgment can only be collaterally attacked if the court's action involves a "plain usurpation of power." 1
Moore's Federal Practice, § 60.25[2].

The facts of the case must first be understood. On June 6, 1981, Mark Allen Christenson, 17 years old, was operating a 1968
Ford motor vehicle owned by Eric T. Christenson. Mark's passenger in the automobile was Kristine N. Hinckley, a minor at
the time. The automobile overturned on a
county road in Yellowstone County and
Kristine suffered personal injuries.

HfcYfc \t \s> dfcfcY that the )\idgrc\eY\t of the
District Court cannot be collaterally attacked. Christenson's motion to set aside
the default judgment is not timely. This
Court cannot reach the merits involving
validity of Farmers' subrogation interestsI vote to affirm.
WEBER, Justice, specially concurs as
follows:
I concur in the result reached in the
majority opinion for the reasons set forth
in the foregoing special concurrence of Justice Morrison. I therefore vote to affirm.
SHEEHY, Justice, dissenting:
I dissent.
The ancients tell us that Aeneas descended with the Sibyl to the melancholy regions
of the dead. He was shown, near the rivet
of oblivion, a place of torment for one who
perverts the law, making it say one thing
today and another tomorrow.
I am not implying that by this decision
the members of the majority will go to
Hades. That is not in my jurisdiction. I
am implying that the members of the majority should look over their shoulders to
the past and their earlier pronouncements.
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Mark Allen Christenson, the driver, was
the minor son of Roland J. and Karense M.
Christenson. Mark's parents, in compliance with Montana law, had agreed to assume Mark's liability so that he could get a
driver's license. These parents undoubtedly did not realize, and I am sure that most
parents do not realize, that m Montana,
when they assume full liability for the issuance of a driver's license to a minor
person, they are on the legal hook for
absolute liability without limit if the minor
person is driving an uninsured^ vehicle
which injures someone, or if their own policy of liability insurance does not follow the
minor when he drives a non-owned automobile.
In this case, the minor was driving an
automobile owned by Eric T. Christenson,
a brother, and not owned by his parents.
It is quite possible (we have no record on
this point) that the parents here had a
policy of liability insurance, which would
follow Mark and provide him coverage, unless the automobile Mark was driving was
owned by a member of the same household,
but was not insured under the parents'
policy. In that situation, the parents' policy of insurance coverage does not follow
the minor driver.
Because of this unfortunate situation,
the net result to the parents of Mark Allen
Christenson is that they will probably be
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called upon to pay the judgment required
now by the majority of this Court. While
the parents were always at risk to Kristine,
if she were injured through Mark's driving
an uninsured vehicle, the parents were never at risk to her insurer until the majority
opinion of this Court.
At the time of the collision, Kristine N.
Hinckley was insured by Farmers Insurance Exchange, probably through a policy
of automobile liability insurance owned by
her parents, Dan K. and Rae D. Hinckley.
The policy of insurance owned by the
Hinckleys with the Farmers Insurance Exchange provided uninsured motorists coverage as is required in Montana. Farmers
Insurance Exchange, without suit, entered
into a settlement agreement with the parents of Kristine Hinckley for the sum of
$7,000. It should be remembered that
when an automobile accident occurs to
which an uninsured motorist coverage applies, the insurance company becomes an
adversary of its own insured, taking the
part jf the uninsured motorist as against
its insured in negotating a settlement.
On February 10, 1982, Dan K. Hinckley,
as the father and conservator of the estate
of Kristine and Rae D. Hinckley as her
mother, entered into a release agreement
with Farmers Insurance Exchange for the
sum of $7,000, which release contains the
following language.
"NOW THEREFORE the undersigned,
individually, as father of Kristine Hinckley and as conservator of the estate of
Kristine N. Hinckley, protected person,
in consideration of the payment of Seven
Thousand Dollars ($7,000.00) received by
him, does hereby forever release and discharge Farmers Insurance Exchange and
Farmers Insurance Group, its agents,
and employees, of and from any and all
claims and causes of actions of every
kind and character arising out of the
injuries to Kristine Hinckley on or about
June 6, 1981. The parties expressly
agree, in the event that Kristine Hinckley or Dan K. Hinckley, as her guardian,
successfully pursue any claim against
the driver of the automobile, Mark Allen

Christenson, Farmers Insurance Exchange shall become subrogated to and
entitled to indemnity for the payment
made, namely Seven Thousand Dollars
($7,000.00)."
Note please that the language in the
release instrument does not constitute a
transfer of the cause of action, but instead
is a conditional provision for indemnity in
the event that either Kristine or her guardian presses a claim against the uninsured
motorist. No mention is made in the release of a suit by the insurance company,
acting for itself, against the parents of
Mark Allen Christenson.
This is not the first release that the
Hinckley's signed for Farmers Insurance
Exchange, but I will discuss that later in
this dissenting opinion.
Farmers Insurance Exchange, instead of
following the language of its release,
above, and allowing Kristine Hinckley or
her guardian to pursue the personal injury
claim against Mark and his parents, chocc
instead to file its action in its own name
directly in the District Court for the $7,000
it paid on Kristine's claim. It took a default judgment. Some nine months after
the default judgment was entered, the financial responsibility division of the Montana Highway Patrol suspended the driver's license of the father of Mark Christenson. It was this unlooked-for incident that
triggered the motion of the parents of
Mark to set aside the default judgment
obtained against them in favor of Farmers
Insurance Exchange on the ground that the
assignment of a personal injury claim is
invalid in Montana.
The assignment of a personal injury
claim based on tort in Montana is indeed
invalid, or was until now. That a personal
injury claim could not be assigned was
established in Caledonia Insurance Co. v.
Northern Pacific Railroad Co. (1905), 32
Mont. 46, 79 P. 544. There Judge Holloway noted the distinction that a right of
action growing out of a violation of property rights was assignable, but a right of
action growing out of the violation of a
purely personal right was not. As recently
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as May 28, 1981, this was the law in Montana. This Court affirmed that position in
All-State Insurance Co. v. Reitler and
Farmers Insurance Exchange (Mont.
1981), 628 P.2d 667, 6?0, 38 St.Rep. 821,
824-25 (authored by Morrison, J., and concurred in by Haswell, C.J., Harrison, Shea,
and Weber, J.). In that case it is stated:
"Montana has long opposed the assignment of personal injury claims (citing a
case). Whether an insurance policy provides for subrogation [as in this case] or
provides that the carrier has a lien on the
proceeds of an insured's third party recovery, that policy has the effect of assigning a part of the insured's right to
recovery against a third party tortfeasor.
We hold that such an assignment is invalid." (Material in brackets added.)
As I have pointed out above, the release
agreement does not permit Farmers Insurance Exchange to sue in its own name
against the tortfeasor, since the release
agreement is one for indemnity between
the insurance company and its insured. If
Farmers Insurance Exchange has an independent right of subrogation at all it must
come from its insurance policy issued to
the Hinckleys which includes the following
clause:
"Subrogation. In the event of any payment under this policy, this company
shall be subrogated to all the insured's
right of recovery therefor, against any
person or organization, and the insured
shall execute and deliver instruments
and papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such rights. The insured shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights."
This is the clause on which Farmers Insurance Exchange claims the right to sue
as the real party in interest against the
tortfeasor for the insured's right of recovery, and against all persons or organizations from whom recovery might be obtained, including the parents of the uninsured driver. That constitutes a transfer
of the personal injury claim of Kristine
Hinckley. The clause appears in the general provisions of the insurance policy, and
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not on the insured motorist endorsement
itself. I recognize that a general subrogation clause is necessary in an insurance
policy because the company has a right of
subrogation for property damage payments
for which it might make. There is no quarrel in Montana about that. Applying the
clause however to personal injury claims
paid for under the endorsement was invalid
at the time of the issuance of the policy
because of this Court's long standing position that personal injury claims could not
be assigned or subrogated. It is this
clause upon which Farmers Insurance Exchange right of action must stand or fall.
The majority members are injudicious in
permitting Farmers' action here on at least
the following grounds:
(1) The Court has no statutory authority to
permit it; (2) The Court fails to distinguish
between subrogation proper and assignment; (3) Farmers' action is not a bar to
further suits by the Hinckleys against the
tortfeasor; and (4) The insurer's action is
improper when the insured is not fully compensated; and (5) There will be no accompanying reduction in the premiums Montanans pay for uninsured motorist coverage.
(1) Lack of Statutory

Authority

In the absence of statutory authority
permitting subrogation of uninsured motorist coverage claims we should scruple to
permit subrogation. Other states have
adopted such permitting legislation. An
analysis of cases rising in other states,
under permissive statutes, reveals a number of incidental questions relating to subrogation that require legislation to solve.
Waiting for legislative direction in the field
would undoubtedly help close the avenues
to some needless litigajon in our state
opened up by the majority.
In examining the statutes of other states
within the Pacific Digest system, we find
Arizona (Section 20.259.01 Ariz.Stat), Colorado (Colo.Rev.Stat. § 10-4-609), Hawaii
(Section 431-448 HRS), and Utah (Section
41-12-21.1 UC) have provisions nearly the
same as ours (Section 33-23-201, MCA).
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No hint of subrogation is found in those
statutes.
The California legislature has adopted
the following provision (Section 11 580.2(7)(g)):
"Subrogation.
The insurer paying a
claim under an uninsured motorist indorsement or coverage, shall be entitled
to be subrogated to the rights of the
insured to whom such claim was paid
against any person causing such injury
or death to the extent that the payment
was made . . . "
Note that the California provision provides for subrogation not only against the
uninsured motorist but against "any person causing such injury or death." This
means that joint and several tortfeasors
can be made to respond in subrogation to
an insurer who has made a payment under
the uninsured motorist coverage.
In California, however, the right of the
subrogating insurer to collect from others
in sublimated to the right of the injured
party to be made whole. Thus, if the injured party is not fully compensated by the
recovery of the limits of the uninsured
motorist coverage, and has an action
against other joint tortfeasors, the insurer
making payment under the uninsured motorist coverage has no right of subrogation
until the injured party has been made
whole from the other tortfeasors. United
Pacific-Reliance Insurance Companies v.
Kelly (1983), 140 Cal.App.3d 72, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 323; Security National Insurance
Co. v. Hand (1973), 31 Cal.App.3d 227, 107
Cal.Rptr. 439. The majority opinion in this
case ignores this restrictive provision protecting insureds.
In the case we are deciding here, the
general grant of authority for subrogation
by the majority of this Court to the insurer
does not take into account the result as to
joint tortfeasors. I submit the legislature
should decide such issue.
Here is the other side of the joint tortfeasor coin: In Washington, section 48.22.040(3), R.C.W., provides:
"In the event of payment to an insured
under the coverage required by this

chapter and subject to the terms and
conditions of such coverage, the insurer
making such payments shall, to the extent thereof, be entitled to the proceeds
of any settlement or judgment resulting
from the exercise of any rights of recovery of such insured against any person
or organization legal responsible for the
bodily injury for which such payment
made, . . . "
In Hawaiian Insurance and Guaranty
Company v. Mead (1975), 538 P.2d 865,
869, the Washington Appellate Court held
that the statute provided subrogation only
against the uninsured motorist, the person causing the damage, and no right of
recovery existed against other parties.
The Washington decision recites that four
states, Mississippi, Michigan, Missouri, and
Georgia have held likewise. The majority
in this case permit suit by the insurance
company against the parents of the uninsured driver
Subrogation is founded upon the equitable theory that one who pays the legal
obligation of another should stand in the
shoes of the payee to recover the payment
from the one who should have made payment. That makes equitable sense. The
five states which limit the right of recovery^
in subrogation against the uninsured motorist, and no others, recognize that the
theory on which subrogation is founded
should not be extended to grant a right of
recovery against parties who have not participated in the condition of being uninsured. Again the majority has deficiently
considered the implications of its majority
decision in this case with respect to third
parties, other than the uninsured motorist.
In section 743.795 ORS, tne state of Oregon is careful to keep the light of action in
the insured, not the company, in the event
of payment under an uninsured motorist
coverage. Its statute sets out clauses to
be included in the policy of motor vehicle
insurance including 11(a) "the insurer shall
be entitled to the extent of such payment
to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment that may result from the exercise of
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any rights of recovery of such person
against any uninsured motorist . . . "
Clause 11(b) provides that "such person
shall hold in trust for the benefit of the
insurer all rights of recovery which he may
have against the uninsured person . . . "
Clause 11(c) allows recovery to be made
from joint tortfeasors. Clause 11(e) provides the insured shall bring action against
the uninsured motorist or other parties if
the insured is requested to do so by the
insurer.
Clearly Oregon still observes the common law sanction against assignment of
personal injury claims.
The statutes of Kansas (Kan.Stat.Ann.
§ 40-287), Idaho (Idaho Code § 41-2505),
Washington (Wash.Rev.Code § 48-22-030),
and Wyoming (Wyo.Stat. § 31-10-104)
point to another interesting result. In
those states where the statutes are nearly
the same, it is provided that the insurer
making a payment on the uninsured motorist coverage, "shall, to that extent, be entitled to the proceeds of any settlement or
judgment resulting from the exercise of
any right of recovery" against a responsible party. Each of those statutes goes on
to provide that the insurer shall have a
direct right of action only if the insurer is
required to make an uninsured motorist
payment by virtue of the insolvency of the
motorist. It may be deduced from the
terms of these statutes that the right to
sue remains in the insured, subject to reimbursement of the insurer making payment
after judgment or settlement, but a direct
right of action to the insurer is given where
the responsible motorist is insolvent
against his insolvent estate.
From the foregoing, it can be seen that
the issue is not simply should the Court
without statutory authority, allow subrogation of uninsured motorist coverage payments and direct action therefore by the
insurer. The related problems are too complex to be answered by a court in a single
case and the whole subject should be decided by the legislature.
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(2) The majority failed to distinguish
between subrogation and assignment.
The gist of the issue in this case is
whether Farmers can bring a direct action
against the uninsured motorist and his
guarantors. This Court noted in Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Reitler, supra, that a
subrogation which results in a transfer of
the cause of action to the insurer, is in
effect an assignment and not subrogation.
The distinction should be kept clearly in
mind. There is, of course, no reason why
Farmers should not be able to recover to
the extent it made payment its settlement
under the uninsured motorist coverage
clause, if that recovery is made by the
insureds. Certainly that is what the release which Farmers took from the Hinckleys contemplated. I would agree if the
majority held that the subrogation clause
on an automobile policy merely asserted a
r\ght to YembuYseYTiertt, w>ritY\bution OY indemnity, but I cannot agree that the insurer became the owner of the cause of action.
Idaho, in Rinehart v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. (1974), 96 Idaho 115, 524
P.2d 1343, was careful to riuce that distinction.
If Farmers according to its release was
simply seeking to recover here to the extent of its payment from any judgments or
settlement received in the name of the
Hinckleys, I would have no quarrel with its
right to such recovery. When it insists on
the right to sue directly, in its own name,
as a real party in interest, its subrogation
becomes an assignment. In Fifield Manor
v. Finsten (1960), 54 Cal.2d 632, 7 Cal.Rptr.
377, 354 P.2d 1073, the California Supreme
Court was careful to preserve the distinction and to refuse subrogation where no
statutory authority for the assignment of
the cause of action existed.
(3) Farmers action against the uninsured motorist is not a bar to further
action by the Hinckley's.
An excellent reason for refusing at this
juncture, in the absence of legislative action, to permit direct suit by insurers who
have made payments under uninsured motorist coverage is that such direct suits do
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not bar further action by the injured parties against the same uninsured motorist or
his guarantors. Thus, the cause of action
is split, which goes against the grain of all
jurisprudential sense and finality.
This case is an excellent illustration. Attached as an appendix is a copy of the
release obtained by Farmers in this case.
In the second "whereas" clause, it is noted
that the policy issued to the Hinckleys included uninsured motorist and medical payments coverages. In view of those coverages, it is curious that the release also
includes the following paragraph:
"In this regard, the parties agree that
the original release, dated September 16,
1981, was incorrect so far as the recitations therein concerning the insurance
provisions under which the $7,000 payment was made. It is now expressly
understood that the sum of $7,000 was
paid pursuant to the uninsured motorist
coverage."
The release goes on to say, however, that
the $7,000 payment is full and final payment of every kind of claim against Farmers Insurance Group by the Hinckleys, presumably including medical coverage payments.
Two possibilities exist with respect to the
release: (1) payment was made exclusively
under the uninsured motorist coverage, and
no payment was made to the Hinckleys
under the medical payment provision. In
such case, Hinckleys have the right to recover medical expenses against the uninsured motorist or his guarantors. Thus,
permitting Farmers to recover on the uninsured motorist coverage and the Hinckleys
to recover on the medical payments expenses constitutes a splitting of the cause
of action. (2) Or, the medical payments
were subsumed by Farmers in the single
payment of $7,000. In that event, Farmers
is suing for medical benefits paid, under
medical payments coverage, which, under
our holding in Reitler, is invalid in Montana.
Of course, the statute of limitations may
now have run as far as the Hinckley suit
against the uninsured motorist is con-
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cerned, but at the time of the taking of the
release here in question, only seven months
had elapsed. Again, this Court should consider the rule in California, quoted above,
that the insurer has no right of subrogation where an insured has not been fully
compensated. I would hope that we would
continue the rule adopted in Skauge v.
Mountain States Tel and Tel Co. (1977),
172 Mont, 521, 565 P.2d 628, 632, to the
effect that when an insured has sustained a
loss in excess of the reimbursement by the
insurer, the insured is entitled to be made
whole for his entire loss and any cost of
recovery including attorneys fees before
the insurer can assert its right of legal
subrogation against the insured or the tortfeasors.
(4) Action by the insurer would be improper where the insured is not fully
compensated.
We have cited the California cases above,
and Skauge, our case, indicating that subrogation is not available to an insurer unless the insured is fully compensated.
When, as in this case, a right is granted to
an insured to bring direct action, there will
be a race to the courthouse between the
insurer and the insured to achieve a first
recovery. That is the inevitable result of
splitting a cause of action.
It should be a matter of embarrassment
to this Court, and to the law firm involved,
that the arguments made in this case, and
the stance adopted by this Court, are exactly opposite to the arguments and stances
adopted in Reitler, supra. In Reitler, the
same law firm then representing Farmers
Insurance Exchange filed a brief in this
case in which it urged upon this Court that
we had expressly recognized the rule that
causes of action against personal injury are
not assignable. It cited in support of that
proposition Coty v. Cogswell (1935), 100
Mont. 496, 50 P.2d 249; Toole v. Paumie
Parisian Dye House (1935), 101 Mont. 74,
52 P.2d 162; Baker v. Tullock (1938), 106
Mont. 375, 77 P.2d 1035; Caledonia Insurance Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (1905),
32 Mont. 46, 79 P. 544; and 40 A.L.R.2d
480, relating to assignability of claims for
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personal injury, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 547.
Now, three years later, the same law
firm and the same insurance company take
an opposite stance, and in the name of
public policy, ask this Court to reverse
without statutory authority our longstanding position with respect to the non-assignability of personal injury claims. Farmers
argued and the majority swallowed, that
public policy in providing insurance on all
motor vehicles in the state is enhanced by
allowing insurers to bring direct actions
against uninsured motorists! It should be
evident to all of us that Farmers is not
going to sue uninsured motorists who are
judgment-proof. It is only because in this
case the parents signed a liability form for
Mark that suit had been brought in this
case. Insurance companies are not eleemosynary institutions. There are no more
apt to chase good money after bad than
any other party.
(5) There will be no accompanying reduction in premiums Montanans pay for
uninsured motorist coverage.
The right of subrogation granted by the
majority in this case is complete gravy to
the insurance company. Subrogation is not
a factor used by insurance companies in
determining the rate of premiums charged.
Arizona took note of this fact in refusing to
make any distinction between assignment
and subrogation with respect to the right
of the insurer to recover. It held in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Durke (1978), 118
Ariz. 301, 576 P.2d 489, 492:
"Also, to require an injured policy holder
to return to his insurer the benefits for
which he has paid premiums is to deny
him the benefits of his thrift and foresight. In terms of public policy the only
justification for allowing an insurance
company to recoup the benefits it contracted to pay out in exchange for the
receipt of premium payments which are
presumably actuarially adequate would
be the lowering of premium rates as the
result of such a recoupment. This is
generally not the case:
683 P 2d—30
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" 'Subrogation is a windfall to the insurer, it plays no part in the rate schedules
(or only a minor one), and no reduction is
made in insuring interest . . where the
subrogation right will obviously be worth
something.' Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law at 151-152 (2d ed. 1957)
(citing authority)." 576 P.2d at 492.
Thus, although the majority has opened
up to insurance companies a right of subrogation to sue in its own name wherever it
might make recovery, not only against uninsureds, but against other parties, no accompanying benefit will accrue in the form
of reduced premiums to be paid by Montanans for their uninsured motorist coverage.
The insurers will collect the same amount
of money from us for that coverage whether or not we permit subrogation.
Insurers can rejoice in that. Subrogation
is not factored in by insurers when they set
the premiums for uninsured motorist coverages. The loss cost is spread among the
policy holders without regard to subrogation. Montanans won't see a drop in uninsured motorist coverage premiums because
of this decision. The> w\\\ see a proliferation of lawsuits by insurers "enforcing
public policy" as the majority believes, to
collect that gravy.
The term "law" can be defined as that
group of principles and precedents which, it
may be fairly predicted, a court will apply
to a given set of facts. Predicability is of
the essence. A court which swings unpredictably from one end of the spectrum to
the other, not pausing at any shades between, is not applying law. It is acting as
no more than an ad hoc committee.
I would reverse and dismiss.
APPENDIX
PLAINTIFFS EXHIBIT B
RELEASE
WHEREAS, on June 6, 1981, Kristine
Hinckely received injuries when the automobile in which she was riding as a passenger, which automobile was operated by
Mark Allan Christenson, on County Road
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APPENDIX—Continued
L745 near the junction with Fly Creek
Road went out of control, left the road, and
overturned. Said automobile driven by
Mark Allan Christenson was uninsured;
and
WHEREAS, the undersigned Dan K.
Hinckley holds a policy of insurance issued
by Farmers Insurance Exchange which includes uninsured motorist coverage and a
medical payment provision; and
WHEREAS, the undersigned Dan K.
Hinckley was appointed conservator of the
estate of Kristine Hinckley, and in his individual capacity as father and as conservator of the estate of Kristine Hinckley, his
minor daughter, has now agreed upon a
full and final settlement with Farmers Insurance Exchange and Farmers Insurance
Group;
NOW, THEREFORE, the undersigned,
individually, as father of Kristine Hinckley,
and as conservator of the estate of Kristine
Hinckley, protected person, in consideration of the payment of Seven Thousand and
no/100 Dollars ($7,000.00), received by him,
does hereby forever release and discharge
Farmers Insurance Exchange and Farmers
Insurance Group, its agents, and employees, of and from any and all claims and
causes of action of every kind and character arising out of the injuries to Kristine
Hinckley on or about June 6, 1981. The
parties expressly agree, in the event that
Kristine Hinckley or Dan K. Hinckley, as
her guardian, successfully pursue any
claim against the driver of the automobile,
Mark Allan Christenson, Farmers Insurance Exchange shall become subrogated to
and entitled to indemnity for the payment
made, namely $7,000.00.
In this regard, the parties agree that the
original release, dated September 16, 1981,
was incorrect so far as the recitations
therein concerning the insurance provisions
under which the $7,000 payment was made.
It is now expressly understood that the
sum of $7,000 was paid pursuant to the
uninsured motorist coverage.
It is the intent hereof that all claims of
every kind and character against Farmers
Insurance Group and Farmers Insurance

Exchange be hereby fully and finally compromised and settled.
This release is given pursuant to an order of the District Court of the Thirteenth
Judicial District of the State of Montana, in
and for the County of Yellowstone.
Dated this 10 day of February, 1982.
/ s / Dan K. Hinckley
Dan K. Hinckley, individually as
father, and as conservator of the
estate of Kristine Hinckley, protected person.
/ s / Rae D. Johnson Hinckley
Rae D. Johnson Hinckley, mother
of Kristine Hinckley, protected
person.

Molly STRONG, Petitioner
and Appellant,
v.
Billy Ray WEAVER, Respondent
and Respondent.
No. 83-424.
Supreme Court of Montana.
Submitted on Briefs April 18, 1984.
Decided July 23, 1984.
Mother appealed an order of the District Court, Flathead County, Michael
Keedy, J., modifying previous child custody
order. The Supreme Court, Shea, J., held
that since there was no visitation hearing,
no finding in order that modification was in
the "best interest" of the child, and no
findings and conclusions to support order,
remand was necessary.
Vacated and remanded.
1. Infants <®=>19.3(5)
Ultimate finding of trial court that
modification of custody decree would be in
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TUCKETT,

25 Utah 2d 310
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
David Craig CARLSEN, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 11876.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 5, 1971.

Defendant was convicted before the
First District Court, Cache County, Lewis
Jones, J., of attempted second-degree burglary, and he appealed. The Supreme Court,
Tuckett, J., held that where trial court
directed clerk to furnish defendant true
and complete copy of documents, minute
entries and transcript of proceedings without cost to him and where defendant was
notified that transcript filed in Supreme
Court would be made available to him for
purpose of aiding him in appeal, conviction for attempted second-degree burglary
was not improper on ground that trial
court failed to furnish defendant without
cost copies of minute entries and transcript
of proceedings of his trial.
Affirmed.

Utah

739

P.2d 739

Justice:

The defendant was found guilty of attempted second-degree burglary, and from
the verdict and the judgment of the court
sentencing the defendant to a term in the
Utah State Prison he has appealed. The
sole basis of the defendant's appeal is
that the trial court failed to furnish him
without cost copies of minute entries and
a transcript of the proceedings of his trial.
The record belies defendant's contention
in that it shows that the court below did in
fact make an order directing the clerk to
furnish the defendant a true and complete copy of the documents, minute entries
and a transcript of the proceedings without cost to the defendant. The record also
shows that the defendant was notified that
the transcript filed in this court would be
made available to him for the purpose of
aiding him in this appeal.
It appears that the defendant's contentions before this court are without merit
and the verdict and judgment of the court
below are affirmed.
CALLISTER, C. J., and H E N R I O D ,
E L L E T T and CROCKETT, JJ., concur.
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Criminal Law <§=>I077

Where trial court directed clerk to
furnish defendant true and complete copy
of documents, minute entries and transcript
of proceedings without cost to him and
where defendant was notified that transcript filed in Supreme Court would be
made available to him for purpose of aiding him in appeal, conviction for attempted second-degree burglary was not improp* * on ground that trial court failed to furbish defendant without cost copies of minute entries and transcript of proceedings of
n
»s trial.

David Craig Carlsen, pro se.
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Lauren
- Beasley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake
^-lty, for plaintiff and respondent.
N

9J

25 Utah 2d 311
Barbara LYON, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND I N D E M N I TY COMPANY and Yosemite Insurance
Company, Defendants and Appellant.
No. (2068.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 9, 1971.

Injured passenger, after obtaining
judgment against uninsured motorist and
another for injuries sustained in motor vehicle collision, brought action to recover
benefits under uninsured motorist coverage
of two policies. The Third District Court,
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Salt Lake County, Gordon R. Hall, J., entered judgment for the passenger. Her insurer appealed, and she cross-appealed.
The Supreme Court, Callister, C. J., held
that where policy contained uninsured motorist endorsement with limit of $20,000
per person but contained provision that the
endorsement applied only in amount by
which limit of liability exceeded applicable
limit of liability of other similar insurance
and where the passenger recovered under
another policy containing $10,000 uninsured motorist endorsement, the former
policy's excess-escape clause was effective
and the passenger was only entitled to recover on the former policy the difference
between limits of the policies' endorsements notwithstanding uninsured motorist
statute, but that the passenger was entitled
to interest on judgment on the policies only
from time that judgment was rendered
against uninsured motorist and another.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded with order to render judgment in accordance with opinion.
Henriod, J., did not participate herein.
1. Insurance @=>53l.3
Purpose of uninsured motorist statute
is to provide protection only up to minimum statutory limits for bodily injuries
and not to provide insured with greater insurance protection than would have been
available had he been injured by insured
motorist. U.C.A.1953, 41-12-5, 41-12-21.1.
2. Insurance <©=>53l.3
Where one policy contained uninsured
motorist endorsement with limit of $20,000
per person but contained provision that the
endorsement applied only in amount by
which limit of liability exceeded applicable
limit of liability of other similar insurance
and where passenger recovered under another policy containing $10,000 uninsured
motorist endorsement the former policy's
excess-escape clause was effective and the
passenger was only entitled to recover on
the former policy the difference between
limits of the policies' endorsements not-
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withstanding uninsured motorist stati
U.C.A.1953, 41-12-5, 41-12-21.1. ,r f$
3. Insurance <§=>532

Where insured's damages exceed!
policy limits under uninsured motorist c§
erage and insurer was not subject to dol
ble exposure for the insured's medicaid
penses, the insurer was not entitled toll
off amount that it had paid under medi|
payment coverage against amount thai
was deemed liable to pay under uninsur
motorist coverage under provision of<i
cy which stated that insurer was not^bbu
gated to pay under uninsured motorist CQ
erage that part of damage which represe.
ed expenses for medical services. " ;VKij
4. Insurance <§=>606(4)
Where insured remained uncompensL
ed for her total damages, her insurer^"
not entitled to receive $2,000 paid-in
court by insurer of judgment debtor on
sis of former insurer's right of subrogat
for medical payments.
5. Insurance <§=>607.!(8)
i 1«H
Where insurer was not entitled
award from another insurer based on^SU
rogation rights for medical paymc
judgment for $500 attorneys' fees as fot|
er insurer's share of expenses in^repov
ing the medical payments could not Jjejf
1

tained.

\ '$£$
* JH.

6. Interest <S==39(2)
Where insurer's obligation to perlj
under expressed terms of contract, d*||§
arise until there was legal determinatjo
liability of uninsured motorist andjjW
of damages sustained, insured was ^rftj
to interest on judgment against the ii)
under uninsured motorist provision^
from time that judgment was^renj
against uninsured motorist and another^
7. Insurance <§=>602.l
*
Insured was not entitled to dama|
insurer's failure to bargain with n f£j$
tie her claim in connection with unins
motorist.
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^ j j a r o l d G. Christensen, of Worsley, awarded judgment to plaintiff against
Snow & Christensen, Salt Lake City, for Hartford for $20,000, the face amount of
the uninsured motorist coverage in the pol^defendants-appellant.
f
icy it had issued in which plaintiff was a
Robert M. McRae, of Hatch, McRae,
Plaintiff was awarded
Richardson & Kinghorn, Salt Lake City, for named insured.
judgment against Yosemite for $10,000, the
plaintiff-respondent.
maximum coverage contained under its un"David B. Dee and Leonard W. Burinsured motorist endorsement. In addition,
r llingham, Salt Lake City, Utah, Utah Trial
plaintiff was awarded $500 for reasonable
?£awyers Assn., for amicus curiae.
attorneys' fees incurred in assisting Hartford in the recovery of $2,000 medical pay\r CALLISTER, Chief Justice:
ments from Allstate.
Hartford
was
l
awarded the $2,000 under its subrogation
c rfrPlaintiff sustained serious injuries in a
motor vehicle collision. She was a passen- rights for medical payments. The trial
ger in the automobile of one Martinez; court awarded plaintiff interest from the
Yosemite Insurance Company had issued a day of her original judgment except for
liability policy upon this vehicle which con- the $500 attorneys' fees. Hartford appeals,
tained an uninsured motorist endorsement and plaintiff cross-appeals.
in accordance with Sec. 41-12-21.1, U.C.
On appeal, Hartford asserts that under
A.1953, as amended 1967. In a separate
the terms of its policy its obligation to
action plaintiff was granted a jury verdict
plaintiff cannot exceed $10,000, under its
of $70,830.75 against the operators of two
uninsured motorist coverage, which is the
other motor vehicles, who were deemed
difference between the policy limits of
jointly and severally liable. One driver,
Yosemite and Hartford. The Hartford
Robert G. Butcher, was insured with Allpolicy provides:
state, his coverage conformed to the statutory minimum as provided in Sec. 41-12-5,
With respect to bodily injury to an in$10,000 for bodily injury or death to one
sured while occupying an automobile not
owned by the named insured, the insurperson. The other driver, Scott G. Nickel,
ance under Coverage D—Uninsured Mowas an uninsured motorist.
torists shall apply only as excess insurPlaintiff was an insured under a policy
ance over any other similar insurance
issued to her father by Hartford Accident
available to such insured and applicable
and Indemnity Company, which contained
to such automobile as primary insurance,
an uninsured motorist endorsement with a
and this insurance shall then apply only
declared limit of $20,000 per person. In
in the amount by which the limit of liaaddition, plaintiff was covered under a
bility for this coverage exceeds the apmedical expense provision. At the concluplicable limit of liability of such other
sion of the plaintiff's tort action, Allstate,
insurance.
the insurer of Butcher, tendered $10,000,
the limit of its coverage. Plaintiff reIn Russell v. Paulson *• this court upheld
ceived $8,000; the other $2,000 was paid to the validity of an excess-escape ciause conthe clerk of the court because Hartford as- tained in an uninsured motoric provision,
serted subrogation rights to the $2,000 that wherein the insurer was obligated to pay
rt had paid plaintiff under the medical ex- only that amount by which the limits of its
penses coverage.
policy exceeded the limits of all other
Plaintiff initiated the instant action to
recover the benefits under the uninsured
Motorist coverage of both the Yosemite
an
d Hartford policies. The trial court
I. 18 Utah 2d 157,
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available insurance.
In other words,
where the insured is injured in a nonowned vehicle upon which there has been
issued an uninsured motorist endorsement,
L7P.2d658 (1966).
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the coverage to the insured under his policy constitutes excess insurance.
Subsequent to the decision in Russell v.
Paulson, the legislature enacted Sec. 4 1 12-21.1, U.C.A.1953, as amended 1967,
which provides:
Commencing on July 1, 1967, no automobile liability insurance policy insuring
against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death
or property damage suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, shall be
delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed
in this state, with respect to any motor
vehicle registered or principally garaged
in this state, unless coverage is provided
in such policy or a supplement to it, in
limits for bodily injury or death set
forth in section 41-12-5, under provisions filed with and approved by the
state insurance commission for the protection of persons insured thereunder
who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run
motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom. * * *
Plaintiff convinced the trial court that
Sec. 41-12-21.1 indicated a legislative intent to overrule the holding in Russell v.
Paulson; she successfully contended that
this excess-escape clause limited the protection afforded the insured in a manner
contrary to the policy expressed by the legislature and was therefore invalid. Plaintiffs argument is sustained by case authority, for there has been a marked divergence of opinion among the judiciary as to
the proper interpretation jof these uninsured motorist statutes. '''The two views
are succinctly expressed in 28 A.L.R.3d
551, 554 Anno: Uninsured Motorists—
"Other Insurance":
A number of courts have held that
"other insurance" provisions, whether in

the form of a "pro rata," "excess iristif-1
ance," "excess-escape," or other similafi
clause, are invalid as a part of uninsuriSl
motorist protection, on the ground that!
the statute requiring every liability polill
cy to provide this type of protection wittl
not permit the insurer to provide in any!
way that the coverage will not appljjl
where other insurance is also "availaSl
ble," despite the fact that the i n s u r e r
may thus be put in a better position thalp
he would be in if the other motorislj
were properly insured. Other couriP
have stated, however, that the design a n i l
purpose of uninsured motorist statute§|
are to provide protection only up totlS*!
minimum statutory limits for bodily in)t$J
ries, and not to provide the insured witKj
greater insurance protection than wouldj
have been available had he been injured!
by an insured motorist, and have helflf
such "other insurance" provisions "ar
valid where they do not reduce coverag
below the minimum statutory limits.
[1] The latter view appears to be^ij
accord with this State's statutory scheme
Section 41-12-21.1 is part of the Mot
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act;_st
minimum limits of uninsured motorist coy!
erage are correlated with the minimuj
limits of coverage required for an autoind
bile liability policy under Sec. 41-12-5^
C.A.1953^
;.;4|
In Tindall v. Farmers Automobile Ma
agement Corp. 2 the court rejected plwj
tiff's argument that an excess-escaj
clause contained in an uninsured motor
provision violated the Illinois uninsu|
motorist statute (paragraph 755(a) ,•(143a) of Chap. 75, Ill.Rev.Stat. (IH.J
Code)). The court observed that the^stf
utory provision was designed to Pr0J*SL
and encourage protection complementary^
that afforded by the financial responsiw|
ty act, thereby affording coverage' f tO;
same extent as would have been in*ef
if the tort-feasor had complied withj

2. 83 Ill.App.2d 165, 226 N.E.2d 397, 28 A.L.R.3d 546 (1967).
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guarantee a # source fiom which an insured could recover his damages up to
limits of $15,000/$30,000/$5,000 with respect to any accident
*
*
*
*
*
*

requirements of the financial re-

sponsibility act 3
In Martin v Chnstensen, 4 this court
held that the provisions of Sec 41-12-21 1
did not preclude the application of a clause
providing that if the company had issued
inore than ore policy to the insured, the insurer would be liable only up to the maximum coverage of its highest limit of any
one policy for any one accident or loss
This court cited as authority M. F A Mutual Ins Co v Wallace 5 in its rejection of
the argument of insured, that the statute
fixed the minimum coverage under each
policy separately, and, therefore, the insured was entitled to the maximum amount
under both policies
)] In 52 Virginia Law Review 538, 554-557
(1966), there is an incisive critique of the
recent judicial trend of permitting the
stacking of policies, 1 e , the courts have
allowed recovery up to the combined limits
of each policy available to the injured insured b> ruling that "excess" or "other insurance" clauses were invalid The author
asserts that the Uninsured Motorist Acts
are not being applied in a manner which
places the victim of an uninsured motorist
upon an equal footing with the victim of
an insured motorist In reference to the
Virginia Act, the author states

By their application of the Uninsured
Motorist Act, the courts in many instances have placed the innocent victim
of an uninsured motorist in a superior
position to that which he would have occupied if his wrongdoer had had liability
coverage The pendulum has made the
full swing Before the enactment of the
Uninsured Motorist Act, one who had
taken pains to protect the public against
the effect of his own negligence by
carrying insurance was himself left unprotected against the effect of the negligence of an uninsured motorist Toda>
the same person, through his uninsured
motorist endorsement, is usually better
protected and procedurally is in a better
position if the wrongdoer is uninsured

/

In these cases the courts have looked
only to the number of policies available
to pay the judgment obtained against the
uninsured motorist
No thought has
been given to the fact that the act was
intended merely to fill, not overflow, an
insurance vacuum
Surely the General
Assembly did not intend to foster a
scheme whereby the innocent victim of
an insured motorist may be penalized
It seems more logical that it intended to
3

Also see II i n is v Southern Farm Bu
lean Casualty Ins C o , A r k , 448 S W 2d
052 (1970), M F A Mutual Ins Co \
Wallace, 245 Ark 230, 431 S W 2d 742
(19G8) , Jackson v State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins C o , La A p p , 235 So
2d 621 (1970) , Long ^ Lnited States
Fire Ins Co, La A p p , 236 So 2d 521
(1970), M a n land Casualty Co v. Howe,
106 X H 422, 213 A 2d 420 (1965) ,
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/ [2] A careful review of the case law
reveals that the better reasoned cases give
effect to an excess-escape clause contained
in an uninsured motorist endorsement In
the instant action, the trial court erred by
its refusal to apply such a clause in Hartford's policy \Plaintiff is entitled to recover o n l y t h e difference between the limits of the policies issued b> Hartford and
Yosemite, 1 e , $10,000
Defendant, Hartford, further contends
that it is entitled to set off the $2,000 that
it has paid under the medical payments
coverage against the amount that it is
deemed liable to pay plaintiff under the
uninsured motorist coverage
Hartford
cites the following provision in its policy
The company shall not be obligated to
pay under Coverage D—Uninsured Mocontra, More^ock ^ Milleis Mutual Ins
Assn , 125 111 App 2d 2S3, 260 N E 2d
477 (1970), wherein the court, Appellate,
5th District, declined to follow the hold
ings of the other Illinois Appellate Courts
4

22 Utah
(1969)

2d 415, 417, 454 P 2 d

5

Note 3, supra
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torists that part of the damage which the
insured may be entitled to recover from
the owner or operator of an uninsured
highway vehicle which represents expenses for medical services paid or payable under Coverage B—Medical Expense.
A similar provision was interpreted by
the court in Taylor v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co. 6 as follows:
* * * we consider it to be designed
to protect the insurance company from
double exposure for medical payments.
Thus, it prevents an insured whose medical expenses have been paid under the
Medical Payments Coverage from collecting for those medical expenses once
again, in the event that a judgment for
general damages in his favor and against
the insurance company under its t/ninsured Motorist Coverage falls below the
policy limits of that coverage. However,
in a case such as Mr. Taylor's where the
award for general damages exceeds the
policy limits on Uninsured Moton^r Coverage, the insurance company must pay
its insured the full limits of the policy,
in this case $5,000 regardless of what it
has paid him under the Medical Payments Coverage. W e are fortified in
our interpretation of this amendment by
the fact that this is the only just meaning that it could have. Mr. Taylor paid
two separate premiums for two separate
coverages. * * * To interpret the
amendment as the company would have
us do, would make the Medical Payment
Coverage useless except in cases where
the insured suffered physical injury as a
result of his own negligence.
* * *7
[3] In the instant action, plaintiff's
damages exceeded the policy limits under
the uninsured motorist coverage, and Hart6. La.App., 237 So.2d 690, 693 (1970).
7. Also see Hutchison v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 34 A.D.2d 1010,
312 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1970).
8. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Farmers
Exchange, 22 Utah 2d 183, 184, 450 P.
2d 458 (1969).

ford was not subject to double exposufii
for plaintiffs medical expenses. Und
such circumstances, Hartford was not tied to offset the medical payments again
the uninsured motorist coverage.
Plaintiff in her cross-appeal asserts't!
the trial court erred in its award to Har
ford the $2,000 paid into the court by"
state under Hartford's right of subrog
tion for medical payments, when plaintiff
damages far exceed her recovery theref<§
Subrogation springs from equity c<§n
eluding that one having been reimburse
for a specific loss should not be entitle
to a second reimbursement therefo
This principle has been accepted in""|
insurance field with respect to proper
damage, and with respect to medic
costs by an impressive weight of author!?
J-y

%

*

* g

The Hartford policy provides:
In the event of any payment unde
Coverage B—Medical Expense of thil
policy, the company shall be subrogatea|
to all the rights of recovery therefdf
which the injured person or anyone }
ceiving such payment may have again
any person or organization and such^
son shall execute and deliver instrument]
and papers and do whatever else isi.ne
essary to secure such rights. SuchJ j
son shall do nothing after loss to prej
dice such rights.
Since subrogation is an offspring oi£
uity, equitable principles apply, even w_|
the subrogation is based on contract,^
cept as modified by specific provision^
the contract. In the absence of exgre
terms to the contrary, the insured isrej]
tied to be made whole before *he insg*
may recover any portion of che recoy£
from the tort-feasor. 9 If the one respons
ble has paid the full extent of the loss^,
9. Providence Washington Insurance Co.
Hogges, 67 N.J.Super. 475, 171 A.2d 120^
124 (1961) ; First National Bank ^
Lafayette v. Stovall, La.App., 128 '»
2d 712, 717 (1961) ; 46 C.J.S. Insurano
§ L209, p. 155.
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^insured should not claim both sums, and
t'the insurer may then assert its claim to
'subrogation.10
; - [4,5] In the instant action, there are
no terms in this general subrogation clause
which would support Hartford's subrogation claim to the $2,000, while plaintiff remains uncompensated for her total damages. Furthermore, since Hartford is not
entitled to the award, the judgment for
$500 attorneys' fees as Hartford's share
\f expenses in recovering the medical pay,ents cannot be sustained.
Plaintiff further asserts that since this is
an action in contract between an insured
and an insurer, she is entitled to interest
from the date of her loss, the date of the
accident, and not from the date she was
granted judgment against the tort-feasors.
The insurance contract provides:
The company will pay all sums which
the insured shall be legally entitled to re~ cover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.
* * * [Emphasis added.]

Hartford's failure to bargain, she was
compelled to incur legal expenses for
which she is entitled to be compensated.
Plaintiff's analogy is untenable because
of the distinction HI the relationship between a liability insurer arid its insured
and that between the insurer and its insured in connection with an uninsured motorist. In the former situation, the insurer
must act in good faith and be as zealous in
protecting the interests of the insured as it
would be in regard to its own. 12 In the
latter situation, the insured and the insurer
are, in effect and practically speaking,
adversaries. 13
The judgment of the district court is reversed, and this cause is remanded with an
order to render judgment in accordance
with this opinion. Each party should bear
its own costs.
T U C K E T T , E L L E T T and
ETT, JJ., concur.
HENRIOD,
herein.

[6] Since Hartford's obligation to perform, under the express terms of its contract with the insured, did not arise until
there was a legal determination of the liability of the uninsured motorist and the extent of the damages sustained, the insured,
plaintiff, is entitled to interest only from
the time that judgment was rendered
against the tort-feasors.
* [7] Finally, plaintiff contends that the
trial court should have awarded her damages for Hartford's failure to bargain with
her or settle her claim. She concedes that
there is no case in point but asserts that
this court should analogize her situation to
that where a liability insurer refuses in
bad faith to settle a claim with third parties
Within the policy limits and a judgment in
e
*cess of the policy limits is rendered
against the insured. 11 She reasons that by
,0

- McConneli v. Conaway, 62 Ohio App.
335, 23 X.E.2d 970. 971 (1939).

'• Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exchange,
!9 Utah 2d 261, 430 P.2d 576 (1967).

J.,

O

does

not

CROCKparticipate
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25 Utah 2d 319
James P. KNUCKLES, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
METROPOLITAN L I F E INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 12254.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 5, 1971.

Action by insured against insurer for
benefits under policy for loss of sight.
The Seventh District Court, Grand County,
12. Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exchange,
note 11, supra.
13. 7 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, 1970 Supp., § 4331, p. 128.
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Admittedly, damages for inconvenience,
annoyance, discomfort and mental distress
are not capable of precise calculation, although those elements may reflect direct,
immediate, and real injury. In this case the
jury had evidence before it to justify the
award of substantial damages of the type
under consideration. The Branches testified to the emotional distress caused Jeanne
Branch which culminated in her leaving her
husband for a period of three or four
months. In addition to that, the Branches
were forced to truck water onto their property and to take numerous other steps to
counter the nuisance created by Western.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court in all respects
except with respect to the striking of the
award of damages for mental distress, annoyance, and discomfort and remand for
the re-entry of that award in the amount
specified by the jury.
HALL, C.J., and OAKS and HOWE, JJ.,
concur.
DURHAM, J., does not participate herein.

sought to intervene as of right as party
defendant in tort action between its insured
and uninsured motorist tort-feasor. Th^
Second District Court, Weber County, Ronald 0« Hyde, J., denied intervention, and
carrier appealed. The Supreme Court,
Stewart, J., held that carrier could intervene.
Reversed.

1. Parties <s=*40(7)
Automobile liability insurance carrier
providing uninsured motorist coverage may
intervene as of right as party defendant in
tort action between its insured and an uninsured motorist tort-feasor. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 24; U.C.A.1953, 41-12-21.1.
2. Parties <&=*41
In determining whether intervention as
of right is mandated, adequacy of representation generally turns on whether there is
identity or divergence of interest between
potential intervenor and original party and
on whether that interest is diligently represented. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 24, 24(a),
(aX2).
3. Parties <&=>41
In determining whether intervention as
of right is mandated, representation is considered to be inadequate if original party is
not diligent in prosecution or defense of
action or allows default judgment to be
entered. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 24, 24(a),
(a)(2).

Barbara LIMA, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Earl CHAMBERS, Defendant
and Respondent,
v.
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Intervenor and Appellant.
No. 17622.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 26, 1982.
Automobile liability insurance carrier
providing uninsured motorist coverage

4. Parties @=>41
Rule governing intervention as of right
should be Rurally construed to achieve purpose of eli T Jnating unnecessary duplication
of litigation. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 24.
5. Parties <s=>40(7)
Because applicable section requires insurers to assume financial responsibility for
judgments obtained by their insureds
against uninsured motorist tort-feasors and
because of insurer's contractual obligation
which embodies that statutory requirement,
insurer "is or may be bound" by tort judg-
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ment within meaning of rule providing for
intervention of parties as of right. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 24; U.C.A.1953, 41-12-21.1.
6. Parties <s=»48
When intervention is permitted, intervenor must accept pending action as he
finds it; his right to litigate is only as broad
as that of other parties to the action.
7. Trial <s=>127
Identity of intervening insurance company should be made known to jury in tort
action between insured and uninsured motorist tort-feasor, and intervening insurer
must disclose to its insured that their respective interests may be conflicting.
8. Witnesses <s=>196
Intervening insurer in tort action between insured and uninsured motorist tortfeasor must not be allowed to use against
its insured any information whatsoever
gained by reason of insurer-insured relationship.
9. Attorney and Client <s=>20
If intervening insurer in tort action
between insured and uninsured motorist
tort-feasor has obligation to defend insured,
for example as a defendant on counterclaim
by uninsured motorist, insured should be
allowed to choose his own independent
counsel who must then be compensated by
insurer. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 24; U.C.A.
1953, 41-12-21.1.
Timothy R. Hanson, Salt Lake City, for
intervenor and appellant.
David Bert Havas, pro se.
STEWART, Justice:
[1] On this appeal we decide whether an
automobile liability insurance carrier providing uninsured motorist coverage may intervene as of right as a party defendant in
a tort action between its insured and an
uninsured motorist tortfeasor. The trial
court denied intervention; we reverse.
The facts are not in dispute. In July of
1977 plaintiff, Barbara Lima, was involved
in an automobile collision with defendant
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Earl Chambers, an uninsured motorist.
Lima brought a negligence action against
Chambers, an answer was filed, and discovery ensued* Thereafter, Chambers' attorney withdrew from the case. The following day Chambers executed an affidavit
prepared by plaintiff's attorney acknowledging that he was uninsured and admitting that he had caused the collision with
plaintiff Lima. On the basis of that admission, plaintiff moved for and obtained a
summary judgment on the issue of defendant's liability, leaving the question of damages to be decided at trial. Thereafter,
plaintiff's liability insurer, Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Prudential), which is contractually liable for a
judgment against an uninsured motorist,
moved to intervene as a party defendant in
the litigation of the damages issue. Apparently considering our prior decision in Kesler v. Tate, 28 Utah 2d 355, 502 P.2d 565
(1972), to be controlling, the trial court denied the motion to intervene.
Prudential appeals, urging that we overrule Kesler and allow intervention because
(1) it will be bound by a judgment against
the uninsured motorist and denial of intervention therefore violates its constitutional
right to due process; and (2) Rule 24, UtaTi A
R.Civ.P., governing intervention, entitles it
to intervene as of right. Plaintiff Lima
counters that Kesler was decided correctly,
that Prudential has only a potential contractual obligation to plaintiff with no interest in the pending tort action, and therefore, that neither due process nor Rule 24
requires Prudential's intervention.
I.
Utah Code Ann., 1953, § 41-12-21.1 requires that automobile liability insurance
policies include coverage for accidents with
uninsured motorists:
[N]o automobile liability insurance policy
insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or
death or property damage suffered by
any person arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle,
shall be delivered . unless coverage is
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provided in such policy . . . for the protection of persons insured thereunder
who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting
therefrom. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, if an insured is injured by an uninsured motorist, the insured may recover
damages from his own insurance company
upon showing that he is "legally entitled"
to recover those damages from the uninsured tortfeasor. This showing of legal entitlement typically entails a lawsuit against
the uninsured tortfeasor to litigate the issues of liability and damages. A judgment
favorable to the insured fixes the insurer's
contractual duty to satisfy that judgment,
within the policy limits. The insurer is then
left to pursue its subrogation remedy
against the uninsured tortfeasor.
Because of the direct effect of the tort
litigation on the insurer's contractual duty,
both insureds and insurers have sought, under certain circumstances, to involve the
insurer in the tort litigation. Insureds have
pressed for intervention to make the tort
judgment binding on the insurer, and insurers have sought intervention to make certain the tort issues are fully and fairly
litigated. Three different attempts have
been made in this Court to involve an uninsured motorist insurance carrier in the tort
litigation between the insured and the uninsured tortfeasor.
The first attempt was in Christensen v.
Peterson, 25 Utah 2d 411, 483 P.2d 447
(1971). There we held that to avoid the
disclosure of insurance coverage to the jury,
to prevent the mixture of a, eontraet action
with a tort action, and to avoid placing thj
insurer in a position hostile to its own Insured, a plaintiff could not join its insurer
as a party defendant in the tort action
against the uninsured tortfeasor. The following year in Kesler v. Tate, 28 Utah 2d
355, 502 P.2d 565 (1972), we addressed the
precise issue raised again on this appeal:
Whether the insurer may, on its own motion, intervene as a party defendant in the

tort action between the insured and the
uninsured tortfeasor. There we concluded
that Christensen v. Peterson was controlling and, without discussing whether the
requirements of Rule 24 were satisfied, held
that the insurer could not intervene. Most
recently, in Wright v. Brown, Utah, 574
P.2d 1154 (1978), we held that the nonparty
insurer lacked standing to appeal the default judgment entered in favor of the insured against the uninsured tortfeasor.
Thus, one-by-one we have closed all three
doors to possible insurer participation in the
tort litigation and have thereby effectively
precluded the insurer from ensuring that its
contractual obligation is properly and fairly
invoked. As the law now stands, the insurer may not be joined, may not intervene,
and may not appeal. We are here asked to
open only the door of intervention.
11.
The overwhelming majority of courts
have allowed an uninsured motorist insurance carrier to intervene in a tort action
between its insured and an uninsured tortfeasor. See, e.g., Oliver v. Perry, 293 Ala.
424, 304 So.2d 583 (1974); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Brown, 114 Ga.
App. 650, 152 S.E.2d 641 (1966); Wert v.
Burke, 47 Ill.App.2d 453, 197 N.E.2d 717
(1964); Indiana Ins. Co. v. Noble, 148 Ind.
App. 297, 265 N.E.2d 419 (1970); Rawlins v.
Stanley, 207 Kan. 564, 486 P.2d 840 (1971);
Barry v. Keith, Ky., 474 S.W.2d 876 (1971);
State v. Craig, Mo.App., 364 S.W.2d 343
(1963), Dominiei v. State Farm Mut Ins.
Co., 143 Mont. 406, 390 P.2d 806 (1964);
Heisner v. Jones, 184 Neb. 602, 169 N.W.2d
606 (1969); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Pietrosh, 85
Nev. 310, 454 P.2d 106 (1969); Kirouac v.
Healey, 104 N.H. 157, 181 A.2d 634 (1962);
Xee) v. MFA Ins. Co., OM., 553 P.2d 153
(1976); Glover v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins. Co., 225 Tenn. 306, 468 S.W.2d 727
(1971). See also 7 Am.Jur.2d Automobile
Insurance § 331 (1980); Annot, 95 A.L.
R.2d 1330 (1964); Comment, Insurer Intervention in Uninsured Motorist Cases, 55
Ind.LJ. 717 (1980). The weight of these
authorities is sufficient to persuade us to
reevaluate our construction of Rule 24,
upon which the outcome of this case rests.
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Intervention of right is asserted in this
case under Rule 24(aX2).x By the terms of
that rule, an applicant must be allowed to
intervene if four requirements are met: 1)
the application is timely; 2) the applicant
has an interest in the subject matter of the
dispute; 3) that interest is or may be inadequately represented; and 4) the applicant is
or may be bound by a judgment in the
action. The timeliness of the application to
intervene in the hearing on damages in this
case has not been challenged and is deemed
satisfied. The remaining requirements are
discussed in order.
1. To justify intervention, the party
seeking intervention must demonstrate a
direct interest in the subject matter of the
litigation such that the intervenor's rights
may be affected, for good or for ill. In
State v. Craig, Mo.App., 364 S.W.2d 343
(1963), the court stated:
[The required] interest does not include a
mere, consequential, remote or conjectural possibility of being in some manner
affected by the result of the original action. It must be such a direct claim upon
the subject matter of the action that the
intervenor will either gain or lose by direct operation of the judgment to be rendered.
Id. at 346. See also State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Brown, 114 Ga.App.
650, 152 S.E.2d 641, 646 (1966); Commercial
Block Realty Co. v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co., 83 Utah 414, 28 P.2d 1081
(1934).
The court in State v. Craig, supra, held
that an insurer providing uninsured motorist insurance has such a direct and immediate interest because the insurer "should
have the right to dispute the questions
which make it liable on its contract." 364
S.W.2d at 347. Heisner v. Jones, 184 Neb.
602, 169 N.W.2d 606 (1969), relied on that
same interest in allowing intervention:
It is apparent that the questions litigated
[in] the action between the insured and
1. Rule 24(a) Intervention of Right Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action
(2) when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing
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the uninsured tort-feasor, for liability and
damages, are the identical issues which
determine liability of Protective under
the insurance policy ar^ which give rise
to Protective^ contractual duty to pay
the insured. Protective has a direct interest in the matter of litigation within
the meaning of our intervention statute.
169 KW.2d at 611. Vernon Fire and Casualty Ins. Co v. Matney, 170 Ind.App. 45, 351
N.E.2d 60 (1976), identified the interest in
similar terms:
Clearly the basis of the action by Matney [insured] against Vernon [insurer] is
contractual. However, any action on the
contract is inseparably tied to the legal
liability of Thorns [uninsured tortfeasor].
Therefore, the initial action in which the
liability of Thorns is determined is but the
first link m an unbroken chain leading to
the contractual liability of Vernon
Id 351 N.E 2d at 64. See also Continental
Ins. Co. v. Smith, 115 Ga.App. 667, 155
S.E.2d 713, 715 (1967). In requiring the
insurer to pay its insured what th»- Insured
is "legally entitled" to recover from the
uninsured tortfeasor, within the limits of
the insured's policy, the legislature must
have intended that the insurer would "take
whatever legal steps were necessary and
fitting .
to insure that the judgment
against the uninsured motorist . . . was
rendered on legal and sufficient evidence."
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v.
Glover, 113 Ga.App. 815, 820, 149 S.E.2d
852, 856 (1966).
We agree with the reasoning of the authorities cited and conclude that since the
extent of Prudential's contractual liability
to its insured will be determined by the
amount of damages awarded to its insured
in the tort action, Prudential stands to lose
by the operation of that judgment, and
therefore has sufficient interest in that action to justify intervention.
2. The next issue is whether Prudential's interest is or may be inadequately
parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the
action
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represented by the existing parties. Since
Prudential, if allowed, would intervene as a
party defendant, the question is narrowed
to whether the uninsured motorist, Chambers, would adequately represent Prudential's interest in actively litigating the issue
of damages. Prudential argues that its interest is inadequately represented because
Chambers lacks the assistance of counsel
and proposes to litigate the damages issue
pro se. Because of Chambers' ready admission of liability resulting in the summary
judgment establishing Chambers' liability,
Prudential has a reasonable basis for anticipating that the damages issue will not be
fully and fairly litigated without Chambers'
personal liability for the judgment provides
sufficient incentive to keep the damages
low. Lima also argues that the burden of
proof placed ot\ him, coupled with the close
supervision of the trial court, will ensure a
just judgment.
[2] Adequacy of representation generally turns on whether there is an identity or
divergence of interest between the potential intervenor and an original party and on
whether that interest is diligently represented. Alsbach v. Bader, Mo.App., 616
S.W.2d 147,151 (1981); Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d
1412 (1962). Generally, where the applicant's interest is different from that of an
existing party, the applicant's interest is
not represented. While Prudential's interest appears on the surface to be the same as
Chambers', the interests are likely divergent. Chambers' primary interest appears
to be not in minimizing damages, but in
bringing the whole matter to a close as soon
as possible, with little regard for the
amount of damages awarded. In this case,
litigation of the damage issue by Chambers
on a pro se basis does not provide adequate
representation of Prudential's interest. Although Chambers will be personally liable
for the judgment and technically obligated
to reimburse Prudential, that does not suffice to assure adequate representation of
Prudential's interest.
[3] Closely related to the question of
similarity of interests is whether the interest of the applicant, even if assumed to be

represented, is represented diligently. Representation is considered to be inadequate if
the original party is not diligent in the
prosecution or defense of the action or allows a default judgment to be entered.
Annot, 84 A.L.R.2d 1412 at § 5 (1962).
The close cooperation between plaintiff and
defendant in resolving the liability issue in
this case evidences an absence of the adverse relationship essential to a full and fair
litigation of the damage issue. Moreover,
whereas a disinterested attitude of counsel
for an uninsured motorist may affect the
diligence of representation, an absence of
counsel for Chambers in the instant case
creates a strong presumption against adequate representation. Proper representation would undoubtedly be hampered further by Chambers' apparent inability to
read.
Finally, we reject plaintiff Lima's argument that a fair result is ensured by her
having to meet the burden of proof and by
court supervision. Neither position has
merit. The burden oi proof requirement is
effective only when a case is actually and
fairly litigated in a truly adversarial trial.
As for court supervision, we need only remark that it is not the role of a judge to be
an advocate. Such a concept is fundamentally contrary to the nature of our adversary system. The court in State v. Craig,
Mo.App., 364 S.W.2d 343 (1963), responded
in like manner to the suggestion that the
interests of a defaulting defendant (and
hence the interests of the potential intervenor) were adequately protected by the
court:
We think the argument that relator's
interest will be "adequately represented"
in respect to Count I because the court
will require proof of plaintiff's cause is
specious. It is not the duty of the trial
court to subpoena and interrogate witnesses who might contradict the testimony of plaintiffs or those who might testify to compelling facts which show that
plaintiff is not "legally entitled to recover" the damages he claims. The court
cannot, and should not, act as attorney
for the defaulting defendants. Every
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practicing lawyer knows that, in so far as
the issues of fact are concerned, the defaulting defendants are not "adequately
represented."
Id. at 346
We therefore conclude that Prudential's
interest is not adequately represented.
3. Finally, we must decide whether Prudential is or may be bound by a judgment
in the tort action. Prudential argues that it
is "probably bound" by a judgment against
the uninsured tortfeasor. Plaintiff Lima
argues that a judgment binds only the defendant Chambers, and not Prudential,
whose contractual obligation is merely triggered by the tort judgment.

bound," clearly contemplates that the rule
should be construed broadly enough to further both fairness and economy in judicial
administration.
[5] We hold that because section 41-1221.1 requires insurers to assume financial
responsibility for judgments obtained by
their insureds against uninsured motorist
tortfeasors (within certain limits), and because of the insurer's contractual obligation
which embodies that statutory requirement,
the insurer "is or may be bound" by the tort
judgment within the meaning of Rule 24.2
Having concluded that the four requirements for intervention of right have been
met, we hold that Prudential should be allowed to intervene in the pending damages
litigation between its insured and the uninsured tortfeasor. Having resolved the issue
at hand on statutory grounds, we need not
address Prudential's constitutional argument concerning denial of due process.

[4] A major conflict of authority exists
on the meaning of the word "bound." Annot, 84 A.L.R.2d 1412 at § 6 (1962). Some
courts have applied a strict interpretation
requiring a showing that the judgment
would be res judicata as to petitioner for
intervention, thus preventing the retrial of
In allowing intervention in this case, we
decided issues. Other courts have applied a
necessarily
overrule Kesler v. Tate, supra,
more liberal construction requiring only a
showing that the applicant would be bound and thereby partially fulfill Chief Justice
in a practical sense. The federal interven- Hall's foreshadowing comment m Wright v.
tion rule and many states' rules have been Brown, supra at 1155, that "the time [could
amended to clear up this ambiguity by de- be] nigh to alter the course of the law as set
leting the "bound" requirement and requir- forth in Christensen v. Peterson and Kesler
ing only that the judgment in some way v. Tate"
impair the applicant's interest. This construction is now applied in the majority of
III.
jurisdictions, either under expressly rewordWe do not hold that in each and every
ed rules of intervention or through a liberal uninsured motorist case intervention must
construction of the term "is or may be be allowed. In each case it will be necesbound." We are of the opinion that Rule 24 sary for the trial judge to make an assessshould be liberally construed to achieve the ment of the adequacy of representation. If
purpose of eliminating unnecessary duplica- the defendant has counsel who actively litition of litigation. Centurian Corp. v. gates the case, intervention may not be
Cripps, Utah, 577 P.2d 955 (1978); Bartholo- appropriate.
mew v. Bartholomew, Utah, 548 P.2d 238
(1976). The language of the rule requiring
[6-9] When intervention is permitted,
only that a petitioner show that he "may be the intervenor must accept the pending ac2. We need not decide whether Prudential might
be bound by the judgment under the doctrines
of res judicata or estoppel That question cannot arise until it is established that there is a
right to intervene Presumably, a nonparty insurer could not be bound in a res judicata sense
unless it had the right and opportunity to intervene and chose not to See Wells v. Hartford
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Accident and Indemnity Co, Mo , 459 S W 2d
253 (1970), Alsbach v Bader, Mo App , 616
SW2d 147 (1981), Domimci v State Farm
Mut Ins Co, 143 Mont 406, 390 P 2d 806
(1964), Allstate Ins Co v Pietrosh, 85 Nev
310, 454 P2d 106 (1969), Indiana Ins Co v
Noble, 148 Ind App 297, 265 N E 2d 419 (1970)
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tion as he finds it; his right to litigate is
only as broad as that of the other parties to
the action. Kg., Beard v. Jackson, Mo.
App., 502 S.W.2d 416, 419 (1973). The identity of the intervening insurance company
should be made known to the jury, and an
intervening insurer must disclose to its insured that their respective interests may be
conflicting.3 The insurer must not be allowed to use against its insured any information whatsoever gained by reason of the
insurer-insured relationship. See Barry v.
Keith, Ky., 474 S.W.2d 876 (1971). Finally,
if the insurer has an obligation to defend
the insured, for example as a defendant on
a counterclaim by the uninsured motorist,
the insured should be allowed to choose his
own independent counsel who must then be
compensated by the insurer.
The order of the trial court denying intervention is reversed and the case remanded
for further proceedings. No costs.
HALL, C.J., and OAKS, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.

O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

In the Matter of the Mental Condition
of Lewis Lee GILES.
No. 17976.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 29, 1982.
Mental patient appealed from ruling of
the Fourth District Court, Utah County,
David Sam, J., ordering his involuntary hospitalization. The Supreme Court, Howe, J.,
held that: (1) the action was not mooted by
3.

defendant's release from the hospital, and
(2) necessary elements for involuntary hospitalization existed at time of patient's commitment hearing.
Affirmed.
Stewart, J., concurred in result.

1. Action @=»6
Doctrine of collateral legal consequences, which is chiefly applied in criminal
cases where absence or presence of those
consequences may determine a criminal's
chance of rehabilitation or recidivism, is
equally applicable to patients of mental hospitals who face similar deprivations of liberty and whose commitment and hospitalization must stand scrutiny on the merits
when challenged.
2. Action <s=»6
In light of collateral consequences that
may have been imposed upon former mental patient were he to have faced future
confrontations with legal system, action
challenging his involuntary civil commitment was not mooted by his release from
hospital.
3. Mental Health e=>439
In mental patient's action challenging
his involuntary hospitalization, there was
evidence from which trial court could have
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that, at
time of his hearing, patient suffered from a
mental illness as defined by statute, posed
an immediate danger of physical injury to
others or himself, and lacked ability to engage in a rational decision-making process
regarding acceptance of mental treatment,
that nj less restrictive alternative existed
to a coirt order of hospitalization, and that
hospital could provide patient with treatment that was adequate and appropriate to
his conditions and needs. U.C.A.1953,
64-7-28(1), 64-7-36X10).

We recognize that some conflict of interests
appears to be inevitable. However, the interest
of fairness and judicial economy outweigh, in
our view, the potential difficulties arising from
a conflict of interest. See, e.g., Oliver v. Perry,
293 Ala. 424, 304 So.2d 583 (1974). Vernon
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Fire and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Matney, 170 Ind.
App. 45, 351 N.E.2d 60, 65 (1976); Alsbach v.
Bader, Mo.App., 616 S.W.2d 147, 153-54
(1981); Heisner v. Jones, 184 Neb. 602, 169
N.W.2d 606, 612 (1969).

